This text is part of a larger project that seeks to understand the conditions of possibility of different forms of social science knowledge. The time frame is what Giovanni Arrighi (1994) has called “the long 20th century” and what Neil Smith (2003) refers to as “the American century”—the period from the late 19th to the early 21st century, during which the US first rose and then fell from the position of the world’s leading power. In the larger project, I suggest that the social sciences in the US are inextricably linked to the process of empire formation, and that they may be divided into three periods, each of which corresponds to a shift in the relationship between the US and its imperial domains. These three periods are: (1) The Formation of Empire (circa 1900-1940; in particular, the period between WW I and WW II); (2) The Consolidation of Empire (circa 1945-1975); and (3) The Reconstitution of Empire (circa 1975-the Present).

During each of these periods, I argue, the social sciences have been characterized by a distinctive “geography of enquiry.” Area studies—the geographic mode of the cold war period—is the best known of these, although the other two also have their own distinct geographic frames. Each of these geographies of knowledge, I seek to show, has been enabled by a historically contingent assemblage (Collier and Ong 2005) of institutional practices and relationships. One of my goals is to focus attention on how and why these global assemblages came into being, and in this was to better understand the powers and interests involved in authorizing different forms of social science knowledge.

The emphasis of the present paper is a little-known but important subject. I focus on the collaboration of the military and the academy during WW II to produce the first comprehensive

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version of area studies—a geography of knowledge well-suited to the military’s desire to impose control upon and stability within the extensive territories being “liberated” from Axis control. Before turning to the fruit of this military/academic collaboration, however, I review briefly the geography of knowledge that emerged prior to WW II. Such a contrast will highlight not only the degree to which war-time area studies represented a radical break with what had come before. It will also point to the distinctive institutions, powers and interests involved in producing knowledge during these two periods.

The Consolidation of Empire: the Social Sciences Between the World Wars

During the opening decades of the 20th century—and especially between the two world wars—a new kind of social science research came into being. Unlike the armchair theorizing that dominated past academic endeavors, the “new” social science was problem-oriented and observation-based. Between the world wars, for the first time literally thousands of young men and women began doing primary research—both field and archive-based. Although the range of topics upon which they focused their energies was quite broad, the research of this era had an important commonality. It was intended by its sponsors to have some bearing on understanding the pressing socio-economic and political problems of the day.

The “new” social science was brought into being largely by the great philanthropic foundations located in the United States of America. Rockefeller and Carnegie took the leading role, although Russell Sage, Rosenthal, Phelps Stokes and others also played important parts. As the foundations stated openly and explicitly, they were deeply troubled by the negative impact that the expansion of trade and industry was having on diverse peoples and societies located around the globe. The foundations sought to understand why this was occurring, and wished to ameliorate the worst of the negative impacts. In this way they hoped to promote and expand the benefits of capitalist modernity, a project to which they were deeply committed. This was considered an especially pressing matter in light of the Russian Revolution of 1917, the spread of international communism, and the emergence of numerous, powerful anti-colonial movements.

The foundations turned to the university, and secondarily to the private research institute, as the institutional site where their
goals could best be pursued. They turned to the university-based academic as the source of expertise best suited to gathering the information they sought. The foundations believed that before either was ready to perform the tasks required of them, however, extensive changes in both would have to be made. Universities were oriented predominantly toward teaching, and faculty had neither opportunity nor motivation to engage in primary research. Nor did they have the extensive blocks of uninterrupted time necessary to produce in-depth works of scholarship. Nor were they trained in the problem-oriented, observation-based methods the foundations believed to be essential to their cause.

In an effort to mold academia in the desired directions, the foundations intervened extensively in the organizations of universities and in the training and activities of academics. The philanthropies poured huge sums of money into approximately thirty select universities—the majority in the US, but some in Europe and a few beyond it—to showcase their efforts. Some of the funds were used to relieve the teaching pressure on professors, and to provide them with free time to pursue research and writing. Other monies were made available to sponsor actual research projects that dealt with the pressing social problems that were the focus of foundation concern—and that took academics directly to the contested frontiers and internal lines of fracture of capitalist modernity. Philanthropic largesse was also used to train academics in problem-oriented methodology and observation-based techniques of data collection.

The foundations also provided monies to train graduate studies along similar lines, and to allow them to do their own primary research. The philanthropies were equally committed to increasing the overall number of graduate studies, and to opening graduate study to formerly under-represented groups. These included members of the domestic middle and working classes. They included as well gifted students from beyond Western Europe and the US—from China, India, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East—who were brought to be trained at the foundations’ re-made elite universities. In this way the foundations hoped to form an international academic elite trained in and committed to the problem-oriented, observation-based approach to social engineering that the foundations believed essential to their cause.

In addition to transforming the conditions of academic life within a select group of elite universities, the philanthropies also created new organizations to coordinate and guide the activities
of all universities—especially those in the US. They did so in large part by creating national institutions (especially the SSRC, the ACLS and the National Research Council) that funded the kind of research they sought to promote, the kind of researcher they sought to reward, and the kind of training they sought to provide. These institutions became the most important sources of funding for social science research and training during the entire period in question.

In addition to reorganizing academic life within universities, the foundations also focused their attention on private research institutes. In some cases, the philanthropies created entirely new institutes out of whole cloth. An example here would be the Institute of Pacific Relations, which organized and funded research and publishing about a wide range of issues in what today would be called the Pacific Rim and large sections of SE Asia (Akami 2002). The foundations also reorganized and re-oriented the activities and priorities of existing institutes so that they would promote the kinds of research and scholarship to which the foundations were committed. An example here would be the RIAA—the Royal Institute of International Affairs—whose headquarters were in London. Under philanthropic guidance, the RIAA coordinated research and writing on a wide range of topics, from the economic and political conditions of colonial Africa (Hailey 1938) to the dynamics of the world communist movement (Toynbee 1928).

All in all, during the inter-war period the foundations created an entire infrastructure of social science training, research and publishing. An assemblage that was truly global in scope, this infrastructure was made up of a extensive network of universities, private research institutes, training programs and publishing venues the complete dimensions of which have yet to be fully documented. For the present purposes, however, the important point about this infrastructure is the following; it underwrote virtually all social science research and publishing in the English-speaking world. It also made the US the intellectual and institutional center of the social sciences, and placed the US at the focal point of an emerging global public sphere of social science knowledge.

A review of the scholarship produced during this period as a whole (as opposed to the works of a few famous authors) reveals that the foundations were concerned about problems and processes—labor migration, capital investment, epidemic disease, poverty, colonialism, fascism, international communism—rather
than territories or boundaries. By understanding and ameliorating the worst of the period’s social problems, the foundations hoped to maintain a world without borders—one that would be safe for capital and consumption, and safe from communism and international socialism. The problem-oriented, observation-based forms of knowledge they did so much to create reflected these concerns.²

A War-Time Geography of Knowledge: the Military and Area Studies during World War II

This processual, globally-oriented, field-based approach to applied, practical problems transformed in fundamental ways as a result of WW II, when a new geography of knowledge came into being. The new knowledge geography may be distinguished from the old in a number of ways. First, it emerged in radically transformed global conditions—the heat of industrial warfare (cf., Lutz 2004), waged among the contending capitalist superpowers of the era. It was also enabled by different bodies—an assemblage that was predominantly military/academic as opposed to corporate/academic. Third, in its field dimensions, the new knowledge geography was implemented by different personnel—academically trained soldiers and civilian professionals rather than field-readied academics. Finally, the new geography of knowledge was intended to serve a very different set of needs, and to address a different group of concerns. It is to a consideration of these that we now turn.

During WW II, the US Army did not seek knowledge about global processes that threatened to stir up potentially dangerous peoples living along the external frontiers and the internal lines of fracture of an expanding capitalist order. Instead, the military was in need of a single, overarching conceptual framework that would facilitate direct territorial administration of diverse peoples living in scattered, war-torn areas. As the war progressed, the Army found itself responsible for governing many of the far-flung regions of the globe that were being seized (“liberated,” in the lingo of the Allies) from the Axis powers. The military sought a form of knowledge that would assist in its efforts to govern these areas—that would allow its soldier-administrators to know the territories for which they would be responsible before they actually began governing them, and that would make it possible

² See Nugent (2002) for a more detailed discussion of these processes.
for these soldier-administrators to deepen their understanding as they governed. In other words, military planners sought a form of knowledge that would equip soldiers with conceptual armature they could use to effect the day-to-day administration of occupied territories.

It was in this context that a war-time version of area studies was born—one overseen by high-ranking military officers, designed and taught by academics, and implemented around the globe by military personnel (together with civilian professionals-turned-officers). By the end of the war, this version of area studies had been employed in the armed forces’ efforts to order and administer the lives of over 300 million people around the globe—more than 10% of the world’s population (Holborn 1947: xi).

This iteration of area studies—the first to be institutionalized in the US—did more than simply guide the armed forces in their interim efforts to govern foreign lands. It also acted as the model for the academic version of area studies that consolidated during the Cold War. Indeed, the origins of peace-time area studies, and the academy’s concern with cultures and areas, can be traced directly to WW II, to the same problems that generated the military’s concern with these issues. The processes to be discussed here thus have relevance for understanding how the social sciences have been ordered and conceptualized for much of the period since the beginning of WW II.

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Early in the war, US military planners began to envision a new global geography of power and knowledge—one that had little in common with the web of interconnected processes and prac-

3 The fact that the entire area studies framework represented a significant change of direction for the social sciences is revealed by the following: from its creation (by Rockefeller philanthropy) in 1924 until 1943, the SSRC—which organized the vast majority of all social science research in the US—showed virtually no interest in “culture areas.” The committees of the SSRC covered a wide range of topics—from “Consumption and Leisure,” to “Social and Economic Research in Agriculture,” to “Interracial Relations” (SSRC 1934; see also the annual reports of the SSRC between 1934 and 1943). During this entire twenty-year period, however, only once (from 1926 to 1928) was there a Committee on Culture Areas (SSRC 1934: 37). The SSRC, and the social science community it helped create, was focused on problems and issues rather than areas and cultures.
tical problems of such pressing concern to the corporate-based philanthropies (and to academics) just a short time before. The war-time geography of the military emerged first in the realm of the imagination, for it began to take shape well before the outcome of the war was certain. Nonetheless, Allied military planners began to imagine a globe liberated from the Axis powers. They began to plan for the possibility that they would soon find themselves in control of extensive territories in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Pacific still controlled by the enemy.\(^4\)

The US was not prepared for such an eventuality. Unlike the European countries, which had established extensive colonial empires long before WW II, the US had only rarely imposed direct political control over foreign lands.\(^5\) As a result, it had no ready-made cohort of colonial administrators to whom military planners could turn for assistance. Nor had the US had any reason to establish programs of training comparable to those of the British, the French or the Dutch—who had consciously designed programs to prepare people for roles in colonial administration. As a result, US military planners were compelled to establish new schools and to design new programs of study, where soldiers could be trained for the novel task that appeared to lie ahead.

It was in this context that a new geography of knowledge came into being. Unlike that of the pre-war era, this new geography showed a highly developed concern with the administration of territories—no doubt because control of territory was the central point of contention in the war itself, and could only be established through violent clashes with the enemy. The new knowledge geography was equally concerned with the socio-political processes that took place within the boundaries of territories seized from the enemy—and with ensuring that these processes were a source of order rather than conflict in the context of military government. Indeed, the ability to

\(^4\) It was in England where the Allies first began to anticipate a new geography of political relations. European governments in exile, having fled to London before the advancing forces of the 3\(^{rd}\) Reich, signed agreements with the British. According to the terms of these accords, once Germany had been expelled the British armed forces were to administer the “civil affairs” of the countries in question in an interim capacity, until the governments in exile could return to their home territories. The British signed agreements of this kind with Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Denmark.

\(^5\) The main exceptions were those territories seized from Spain at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War.
control the borders of liberated territories, to understand their internal socio-cultural dynamics, and to maintain stability within these borders, were matters of strategic, military concern. The geography of knowledge that emerged during the war was thus focused on the problems of order and governance within carefully delimited territorial spaces.

The development of plans to train personnel for military government evolved as did the war itself. In early spring of 1942, the Provost Marshal General of the US Army was charged with training several hundred Army officers for military government duty in occupied territory. He was guided in his efforts by the experiences of officers who had performed this same function in Germany after WWI. These soldiers had found themselves wholly unprepared for the task of government administration in occupied lands. On the one hand, they were completely uninformed about the economic patterns, social institutions, political practices, religious beliefs and cultural mores of the people they were to administer. As a result, they had no idea how people were accustomed to living—and therefore how their attachments to familiar patterns of life might affect their responses to military government. Making matters worse, US officers had no German language skills, and thus were unable to educate themselves about these matters in the process of governing. They could not even communicate with the people under their jurisdiction (Coles and Weinberg 1964; Herge 1948).

The military concluded that it was essential to address these problems if they were to prepare soldiers adequately for military government during WW II. They were especially concerned to avoid repeating the mistakes of the last war because, in the military’s estimation, WW II was more “ideological” than the Great War (Friedrich 1948; Holborn 1947). Indeed, it was as if the worst fears of the philanthropies from the 1920s and 1930s had been realized. Despite their best efforts, it had proved impossible to maintain a “world without borders.” Enemy governments and their respective populations in many parts of the world had become deeply committed to communism, socialism, fascism and anti-colonial nationalism—which made them extremely hostile to the US. Military government was therefore likely to be even more difficult than it had been in the non-ideological past.

To ensure that US personnel were fully up to the task that (might!) lay before them, a School of Military Government was established at the University of Virginia, in Charlottesville, in May of 1942. Later that same year a separate Division of
Military Government was created in the office of the Provost Marshal General. In March of the following year, an entire Civil Affairs Division was established in the War Department, and under its auspices programs of study were launched at several hundred colleges and universities across the US. The purpose of this expanding network of institutions was twofold: (1) to train military personnel who could govern effectively in territories as they were seized from the Axis powers; and (2) to prepare soldiers in the numbers required to administer the vast sections of the globe where military government personnel were likely to be needed.

As envisioned by the Armed Forces, the administration of areas formerly under Axis control would be overseen by “civil affairs teams,” divided hierarchically into three groups. A cadre of specially trained officers, who would attend the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia, would be in command. They were “destined mostly for assignments at the higher military headquarters set up to govern states, zones, or large districts of occupied territory” (Grace 1947: vi).

Beneath these high-ranking, commissioned officers in the hierarchy of military government was a second group—civilian professionals and people in possession of specialized, essential skills that were likely to be in short supply in war-torn areas. This group—medical doctors, nurses, engineers, lawyers, public safety personnel, individuals with experience in public administration etc.—would attend a Civil Affairs Training School (CATS), either in Charlottesville, or at one of ten universities scattered around the US. The CATS program would prepare personnel for positions in the field, as opposed to in headquarters; CATS graduates were to be responsible for implementing military government in relatively small territorial districts (Grace 1947: vi).

Both groups of officers would be assisted by a larger group of enlisted men, who would attend the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) at one of 227 colleges and universities (Keefer 1988). This program provided soldiers with elementary training in medicine, engineering, agronomy, veterinary science, surveying, communications, psychology—which would allow them to assist the more highly-skilled, CATS-trained personnel.6 Together,
graduates of the CATS and the ASTP would possess skills and training that would make them indispensable to effective military government in occupied territories. 5

Graduates of the CATS and the ASTP would be assisted by a third group—a special branch of ASTP-trained personnel. These individuals were to complete the military’s Foreign Area and Language Program (FALP), at one of 55 institutions of higher learning in the US. The FALP provided its graduates with intensive training in the cultures and languages of the areas they were to administer. Originally conceived of as military police, FALP personnel were to be trained in police procedure as well as in the cultural characteristics and communicative practices of subject populations (Hyneman 1945: 435-36). 8

7 Colonel Herman Beukema, a professor of history and government at West Point, was named director of the Army Specialized Training Division, in which the ASTP was housed. He appointed Arthur L.H. Rubin, “a civilian who had previously directed the Institute of Military Studies at the University of Chicago … [to be] chief of the ASTP’s Curricula and Standards Branch” (Keefer 1988: 40-41). “[W]ith help from the ASTD Advisory Committee, [he] was largely responsible for determining the general content of the courses comprising each branch of study” (Ibid: 41-44). “The ASTD Advisory Committee consisted of” Isaiah Bowman, president, Johns Hopkins University; Robert E. Doherty, president, Carnegie Institute of Technology; Clarence A. Dykstra, president, University of Wisconsin; Guy Stanton Ford, secretary, American Historical Association; the Very Reverend Robert I Gannon, president, Fordham University; Ralph D. Hetzel, president, Pennsylvania State College; Felix Morley, president, Haverford College; John J. Tigert, president, University of Florida; Ray Lyman Wilbur, chancellor, Stanford University; and Karl Taylor Compton, president, Massachusetts Institute of Technology” (Keefer 1988: 44, note).

8 In practice, relatively few of these individuals ended up being trained in police procedure (Hyneman 1945: 435). The military chose Harold W. Stoke, then professor of political science and acting dean of the graduate school at the University of Wisconsin, to lead the effort to design the FALP curriculum (Hyneman 1945: 438). He “gathered around himself a half dozen men representing a wide range of interests in the study of contemporary civilizations and the group worked out a standard curriculum for the study of foreign areas” (Ibid).
the School of Military Government, and to a lesser extent the graduates of the CATS, foreign-area-and-language-trained ASTP soldiers were to be the rank-and-file of military government—the on-the-ground personnel who would interact intimately with local populations on a day-to-day basis.

The armed forces conceived of graduates of the FALP as a kind of cultural police force, who would enforce the terms of military rule in the specific areas they had been trained to administer, informed by their background in culture and language. The occupational police, however, were not the only personnel to receive anthropological training. The Foreign Area and Language curriculum was also an integral part of the CATS program—which prepared mid-level government administrators. In this way the military sought to ensure that personnel who would have the most direct contact with subject populations had a strong grounding in the cultural characteristics of the areas they were to govern. The armed forces also sought to ensure that soldiers who would be responsible for the actual implementation of military government would be able to communicate effectively with the populations under their jurisdiction.

The architects of military government believed that it was essential to familiarize their soldier-administrators with the linguistic conventions and the cultural patterns that characterized specific peoples and areas—in the belief that this knowledge would prove invaluable in efforts to establish sound, stable, military government. If civil affairs personnel were to be effective administrators, it was of course essential that they be educated as thoroughly as possible about these matters, and that real experts provide their training.

To provide soldiers with the requisite training in language, the military looked to the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS). Mortimer Graves, the ACLS Administrative Secretary, had already developed what the armed forces viewed as a very effective Intensive Language Program (ILP)—one that drew on immersion techniques developed by Franz Boas and Edward Sapir. By the time the military became interested in language training (in the fall of 1942), Graves’ Intensive Language Program was already in place in 18 colleges and universities around the US, and was providing instruction in 25 different languages, few of which had ever been taught before (Hyneman 1945: 436-37). To make the ILP suitable for the armed forces, the Division of Military Government made Graves its consultant and put him in charge of designing a curriculum that could be used in the ASTP and CATS programs (Hyneman 1945: 437-38).
It provide more difficult, however, to provide soldiers with training in culture areas, as the military found existing academic programs inadequate to the task at hand. As a result, the Chief of the Military Government Division gathered together a group of distinguished social scientists—anthropologists, sociologists, geographers, economists, psychologists, political scientists and historians—and asked them to formulate a curriculum to guide instructional efforts in the CATS and the ASTP (Fenton 1945: 696). In relatively short order, this group designed the curriculum in question—one to be used in preparing civil affairs personnel for the task of military government in all foreign areas. It was referred to as the Foreign Area and Language Program (FALP) curriculum.

The program of training designed by this interdisciplinary team of scholars was intended to school CATS- and ASTP-trained soldiers in the logic of what might be called “military governmentality.” Graduates learned that, as military governors, their primary responsibility was to ensure the health and well-being of the populations for which they were responsible. To do so, however, soldiers were taught that they needed to restore stability and maintain order within the war-torn areas they were to administer. It was this combination of concerns that led to the emergence of a new geography of knowledge.9

Civil affairs teams were trained to take a series of steps to ensure the well-being of the population. The first order of busi-

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9 Unless otherwise noted, the following section of the paper is distilled from the following sources, all of which are available through the General Staff Intelligence Division of the US War Department (G-2 Division):

--“History of Training, Military Government” (1 volume; see United States War Department n.d.a).
--“A History of the Army Specialized Training Program (from its inception to 31 December 1944)” (1 volume; see United States War Department n.d.b).
--“History of Training, Army Specialized Training Program (1 January 1945 to 30 June 1945)” (1 volume; see United States War Department n.d.c)
--“The Training History of the Military Intelligence Service Language Schools” (17 volumes; see United States War Department 1949).

The standardized curriculum of the Foreign Area and Language Program can be found in, Division Memorandum Training Circular No. 2, April 10, 1943, prepared by the Military Government Division, Office of the Provost Marshal General, Army Service Forces; see United States Armed Forces n.d.a).
ness was to ensure that military control of the area had been fully established, and that its borders were secure. Once the territorial integrity of the area had been assured, civil affairs personnel could go about the task of establishing military government and investigating socio-cultural patterns within those borders. As soon as an area had been “liberated” they were to start their work immediately. They were to begin by announcing their presence to the local population, and by explaining that they would be acting as an interim government. Their next step was determined by the nature of their FALP training, which had been of limited duration (a maximum of nine months), and had been designed not to fill their heads with facts but to make them aware of what problems to investigate in the field. Building on what they had learned in the classroom, the soldier-administrators were to do a detailed inventory of virtually every aspect of the area assigned to them (Matthew 1947: 81-82). These investigations were to provide a comprehensive overview of the state of affairs in that region, and were also to suggest how everyday life had been organized prior to the war.

Civil affairs teams were to note, for example, the distribution and extent of the area’s natural features, including its water sources, soil types, mineral resources, zones of crop production and areas not suitable for cultivation. They were also to survey and evaluate the state of the region’s infrastructure—especially its roads, bridges, railroads, irrigation works, canals, hospitals and airfields. Civil affairs teams were also to do careful inventories of all supplies of food, water, clothing, shelter and medicine (cf., Italian Campaigns, 1943-45: 539). They were also to pay careful attention to features of the local population—to its size and distribution, to birth and death rates, and to all conditions, natural and social, that resulted in undue mortality. The members of the interim government were also to observe whether the population was sedentary or migratory; if the latter, they were to note the locales between which and the numbers in which the population moved.

Civil affairs teams were also to make detailed observations concerning the main social groupings of the areas assigned to them. They were to focus on linguistic, racial and religious distinctions, and on differentiation by caste and status. They were to take special care in analyzing how these distinctions affected political relations among the groups concerned, and to note whether or not there were areas of existing or potential friction or conflict.
Military government personnel were also trained to observe and record the most important features of economic life. They were to focus on such matters as the dominant industries of the area, the division of labor and the kind and extent of international trade. They were also to pay careful attention to the labor supply—to its size, skill and treatment, to its wages and organization, to the presence or absence of a labor movement. Novice administrators were also told to make note of patterns of land ownership—including size and distribution of tracts, forms of tenancy, and security of holdings. They were also to investigate the effects of government on everyday economic and social life—especially regarding forms of taxation and public utilities and services.

Civil affairs personnel were also told to pay especially careful attention to how the areas they were to administer had been governed. Regarding this problem, graduates of the CATS and ASTP were to investigate such questions as the presence or absence of colonial government, and the degree of self-government and administration. They were to note the kinds of local political positions, the numbers and authority of each, how officials were selected, how they were organized, and the relations between central and local administration. Military government personnel were also to determine the relative importance of elections, tradition and status in the selection of officials. Other important issues about which they were to collect information concerned the presence or absence of political parties or groups, their types of organization, their methods of recruitment, their racial and social foundations, their intensity of feeling and their platforms or beliefs. Military governors were also to take note of the political theories and ideologies embraced by the local population, from American and British theories of democracy, to communism, fascism and international socialism.

Finally, civil affairs teams were to record the important features of family life, the relations between the sexes and between the generations. They were to note patterns of religious belief, major religious ceremonies and the use of special places and objects of worship. They were to investigate what was taught in schools, both general and technical. The local population’s degree of literacy, its reading habits and use of mass media (newspapers, radio) were also to be issues of concern to military governors.

In sum, the military’s Foreign Area and Language Program (FALP) attempted to train its soldiers to “see like a state” (Scott 1998). In the process, the military sought to draw on insights
from all the social science disciplines—to provide civil affairs personnel with the skills they would need to generate a “total picture” of the area they were to administer (Matthews 1947: xii). The military sought to arm its administrators-in-training with insights and abilities that would make them sensitive to any and all conditions in a given area that might affect their ability to govern in an effective manner. In the words of anthropologist William Fenton, the Foreign Area and Language Curriculum “attempted rather uniquely to prepare soldiers for fieldwork of sorts in the civilizations (or cultures) of great areas” (Fenton 1945: 697).

The military provided a clear rationale for providing its personnel with in-depth knowledge about the cultures and languages of strategically important areas of the globe: the maintenance of order. Invoking international law, the War Department argued that “it [was] the duty of the military commander of an occupied area to preserve, as far as military necessity [would] permit, the established institutions and customs” (US War Department n.d.a). “The ideal military government will [therefore] be one which can integrate the local laws, customs and economy of an occupied area and …superimpose military control with a minimum of disturbance to the former and a maximum of control by the latter” (US War Department n.d.b). “Military government is, in a sense, superstructure, erected over the local set-up” (Ibid).

Once the Foreign Area and Language Program curriculum had been reviewed, revised and approved by a second group of distinguished academics, as well as by the military director of the ASTP (Fenton 1945), the Civil Affairs Division called upon the academic community as a whole to assist in training its future military governors. The response was overwhelming. Universities and colleges from all across the country stepped up to do their part. Shortly thereafter, in the spring of 1943, the Civil Affairs Division sent the standardized FALP curriculum to these schools, and asked that they use it as the basis for all their Foreign Area and Language Program course offerings. Of the 227 US institutions of higher learning that administered the ASTP, 55 offered the Foreign Area and Language curriculum.

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10 William Fenton did an assessment of the FALP toward the end of the war, while it was still in progress. His study was published just after the war (see Fenton 1945).

11 This “distinguished group of educators” had been nominated by the American Council on Education and the United States Office of Education (see Herge 1948: 30).
FALP training was provided at an additional ten universities, to officers who took part in the CATS.

As a result of these efforts to train adequate numbers of personnel for military government duty, there was something of an exodus of soldiers out of the barracks and into the classroom—so much so that high-ranking officers in charge of combat operations became truly alarmed, and complained about not having enough troops (Keefer 1995). As a result, the Army established an annual cap of 150,000 on the number of personnel who could be enrolled in the ASTP. Although aggregate figures for the entire war are not available, in mid-October of 1943 there were about 129,000 soldiers enrolled in the Army Specialized Training Program, of whom 13,000 were taking the Foreign Area and Language Program.12 There are no comparable figures concerning the number of soldiers enrolled in the CATS at this time, but the vast majority also received FALP training. As these numbers suggest, social scientists from all disciplines participated in this effort, offering their expertise to train future military government administrators.

Just as the philanthropies had done prior to WW II, during the war the military self-consciously set out to craft a new form of knowledge—one that would contribute to its mission of re-establishing stability and normalcy in far-off lands, and of maintaining the health and well-being of their respective populations. The military did so by means of its Foreign Area and Language Program. Several features of the FALP curriculum are relevant to the present discussion. First, it emphasized the identity of area and language. Each area had a distinct language, and each language in turn implied an area with a distinctive cultural pattern. Not only did each area have its own cultural pattern or configuration, but this pattern could only be discerned by means of “integrated area study.” According to the armed forces, to get the “total picture” upon which successful military governance was based, it was necessary to draw on all the various academic disciplines that might have bearing on understanding the contemporary state of affairs in a given culture area. But simply drawing on the separate disciplines was not enough. It was necessary to integrate them—to bring them together, so that each could benefit from the insights

12 Of these 129,000 soldiers, 74,000 were studying basic engineering, 15,000 were studying advanced engineering, another 14,000 soldiers were studying medicine, an additional 5,000 were being trained in dentistry and 2,000 in veterinary science. A full 13,000 were students of culture area and language (Keefer 1988: 69-70).
of the other. It was necessary to put the separate social science disciplines in direct dialogue with one another, so that they could produce a whole far greater than the sum of its parts.13

Symptomatic of the fact that the military found it necessary to create an entirely new form of knowledge at this time were the challenges it faced in doing so. Although several universities offered area studies programs prior to WW II, they were ill-suited to the needs of the military. Indeed, planners in the Division of Military Government bemoaned the fact that there was no model anywhere in academia for the integrated form of knowledge they desired. Existing programs were “non-integrated.” They presented knowledge of a region in terms of competing academic disciplines, with each discipline taught separately.

The military therefore found it necessary to intervene in the production of knowledge on an extensive basis in order to train its personnel—just as the philanthropies had done during the 1920s and 1930s. Military planners felt compelled to intervene both in the organization of the disciplines and in the presentation of academic knowledge. Toward this end, the Division of Military Government assigned a coordinator to each school that offered FALP training. This individual was in charge of all aspects of the program on his campus. He was responsible for the mundane aspects of the program—the scheduling of classes and examinations. He also had more important duties. It was the coordinator who was responsible for ensuring that the otherwise disparate forms of disciplinary knowledge (anthropological, sociological, etc.) cohered into a seamless, integrated whole.

To achieve this goal, the coordinator established new organizational forms and new modes of interaction. To begin, he convened a special planning group—known as an “area committee”—for each culture/language area to be taught at his campus. This committee consisted of an academic director (chosen by the coordinator), and at least one faculty member from anthropology, sociology, economics, geography, political science and history. A representative of the language relevant to the area under consideration was considered essential to the group. Under the watchful eye of the coordinator, committee members designed courses that would address the general themes identified in the standardized, FALP curriculum (see above). They also planned the sequence of the lectures, and did the actual instruction of the culture area and language courses.

13 The army offered courses in a total of 32 languages, each with its accompanying area study program (Matthew 1947: 4).
This procedure involved an unprecedented degree of cooperation among the participating departments. In many cases, because of the deliberations of the area committee, faculty ended up delivering lectures that they would not have given prior to the war, on topics that were not strictly disciplinary in nature. In large part, this occurred because lectures were submitted for review to the director of the area committee, or to the entire committee, before being delivered. The coordinator also reviewed the lesson plans and proposed lectures, and maintained close supervision over individual instructors. In other words, the committee and the coordinator exercised ongoing, corporate supervision over the entire progress of the area studies training program.14

Coordinators followed this procedure in part to ensure that members of a single area committee did not repeat the same material in presenting lectures. At the same time, however, discussion by the entire committee about educational materials normally presented in disciplinary form exposed each participant to perspectives and insights from all the other fields of study—thus encouraging integration. The integrated nature of instruction was further reinforced by the fact that coordinators insisted that the participating faculty attend and comment upon one another’s lectures. On the one hand, this meant that each faculty member was led to re-assess his own materials in light of what he learned from his colleagues. On the other hand, the collective understandings generated by this practice meant that the group as a whole could draw upon a shared base of knowledge in devising successive revisions of the entire course of study. The end result was a new set of procedures that encouraged the production of interdisciplinary knowledge.

The campus coordinator also introduced new ways of presenting and discussing educational materials that further contributed to the goal of integration. Especially important in this regard was the panel discussion, in which small groups of faculty, sometimes together with outside specialists, would draw out the implications of previous lectures, both for themselves and their students. Another novel approach that coordinators employed was what they called the interview technique, in which a “native informant” was brought to campus to be questioned by a group of faculty or students. Coordinators also employed the project technique, in which a number of students, operating as a team, were asked

14 In practice, of course, these procedures were not always followed (see Fenton 1947).
to draw upon insights from their readings and lectures to solve hypothetical problems of governance.

**Implementing Areas: Civil Affairs in Action, 1942-45**

Based on their training in the above-mentioned areas, and on language skills acquired as part of the same process, military personnel were expected to handle “the delicate problems of military government in occupied territories” (Matthew 1947: 5). Furthermore, they had to do so in conditions of considerable stress and danger, for they were required to take control of conquered territory immediately after the Army had landed. In many cases, military government personnel arrived together with the first wave of troops, when the bullets were still flying—or immediately thereafter.

When Allied troops wrested control of North Africa from the Axis powers, for example, civil affairs teams were included along with regular combat troops. As the Allied front advanced across the desert, these teams set up command posts along the moving frontier (cf., Vincent 1990), and in this way helped consolidate Allied control of new territories as soon as were seized from the enemy (Rennell 1948). When the Allies arrived in Sicily on July 10, 1943, and later in Corsica and southern Italy, civil affairs personnel were included in the first wave of assault (Coles and Weinberg 1964). As combat troops advanced across Italy, steadily claiming more and more territory from the enemy, teams of administrators would immediately establish themselves as the new governing body.

In planning the Allied invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944, US General Eisenhower decided that civil affairs troops would be at too great a risk to be included in the first direct wave of assault (Coles and Weinberg 1964). Instead, wherever possible, in the days prior to the invasion civil affairs teams were dropped by parachute behind enemy lines, in secret, so that they would be poised to begin governing the very instant circumstances allowed (Donnison 1961). On D-Day itself, civil affairs divisions were also dropped by parachute, in the second assault wave. As soon as they hit the ground these soldier-administrators raced by jeep to take control of each village, just moments after it had been liberated. In some cases they arrived ahead of regular combat troops to find German soldiers still packing up supplies in village town halls. Neither interfered with the other; the Germans would continue packing in one part of city hall (after which they would
leave), while civil affairs teams established themselves as the new government in another part of the same building (Edwards and Still 1991). Military government personnel continued to play this same crucial role as the Allies advanced across France, through the German-occupied countries of northwest Europe, and into Germany itself (Coles and Weinberg 1964; Donnison 1961).

The reason that officers like General Eisenhower were so anxious to have civil affairs teams take up their duties as soon as humanly possible—and that these personnel were considered such an integral part of all invasion efforts—was quite simple. It was abundantly clear to high-ranking military personnel that the US Army was far from being the only group vying for control of areas abandoned by the retreating Axis forces. Virtually everywhere the Allies attempted to establish themselves there were other pretenders to the throne—groups with their own ideas about what was involved in returning to normalcy. In France, the Communist Party and General de Gaulle’s Free French movement had both laid careful plans to seize control over civil affairs once the Germans had retreated, and to do so prior to the Americans. In this way both groups hoped to establish themselves as the dominant power in post-war France (Edwards and Still 1991). In much of Mediterranean Europe, indeed in the whole of the continent, the military regarded communism as a grave threat—and believed that, once combat operations were over, immediate action on the part of civil affairs personnel was necessary to forestall what was otherwise sure to be the immanent expansion of communist influence (Friedrich 1948: 20).

In Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, Thailand), the retreat of the Japanese appeared to the Allies to have opened up a political space that they would fill. Much to their dismay, they found that space already occupied. Movements of anti-colonial nationalism, some of them quite radical, had emerged in most former colonies. Many had declared independence prior to or simultaneous with the Japanese surrender, often before the return of the Allies. The Allies being caught by surprise by the sudden nature of the Japanese surrender—because of which Allied forces were not on hand in several parts of SE Asia (especially in Thailand) to actually accept the surrender directly from the Japanese. The European powers had planned to return to their former colonial domains in September or October of 1945. The Japanese surrender came in August.

15 The Allies being caught by surprise by the sudden nature of the Japanese surrender—because of which Allied forces were not on hand in several parts of SE Asia (especially in Thailand) to actually accept the surrender directly from the Japanese. The European powers had planned to return to their former colonial domains in September or October of 1945. The Japanese surrender came in August.
that worked actively to prevent the return of the French. In the former British colonies it was the AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League) in Burma and the MCP (Malayan Communist Party) in Malaya. In the Dutch East Indies, it was a broad coalition of nationalist, anti-colonial forces that sought to prevent the return of the Dutch.

These groups were determined to preserve their independence at any cost. Indeed, long before WW II many had become deeply hostile to European colonizing power. Anti-European sentiment ran sufficiently high that several (Vietnam, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia) hailed the Japanese as liberators from European colonial rule when the Japanese army arrived on the scene beginning in 1940. In other colonies (Ceylon, Malaya, Laos), important social elements conspired with the Japanese in an effort to drive the Europeans from power, or failed to warn the Europeans of immanent Japanese attack.

When the Pacific War finally came to a close in August of 1945, and it became clear that the Europeans intended to re-establish colonial control, pitched battles broke out in several locales. In Saigon and Djakarta, so serious was the opposition to renewed domination by Europeans that the British army, representing the other European colonizing powers, was only able to prevail over nationalist forces by employing large numbers of soldiers captured from Japan—the recently-departed colonizing force. Elsewhere (Malaya, Laos, Cambodía, Burma, Indonesia), armed conflict did not immediately break out. Instead, resistance movements crystallized or expanded to oppose the lingering presence of the Europeans. Many succeeded in bringing colonial rule to an end within a decade. Such were the stakes involved in struggles over civil affairs.

Indeed, the Allied powers realized from the outset that friendly governments would have to be created in most of the territories they intended to “liberate,” and that security concerns would therefore take precedence over all other considerations (Holborn 1947). Creating new security regimes that could keep a close watch over everyday life squared nicely with the short- and long-term goals of the Allies. For example, the US War Department taught its civil affairs officers that “control of a nation’s civil administration would allow the US to [determine] its policies and spread [US] influence throughout liberated and invaded nations for decades to come” (US War Department n.d.a). Officer graduates of the university-based CATS, and of the School of Military Government in Charlottesville, “were told repeatedly that their
first priorities were to further military objectives … to establish law and order” (US War Department n.d.a). They were taught that, whenever the stability of an area was in question—whether the threat was “external” (Axis forces) or “internal” (communist or socialist groups, labor organizations, etc.), whether it stemmed from insecure food supplies or general lawlessness—they were to take a series of steps to protect the general well-being, and to guarantee continued US control.

Civil affairs personnel were told to guard against external threats by patrolling all borders with great care (especially in the early stages of the occupation), to ensure that control of territory remained intact. Thereafter, they were to limit population movement across borders and carefully monitor whatever population movement did take place.\(^{16}\) As complex as these tasks were, however, military government personnel were advised that guarding against internal threats was even more challenging. To do so, civil affairs teams were ordered to disband political organizations of all kinds, and to prohibit political activity in general. In the interest of stability, they were to impose martial law, and to suspend civil liberties. Such liberties as the local population would be allowed were never to interfere with the overriding need to maintain order.\(^{17}\)

The risk of internal threat or instability could be further minimized by ensuring that the population had stable, reliable access to supplies of food, clothing, medicine, etc. Toward this end, wherever they deemed it necessary, civil affairs teams were to re-organize economic affairs. They were to seize control of all important stores of essential items, and to oversee their distribution to the general population. They were also to take command of the provision of key services (drinking water, electrical power, policing, public sanitation), administrative activities (maintenance of property registers, vital statistics offices, etc.) and banking functions. Military government personnel were also to forbid the

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\(^{17}\) See documents in previous note.
use of inflated, war-time currency, and were to replace it with money issued by the military.\textsuperscript{18}

To ensure that key elements of infrastructure (roads, bridges, railroads, irrigation works, public water and sewage systems) were repaired and maintained, the interim military government was to organize work gangs from amongst the local population, and was to recompense the workers in military money (Rundell 1980). To protect private property and personal safety, and to maintain stability, curfews were to be established and strictly enforced. Roads were to be sealed, roadblocks established, and the movement of the population kept to a bare minimum. In those rare instances where people were allowed to be mobile, their movements were to be carefully monitored.

The instructions issued to civil affairs personnel in May, 1944, for subsequent use in France (after D-Day), are not atypical of the directives issued to military government officers in general. According to these instructions, civil affairs teams were to pursue the following, strategic objectives (Edwards and Still 1991: 25-26):

1. restoration and maintenance of law and order.
2. guarantee of a steady supply of food and other goods.
3. coordination of reconstruction projects, using local labor.
4. priority of military requirements over civil rights.
5. dissolution of all pro-enemy political parties and organizations.
6. prohibition on political activity.
7. freedom of movement and association suspended.
8. allied control of local police.
9. restoration of all prewar laws.
10. media and mail censorship.
11. providing food, clothing, medical care, fuel, etc.
12. wage and price controls.

\textsuperscript{18} Relevant documents include the following: Combined Directive on Military Government in Sicily, May 31, 1943; Revised Financial Guide for Germany, Combined Directive for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender, April 18, 1944; Memorandum No. 2 Relating to France, Directives and Agreements on Civil Affairs in France, August 25, 1944; all to be found in Holborn (1947); for a general discussion of military money see Rundell (1980).
13. general control of economy, including banks [and] the issuance of occupation francs.
14. establishing a curfew.
15. set-up road blocks.
16. no civilian use of telephones or mail.

Because of the highly “ideological” commitments of the peoples who had so recently been living under the Axis yoke, the overwhelming emphasis of Allied military government was on order—on controlling and stabilizing living conditions within areas with carefully specified, clearly demarcated boundaries. Knowledge about language and culture was important because it helped make such control possible.

Area Studies in War and Peace

It would be a mistake to view the military version of area studies as a form of knowledge and control that is relevant only to understanding the rather specialized conditions of the Second World War, with no application to the peace that followed. As noted above, the peace-time iteration of area studies—which consolidated during the Cold War—was in fact first articulated during WWII, and had much in common with its military relative. Indeed, the preoccupation with the cultural characteristics of distinct world areas that dominated the social sciences after the war stemmed from the same concerns that focused the attention of military planners on this issue during the war itself.

The Second World War forged new institutional linkages between the US government, academics, and the organizations that sponsored the production of academic knowledge (especially the three main academic councils—the SSRC and the ACLS and the NRC [National Research Council]). William Donovan, head of the new Office of Strategic Services (OSS, the war-time equivalent of and the precursor to the CIA), played a key role in establishing these linkages. In 1941 he decided to draw on the academic community to assemble a strong team of intelligence experts to contribute to the war effort. Donovan invited representatives of the SSRC and the ACLS to help him draw up a “slate of academic advisors” for this purpose (Cumings 1997; Katz 1989). By the time he was done, Donovan had compiled a list of hundreds—leading academics and young scholars alike.\(^\text{19}\)

\(^{19}\) This figure includes a scattering of professionals in non-academic fields.
Many of these individuals went on to play a key role in intelligence activities during the fight against fascism and communism.

The war-time bonds established between the government, social scientists and the academic councils were to prove strong and enduring. In addition to cooperating with OSS Director Donovan on intelligence in the narrow sense, the SSRC and the ACLS also began working collaboratively with the US military and intelligence communities to expand the conventional meaning of intelligence way beyond its normal bounds (Fenton 1947; Hall 1947; Matthew 1947; SSRC 1942-43; SSRC 1943-44). The Councils argued that, in light of the direct responsibilities the US was about to assume for the well being of the entire planet (sic!), knowledge about other peoples and places in every corner of the globe should be considered a matter of “intelligence.” Furthermore, the Councils asserted, the US was sorely lacking in the expertise necessary to gather this intelligence—as a result of which the country had put its interests at great risk.

Such was the conclusion of the SSRC’s Committee on World Regions, in a June, 1943 report entitled “World Regions in the Social Sciences” (Hamilton 1943). After having shown no interest whatsoever in bounded regional cultures during the previous fifteen years, in early 1943 the SSRC formed this committee “to scrutinize the implications of the government’s training programs for service in foreign regions” (SSRC 1942-43: 49). In other words, the SSRC was intensely interested in the military’s Foreign Area and Language Program.

The influence of the armed forces’ Foreign Area and Language Program on the SSRC’s conception of the need for cultural intelligence experts is striking. In March of 1943 the military began using the FALP to train military police who could draw on knowledge of culture and language to address immediate problems of security in occupied lands. In June of that same year, the SSRC proposed a sweeping reorganization of US education intended to equip social scientists and other interested parties with the cultural and linguistic expertise required to address the long-term security concerns of the US in the post-war world.

Drawing on a conceptualization that was virtually identical to the military’s FALC, the SSRC proposed that all the peoples and cultures of the world be brought into a single ordering schema in which the constituent units were discrete, bounded cultural regions.20 “World Regions” identified (in general terms) the kind

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20 In addition to the slate of academic advisors to the OSS mentioned in the text, the SSRC, the ACLS, and the National
of intelligence that should be gathered about these regional units. It also provided a rationale for ranking the regions, according to their geopolitical significance. Finally, the report suggested how to train experts who could generate the much-needed intelligence about these regions.

What emerges out of the “World Regions” document is nothing less a plan for the peace-time institutionalization of the military’s war-time geography of knowledge. The report begins by arguing that the rapidly changing geopolitical concerns of the US called for the production of a new kind of knowledge on an unprecedented scale:

The present war has focused attention as never before upon the entire world. Interest in foreign regions has been intensified and sharp attention drawn to areas over which we have felt little or no concern … The immediate need for social scientists who know the different regions of the world stands second only to the demand for military and naval officers familiar with the actual and potential combat zones. Since few overseas areas have hitherto attracted research, we lack the regional knowledge now required … The consequent scarcity of professional and scientific personnel combining linguistic and regional knowledge with technical proficiency seriously hampers every war agency. (Hamilton 1943: 1; see also Robinson 2004; Wallerstein 1997).

The SSRC report went on to argue that the need for a greatly expanded corpus of knowledge about unfolding conditions around the globe was anything but limited to the period of the war itself. Rather, once the fighting came to an end the safety and security of US interests abroad would depend critically on the continued production of such knowledge:

Our need for comprehensive knowledge of other lands will not end with the armistice or reconstruc-

Research Council (all the creations of the great philanthropies) all established area committees during the war, “when detailed knowledge and experts on virtually every area of the world were in heavy demand” (Hall 1947: iii). These committees joined with the Smithsonian Institution to form the Ethnogeographic Board, which helped coordinate the activities of academics so that they contributed as effectively as possible to the war effort (cf. Farish 2005; Fenton 1945).
tion. No matter what shape international organization may assume, the US will enjoy unparalleled opportunities and face heavy responsibilities. The ease, speed, and cheapness of communication and transportation will tend to promote economic, political and cultural relations among nations. Trade, shipping, air lines, the press, mining, the production and distribution of petroleum, banking, government service, industry and communications will require thousands of Americans who combine thorough professional or technical training with knowledge of the languages, economics, politics, history, geography, peoples, customs and religions of foreign countries. (Hamilton 1943: 2).

On this basis the SSRC called for a sweeping reorganization of education in the US to provide the expertise required to meet the new exigencies of empire. According to the “World Regions” report: “In order that we may fulfill our postwar role [in the world] our citizens must know other lands and appreciate their people, cultures, and institutions. Research, graduate teaching, undergraduate instruction, and elementary education in world regions will be desirable as far as one can see into the future.” (Hamilton 1943: 2).

Although foundation planners recommended that US education as a whole be revamped to train the experts needed to manage US imperial domains, the special focus of reform efforts should be the creation of new institutes in major universities that could provide advanced training in each of the world’s major areas:

In any development for the study of world regions in this country, the first step should be the establishment of university centers for research and graduate instruction. These centers will extend our knowledge of the major areas of the world: supply government and business with experts; and provide materials and teachers for lower levels of instruction … The graduate-research centers alone, [however,] will not meet the needs of our country. The benefits of regional instruction must permeate our entire educational system. America will not be able to assume her [global] economic, political, and cultural responsibilities … after the war without enlarged spatial concepts and a more comprehensive knowledge of the world. (Hamilton 1943: 6)
Discussions about the relation between area knowledge and the security of empire continued after the war. A combination of Cold War politics and decolonization movements in Africa and Asia seemed to threaten US interests on all sides, and reinforced the wartime conviction that knowledge about seemingly far-off people and places did indeed have a strategic dimension.

In this context, high-ranking officials at the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and at the Carnegie Endowment arranged a series of meetings to discuss what was to be done (Szanton 2004: 9). They agreed that the US had to greatly enhance its capacity to “understand and act effectively in previously unfamiliar nations and societies all across the globe” (Ibid). A new cadre of specially trained personnel with expertise in the various regions of the world was required, foundation officials agreed, “to promote capitalist development, … to achieve social and political stability and to secure US interests” (Ibid).

In the late 1940s the foundations began to make good on this vision. In 1947 the SSRC published a new report reiterating the strategic importance of area knowledge (Hall 1947). The following year area studies got off to a modest beginning when the Carnegie Endowment helped the SSRC launch its first program of area studies research and training (Robinson 2004: 137). As the Cold War heated up during the 1950s, Joint SSRC/ACLS Committees that focused on specific world areas (Latin America, Africa, etc.) came to dominate the funding activities of both organizations, and continued to do so for decades. With generous financial support provided by the philanthropies, these Committees were instrumental in making area studies the dominant perspective in the social sciences.

It was the Ford Foundation, however, that ultimately assumed the most important role in institutionalizing the military’s wartime geography of knowledge. At the dawn of the Cold War Ford embarked on a project of truly massive proportions to create a new infrastructure of training, research and publishing in the social sciences. Using the two SSRC reports on world regions/area studies as a sort of loose blueprint, Ford’s Division of International Training and Research (1952) began building

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21 The same year that the SSRC published its second report stressing the importance of area knowledge (1947), the US Congress passed the National Security Act. This act of Congress authorized the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency, an organization that had close ties with the major foundations (especially Ford) and with the area studies centers that the foundations helped build.
interdisciplinary, advanced-degree-granting Area Studies Institutes at major universities throughout the US (Mitchell 2004). By 1966, when Ford discontinued this program, it had succeeded in building Institutes at 34 leading universities, and had spent $120 million dollars on the endeavor (Szanton 2004:11). At the cost of an additional $150 million dollars, Ford subsidized the training, fieldwork and write-up of several thousand social science graduate students, who were steeped in the area studies framework.

As the foregoing suggests, it is not mere coincidence that there are such strong similarities between area studies in war and peace. Both were conceived of early in WW II, almost simultaneously, in anticipation of the expanded role the US would assume in world affairs at the end of the war and during the post-war era. The moment the actual fighting came to an end, the war-time version of area studies—in the context of military government—was critical in establishing US control over vast new sections of the globe. Once order had been established, the peace-time iteration of area studies—in the context of Cold War geopolitics—was intended to help maintain the position that the US had established by means of military conquest. In other words, area studies in war was designed to help address the short-term security concerns of US military government. Area studies in peace was meant to serve the long-term security interests of Cold War, global governmentality. In the words of its corporate sponsors, Cold War area studies was intended “to promote capitalist development … to achieve social and political stability and to secure US interests” (Szanton 2004: 9).

**Conclusion**

Two decades ago Paul Rabinow made the interesting observation that the taboo against specifying the power relations involved in the production of anthropological texts was “much greater that the strictures against denouncing colonialism” (Rabinow 1986: 253). He went on to call for a careful exploration of the politics of the academy—of the complex constraints within which anthropological knowledge is produced and received (Bond 1990: 287). In closing, I would like to paraphrase Rabinow by suggesting that we focus not only on texts, but on the power relations involved in the production of anthropology itself. Anthropologists have

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22 These figures do not include the considerable sums of money that Ford and the other great philanthropies spent on building institutions of higher learning in the non-Western world.
much to gain, I would argue, by extending their gaze beyond the politics of the academy to consider the multiple ways that their discipline is embedded in the power relations of the world writ large. It is not just that these power relations represent the essential conditions of possibility of anthropological research—that most anthropological fieldwork and scholarship since WW II, for example, has taken place in a global arena whose geographic limits were defined directly by the outcome of the war—and whose economic organization and socio-political dynamics were deeply affected by the institutions established to manage the post-war world (the Bretton Woods institutions, the C.I.A., a global network of US military bases, etc.). Nor is it just that these institutions have helped make (parts of) the world safe for anthropology. Equally important is the fact that these same power relations have been deeply involved in the very constitution of anthropological practice. As I have argued in this paper, it was the immediate security concerns of military government in WW II that led army officers and university professors into unprecedented relationships that reconfigured how the world was to be conceived and managed—by social scientists and military personnel alike. It was the longer-term security concerns of the Cold War era that led foundation officials (and later, the US government) to continue what the military had begun—the creation of a new social science infrastructure and a new geography of knowledge (area studies), one that had little if anything in common with pre-war approaches to social processes.

At the time that Paul Rabinow appealed to anthropologists to analyze the politics of the academy, much ink was spilt in debates concerning reflexive anthropology (Clifford and Marcus; Marcus and Fischer 1986; ). I would like to suggest that, interesting and important though these discussions were, they missed entire dimensions of reflexivity. First, they failed to reflect upon why the US has been at the intellectual and institutional center of anthropology during the 20th century—why there is so much anthropology to reflect upon in the first place. Second, these debates showed little awareness of the distinctive assemblages of institutions and relationships that have produced different forms of anthropology as the 20th century has progressed. Finally, the discussions of the 1980s paid scant attention to the forces that have molded and shaped the very conceptual categories that anthropologists employ. The present paper has sought to open a discussion of these issues, and is offered as a preliminary foray into a revised, or new reflexive anthropology.
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