Indigenous Anthropology in Non-Western Countries: A Further Elaboration

by Hussein Fahim and Katherine Helmer

Department of Anthropology, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah 84112/Department of Anthropology, State University of New York, Binghamton, N.Y. 13902, U.S.A. 6 x 79

...we have to remind ourselves that anthropology does not merely apprehend the world in which it is located, but the world also determines how anthropology will apprehend it...

Talal Asad, Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter

In response to a preliminary statement of intention from the organizer and a letter of invitation from the sponsor, the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, 20 participants from 17 countries met at Burg Wartenstein, Austria, July 15–24, 1978, to present papers and discuss issues related to indigenous anthropology in non-Western countries. The term “indigenous anthropology” was proposed as a working concept referring to the practice of anthropology in one’s native country, society, and/or ethnic group. The label “non-Western” was conceived as appropriate for the purpose of this symposium because anthropology had originated and developed in a Western intellectual, economic, and political milieu and the increasing number of anthropologists trained and operating outside this tradition has raised new issues within the discipline.

---


2 The conference was the result of the initiative and cooperation of many individuals. The selection of participants was guided by a concern for a wide range of regional representation, academic training, intellectual perspectives, and age. Four participants came from the fields of sociology, psychology, and linguistics. A graduate student served as rapporteur. The participants and their institutional affiliations are as follows: Soraya Altorki (American University in Cairo), John Barnes (Churchill College, Cambridge), Michael Cernie (World Bank), Yehudi Cohen (Rutgers), Elizabeth Colson (University of California, Berkeley), Jean Cuisinier (Musée National des Arts et Traditions Populaires), Hussein Fahim (University of Utah), Epeli Ha'aufoa (Nuku'alofa, Tonga), Katherine Helmer (State University of New York, Binghamton), Mubanga E. Kashoki (University of Zambia, Ndola Campus), Herbert C. Kelman (Harvard), Koentjaraningrat (Kompleks Universitas Indonesia), T. N. Madan (Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi), Luiz R. B. Mott (Universidade Estadual de Campinas), Nader Asfar Naderi (Iranian Institute for Peasant and Rural Studies), Chie Nakane (University of Tokyo), Carlos Buitrago Ortiz (Universidad de Puerto Rico), Lita Omsundsen (Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research), Robert Petersen (Institute for Eskimology, Denmark), Gunnar Sorbo (University of Bergen), and Arturo Warman (University of Mexico). The participants extend their gratitude to Lita Omsundsen and the entire castle staff, in particular the director, Karl Frey, and the symposium secretary, Kristina Baena.

---

Several recent developments have made the exploration of this theme timely. Many of the countries that previously constituted favorable settings for Western anthropologists’ fieldwork have become politically sensitive developing nations. As a result, they have set restrictions on foreign anthropological research, while vigorously encouraging indigenous anthropologists to conduct research relevant to nationally defined developmental goals. Expanding cadres of local social scientists are currently conducting fieldwork “untainted” by nationalistic accusations of imperialist and colonial connections. Some speak of “decolonializing” anthropology (Macquet 1964, Stavenhagen 1971), while others are developing new concepts and methodologies for the practice of indigenous research (Nash 1975, Fahim 1976).

Parallel to the growth of indigenous anthropology in the Third World, many Western anthropologists, especially in the United States, are turning to domestic social interests and problems. While this trend may be seen as a way of coping with the difficulties of overseas research, unfavorable domestic job markets, and tight academic research budgets, there is a lively and creative indigenous anthropology developing in the United States (e.g., Spradley 1970, Arens and Montague 1976). “Already we have some foreshadowing of the advances that may take place when anthropologists who have worked in other countries turn their thinking to our large-scale American and European societies and their associated institutions” (Colson 1976:268).

In this period of rethinking, reviving, and reassessing anthropology, the discipline has recently begun to examine the fieldwork process and to question results on the basis of methods and techniques. Anthropologists in the United States, for instance, are publishing accounts of their fieldwork experience and procedures (e.g., Freilich 1970, Wax 1971, Foster and Kemper 1974). The experiences of non-Western anthropologists, however, remain to be adequately investigated. Third World anthropologists must be given an equal opportunity to report on the state of anthropology and fieldwork experiences within their local settings.

Many argue that the fundamental premises of the anthropological enterprise are, or should be, the same regardless of the identity of the researcher or the locus of investigation. Nonetheless, the underlying assumption in this working concept of “indigenous anthropology” is that a change in the actor (i.e., local in lieu of foreign) implies a change in the anthropologist’s role and perspective. Methodologies may change from one setting to another, but anthropology in Third World countries may also require a “set of theories based on non-Western precepts and assumptions in the same sense that modern anthropology is based on and has supported Western beliefs and values” (Jones 1970:251). The concept of native anthropology, as proposed by Jones, clearly identifies the re-
searcher as a member of the ethnic/minority group under study and focuses on the epistemological implications of this relationship. Thus native anthropology is only one facet of indigenous anthropology, which accommodates the various relationships which may exist between the local researcher and the people studied and focuses on both the epistemological and the operational consequences of these relationships.

While the ideas of the Enlightenment constituted the source of intellectual inspiration for Western anthropology, the attainment of political and economic independence from colonizing powers coupled with a thrust for greater cultural integrity seems to underlie Third World anthropologists’ efforts to counter the Western traditions of the discipline with an “indigenous base” of novel perspectives. Conference participants differed, however, as to whether or not indigenous anthropology in the Third World should develop a separate non-Western theoretical base.

In the past few decades, Third World perspectives have become increasingly evident. For instance, in Sol Tax’s World Anthropology series, scholars of different nationalities and ideologies share their views on problems of common concern. The concern for “acknowledging and effectively harnessing the paradigm-breaking and paradigm-building capacity of Third World perspectives” (Hsu and Textor 1978:5) has also manifested itself in a number of important activities ranging from the symbolic act of holding the Xth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences in India (December 1978) to the formation of an association for Third World anthropologists.3

Within this conceptual framework, participants were asked to consider the conceptual and operational implications of indigenous anthropology for theoretical, methodological, pedagogical, and ethical issues. It was believed that maximum flexibility befitted the exploratory nature of the conference’s theme, which was conceived as a unique opportunity (1) to gather non-Western anthropologists for an exchange of information and views on their own experiences in practicing anthropology in their respective countries, (2) to seek systematic discussion of the problems facing local anthropologists of the Third World, (3) to explore their potential contributions in relation to the global concerns of the discipline, and (4) to develop means for more effective communication among Third World anthropologists and within the entire world community of anthropologists.

The papers distributed in advance of the conference covered a wide range of topics, reflecting a wealth of diverse experiences and views. Following a brief presentation of each paper, the discussant initiated an exchange of views in an open discussion. Overviews were offered by Elizabeth Colson, T. N. Madan, and Herbert Kelman. (These are printed below, along with a comment on the conference as a whole by Talal Asad.) In light of these presentations, selected themes were suggested for intensive discussion.

ON INDIGENOUS ANTHROPOLOGY

As already indicated, the concept of indigenous anthropology implies a qualitative change in the research process and results attributable to the researcher’s affiliation with a particular nation-state, culture, or ethnic group. Showing a sympathetic understanding of the need for such a concept, some participants offered descriptions of the different situations in which indigenous anthropologists find themselves. Others approached the concept on the epistemological level and were divided in their estimation of its utility. One participant rejected it entirely on the grounds that the contrast between indigenous and foreign, Western and non-Western, is a construct derived from the colonial process which “creates false problems and irrelevant issues.” In general, however, two major orientations towards the concept, related to the long-standing issue of objectivity in the social sciences, emerged.

The first defined the individual’s social and personal attributes as a bias to be overcome by both indigenous and foreign scholars through critical self-awareness and methodological rigor. Carried to an extreme, indigenous anthropology could result in excessive subjectivity and relativism. Barnes and Mott argued that the segmentation of the discipline along ethnic or national lines would be at cross-purposes with the goal of generating universally applicable and valid statements and could result in innumerable anthropologies on the same topic. It was suggested that participants might better address themselves to challenging the epistemological base of the discipline, which continues to conceive of its scope as “the study of others,” inasmuch as this denies the indigenous scholar’s potential for conducting research in his own society and could mean the loss of considerable resources.

Countering this first stance was a second which viewed bias as a problem of the discipline as a whole. According to this orientation, anthropology has been unduly influenced by the cultural perspectives of its predominantly Western practitioners in the selection of topics, approach to problems, and interpretation of data. Nakane, for example, spoke of the distance between the well-established intellectual traditions of Japan and Western Europe, which has led to disparate research concerns in the two scholarly communities. She suggested that her Japanese colleagues could make substantial contributions to theory building, since their perspectives emerge from an independently formed and evolving intellectual milieu. The Japanese case is dissimilar to that of Third World countries, where the colonial process and the postindependence period have had an impact on the evaluation and continuity of indigenous intellectual traditions. Addressing the issue of original scholarship in African universities, Kashiki suggested that Africans return to their own cultural “roots,” in search of a new epistemology that would spring from local knowledge, meanings, and perceptions—indeed, from indigenous sociocultural biases. The fountainhead for unique concepts and terminology might be found in African languages, whose richness has yet to be drawn upon. It was proposed that new concepts and explanatory models generated from other cultural perspectives might provide “a better fit” between social reality—as perceived by a scholarly member of that society—and anthropological paradigms. Some argued that the product would not be “a better fit,” merely a different perspective. If Western paradigms are unsuited to the research demands of non-Western countries, they said, this is an argument for revision of the paradigms rather than a problem calling for a separate theoretical base.

Many Third World participants called on indigenous anthropologists to question, redefine, and, if necessary, reject particular concepts and models that Western anthropologists’ cultural biases have at times produced. Hau’ofoa stressed the need to include sentiment and emotion in analytical frameworks dealing with such basic relations as reciprocity. Analyses bereft of sentiment may distort reality beyond the recognition of the people studied (Hau’ofoa 1975). Research that measures behavior without reference to underlying values may result in the objectification of human beings and the exaggeration of the importance of economically rational behavior.

In a similar vein, Madan called for a new kind of anthropology to fill the gaps of knowledge and understanding left by the positivism of Western anthropologists. By linking symbols, meaning, and values (in the people’s own terms) to behavior, anthropology could achieve a significant change in substance and perspective. This call for greater emphasis on cultural

Vol. 21 • No. 5 • October 1980

645

3 The Association of Third World Anthropologists was founded in Houston, Texas, in 1977 with the purpose of “making anthropology less prejudiced against Third World peoples by making it less ethnocentric in its use of language and paradigms.”
content was vehemently opposed by some participants on the ground that it would represent a regression for the discipline. What would be the social relevance of such studies? Under poverty conditions, where food, shelter, and a better future are more central to people’s concerns, would not this type of understanding be a luxury? It was held that the often-mentioned crisis in anthropology should serve as a deterrent to continued involvement in highly specialized, particularistic studies of little practical value to local communities and help to establish research priority guidelines.

It was countered that areas of relevance should not be so circumscribed as to include only those studies whose ultimate aim is to direct the economic behavior of local populations. With such a definition, the originality of a culture undergoing change might never be recorded. In very practical terms, a profound understanding of values is of great utility in instructing planners on the potential impact of development projects.

A moderating voice suggested that research priorities be determined within each particular setting, taking into account the structure of academic institutions, the specific goals and policies of the government, and the ethical commitments of the individual anthropologist. It may not be crucial to establish rigid categories distinguishing relevant from irrelevant research; the unstructured nature of many inquiries and the compatibility of theoretical and applied research obviate the necessity for a neat distinction.

The views expressed in this debate revealed basic philosophical differences among participants as to the nature and goals of anthropology, especially in terms of the long-standing argument about the status of the social sciences along the humanities/physical-sciences continuum. In order to avoid the epistemological confusion that had risen due to participants’ interchangeable use of the terms “indigenous anthropology” and “Third World perspectives,” it was suggested that the term “indigenous” be abandoned and that discussions focus on the identification and comparison of the works of local and foreign anthropologists.

**Advantages and Constraints**

Given the fact that some of the most comprehensive and perceptive works have been produced by missionaries and Westerners residing abroad for long periods of time, is it possible that two factors alone—the length of the “socialization period” and language facility—separate the foreigner from the local anthropologist trained in the West? Is there something particularly advantageous about indigenous status during fieldwork apart from these factors? These questions were approached in terms of a dichotomy between foreign and indigenous researchers which highlighted the potential complementarity of the two types of researcher and the need for their collaboration.

For example, their access to information depends on differential ability to investigate particular realms of social life and behavior. As Fahim pointed out, the local anthropologist may not be taken seriously by informants if he probes types of behavior that informants view as commonly shared knowledge, such as marriage customs, or he may be considered intolerably crude in broaching other topics, such as sexual practices. Recognized as a member of the society within which he conducts research, he is subject to the cultural expectations of his informants. To challenge certain norms may mean risking estrangement or ostracism. Because of his sensitivity to people’s expectations, he is likely to have better relationships than the foreign anthropologist, although, as Colson stated, “the rude foreigner” may be able to “crash through the barriers and ask the kinds of questions that may not be appropriate. People are willing to respond since they realize that the anthropologist, a sort of ‘innocent child,’ does not know.”

Comparing his fieldwork experiences as an indigenous anthropologist among Javanese peasants with those as a foreign anthropologist among Papuan sago gatherers and Dutch fishermen, Koentjaraningrat described the impact of his social identity on data collection and demonstrated that being a member of the society one studies is both an asset and a liability: “an indigenous investigator will face various communication difficulties because his subjects, members of the same society as himself, a priori put him in a definite social category in which he remains trapped, usually throughout the entire research period.” The role of “powerless and neutral stranger,” to use Barnes’s words, which permits the fieldworker to probe aspects of political and economic events or institutions, is relatively inaccessible to the indigenous scholar.

The insider’s advantages include a more comprehensive view of the macrosociety to which the local community is linked and an ability to acquire intimate data and invaluable understandings of symbol and value systems whose intricacies may perpetually confound the foreigner. The indigenous anthropologist has the advantage of knowing the human processes that are missing in the abstract model. Elaborating on the idea that local anthropologists may profit from their control of knowledge about values, ethnic traditions, religious beliefs, and symbols, Colson pointed out that foreign anthropologists may not always provide sound interpretations of the phenomena they study. “For instance,” she said, “the study of Geertz on the religion of Java may have been an influential work, but it is, in the view of Indonesian scholars, no more than a good description of rituals that failed to explain the values underlying the ritual system.”

Perhaps a common problem facing anthropologists is their unwillingness to commit themselves to the long-term examinations needed to acquire depth of knowledge on the values and traditions related to the phenomena they study. This could, however, result in another serious handicap, for anthropologists who engaged in long-term studies would have difficulty conducting more than one such study. As a result, they would be unable to work in a variety of societies and thus would lose the opportunity of having their assumptions verified and their findings challenged.

The contrast between indigenous and foreign anthropologists was illustrated in a dialogue between Sorbo and Fahim, both of whom have conducted research among Nubians relocated as a result of the construction of the Aswan High Dam. Sorbo and Fahim reflected on their careers, which revealed intriguing parallels and dissimilarities. A Norwegian anthropologist, Sorbo has done 14 months of fieldwork in the Sudan since 1970 in relation to the New Halla resettlement scheme. Indigenous in terms of his nationality, Fahim has spent approximately 30 months among Egyptian Nubians since 1963. Both conducted their doctoral research with academic concerns of a theoretical and methodological nature. However, when they returned to their respective research sites in the early ‘70s to study tenant absenteeism, their experiences diverged. Sponsored by the Norwegian Research Council, Sorbo was able to document tenants’ economic problems by taking advantage of project statistics and through participant observation of Nubians and nomadic people on and off the project. Sponsored by his government and the American University in Cairo, Fahim was unable to gather reliable data from Nubian informants, who felt threatened by his affiliations.

Commenting on their values in the field, Sorbo and Fahim presented a marked contrast. Sorbo stated that his values were academic, geared towards maintaining a critical outlook on his theoretical premises and biases. “It is one thing,” he said, “to ask, ‘How did you feel about a people?’ and quite another to ask, ‘How did this affect your data collection?’ I don’t think that my political attitudes affected the way I went about collecting material.” Fahim acknowledged that he had taken a different set of values into the field with him. Part of a larger society which perceives Nubians as a lower-status group because of their traditional involvement in domestic occupations,
he had felt pressured by friends and relatives who were perplexed by his work. Although he did not underestimate the difficulties of resettlement for the Nubians, he could not entirely share their assessment of the scheme because of his growing awareness of national goals and his understanding of the place the scheme had within this larger context. Aware of the limited impact of his research, Fahim was also frustrated by the fact that the time and research monies could perhaps have been spent in a more useful manner.

The indigenous-foreigner dichotomy has heuristic value in bringing to light the ethical questions and research problems facing the indigenous anthropologist which may not confront his foreign colleagues. However, the broad category of "indigenous anthropologist" obscures the fact that indigenous anthropologists find themselves in a great variety of positions vis-à-vis the local groups that affect their self-perceived roles and the expectations of the local community.

**Professional Identities and Roles**

Unlike his Western colleague, who finds himself in an almost totally academic environment, with its peculiar system of rewards and sanctions meted out by a well-defined reference group, the indigenous anthropologist in non-Western countries may be academically isolated, urged by his government to become involved in development-oriented research, and judged by his fellow citizens, members of his ethnic group or class. While the indigenous anthropologist sees his society through the eyes of a trained professional, he also identifies to some extent with part or all of that society and reacts on a personal level to the changes within it. This can lead the anthropologist to redefine both his own role and that of his discipline.

Thus, if anthropology is a product of the society in which it exists, roles should be diverse rather than standardized, and anthropologists' roles should presumably vary from one country to another and fluctuate over time. It was indicated, for instance, that American anthropologists over the past three decades have become engaged in a variety of activities. In addition to their typical educational role, they have served as consultants for various domestic and foreign agencies in the areas of social welfare, agricultural development, etc. Anthropologists now function in government departments and serve on various committees which deal with policy questions, for example, on food, housing, and energy. This policy-oriented activity, however, is currently witnessing a "trend of retreat," as Colson put it. There is apparently a conservative tendency to look at culture as "a symbolic system rather than as an implement," and many Western anthropologists today are developing a style of anthropology that merges with literature and drama. Their works reflect an interest in text and context and a concern with science and metaphor. Osmundsen suggested that such a variety of roles is probably due to the large number of American anthropologists, a feature that is nonexistent in most Third World countries.

In non-Western countries, the professional and sociopolitical factors confronting local anthropologists are leading them to respond to local needs. Cohen suggested that the demands put on Third World anthropologists will require significant theoretical innovations as well. Basing this argument on the premise that Western anthropology has failed to develop a model of culture as change or rid itself of preconceptions of homeostasis, integration, and persistence, Cohen stressed the unsuitability of Western paradigms for societies undergoing rapid, large-scale change in the developing world. He argued the need for a separate theoretical base, inclusive of exogenous forces of change, and the extension of research scope beyond the boundaries of the local community to the origins of that change in central planning agencies. Innovations directed and provoked by state administration necessitate different models of culture if anthropologists are to participate in the process of social engineering. The training and education of Western anthropologists, he suggested, is geared to culturally perceived ends that generally exclude practical applications, since state planning is viewed as a limitation of the individual's freedom. Anthropologists in different cultures under various social imperatives must devise their own means in pursuit of new goals. Thus, a qualitative difference in the source and direction of change in developing countries and different roles for anthropologists should prompt the creation of a new type of anthropology.

Cohen's remarks drew defensive and cautionary comments. Sorbo pointed to the need for more realistic expectations of anthropology based on a clear distinction between the ability to prophesy events in repetitive, closed systems and the ability to predict sources of change and their effects in the open systems that constitute societies. Warman agreed with Cohen's examination of the discipline's inadequacies, but he related them to the abandonment of evolutionary schemes present in the theories of capitalist expansion and Marxist analyses and their replacement by structural/functional approaches that can "serve only as autopsies or X-rays" of society. Cernea, although he insisted that social scientists have provided crucial information in development situations, suggested that both indigenous and foreign anthropologists lack an adequate theoretical base for development work and have little if any training for practical professional activities. He argued that institutions engaged in the formation of future anthropologists should critically assess the consequences of training students to become members of a learned society to the exclusion of alternative professional roles.

This call for a qualitatively different type of training and education for anthropologists was echoed by Petersen, who found the need apparent in the local community undergoing development. His own minority group, the Inuit of Greenland, has lacked "alternative expertise," independent of the dominant society and decision-making bodies, to advise them on measures proposed by Danish government agencies. Development plans devoid of local input have resulted in cultural misunderstanding between the Inuit and administrators and a sharpening of the Inuit's sense of their own exploitation. Petersen stated that development measures and scientific research have been psychologically very damaging to the Inuit. Recurrently the objects of scientific research, they have not been asked to participate in the selection of research topics, and research findings have seldom been communicated. "In some cases," he said, "you may hear people say: 'No more sociologists!' or the like." The need for well-trained, culturally sensitive, and politically aware intermediaries is recognized by both local populations and central agencies.

Focusing on the role of the indigenous anthropologist in agency-sponsored development research, Cernea emphasized that the indigenous anthropologist's personal commitment, cultural understandings, and potential for activism as a citizen are invaluable in pressuring for development projects more congruent with the expectations and needs of the local people. Indeed, it is often this very capacity for activism that has made governments distrustful and suspicious of their competent social scientists.

The participation of local anthropologists in action-oriented research has not followed a uniform pattern in Third World countries. Warman spoke of Mexico, where local anthropologists had been actively engaged by the government in development projects since the late 1940s; in retrospect, he said, they had been hired to produce research that legitimized the projects and to act as brokers to ensure the participation of the local populations. Seeing the consequences of the projects, Mexican anthropologists had dissociated themselves from the official Mexican, returned to the universities, and become critics of the development model. With the passage of time, their critiques have proven accurate. Their government is now asking for the
advice of social scientists. "We are now in a position where we can decide how and where we will participate. We find that our best work is done with this critical approach to development," Warman said. Fahim agreed with Warman on the significance of a critical approach to development plans, but he maintained that anthropologists should also strive to present alternative strategies. "One important shortcoming in the training process," he noted, "is our inability to provide students with guidelines for formulating alternatives and developing future scenarios."

The discussion of local anthropologists' involvement in national projects raised the issue of the relationship between the anthropologist and the state. Referring to a Western tendency to denounce the collaboration of Third World social scientists with government agencies for the purpose of integrating marginal groups into the national context, Naderi pointed out that it is critical to take such measures in developing countries, where isolated ethnic groups may be vulnerable to the manipulation of "outside agents provocateurs." Related to this issue was Warman's suggestion that realistic assessments of the present position of minority groups within national boundaries would mean the abandonment of such questions as "Can a group be integrated?" or "How can they be brought into the national economic mainstream?" Critical, constructive inquiries concerning the possibility of a more equitable and symmetrical integration of groups that have long been integrated in an exploitative manner are needed.

Naderi pointed to the loss of an audience outside the discipline and of recruits within as symptoms of crisis. Drawing upon his experiences in Iran, he described the utility of social anthropology in the context of development planning and his resolution of the ethical dilemmas faced when, as a citizen and an ethnographer of nomadic people, he was asked to be a consultant to the government on the development of their region. He found that planning agencies would listen if facts and alternatives were offered and that there is not necessarily a polarity of interests between the people studied and the government. Having established rapport with planners, he could influence the design of plans and maximize benefits for the tribesmen.

Cohen contrasted Naderi's efforts to function as mediator with the prevalence of an antistate bias among Western anthropologists. This bias, he stated, leaves them ill-prepared to deal with modern societies where national units, such as corporations or the state, are increasingly controlling the type and quantity of resources available at the local level. The adaptation of these communities is often a function of the pressures and opportunities coming from the state organization. The process by which resources become available or remain inaccessible cannot be studied by focusing on the local unit alone. Antistate bias is usually associated with the anthropologist's advocacy of the local population. To achieve some sort of balance in perspectives, Cohen suggested that social scientists question the basis of their advocacy and take a critical look at the characteristics of local autonomous groups, their disenfranchisement of particular segments within their locale, and their conservative nature, which has at its source a local elite with its own self-serving interests.

The need for "studying up," i.e., focusing on the elite and their roles as decision makers, reflects, in part, a reaction to the inadequacies of local community studies. However, as Kashoki pointed out, it also reflects a deep-seated Western bias which sets up a dichotomy between citizens and the elite, depicting the state as "the property of the elite" and unfairly excluding the elite from the citizen category. In many instances, social scientists form part of this elite, and their activism has encouraged the more equitable distribution of national resources. The placement of academics within the bureaucracies of developing nations creates the possibility of collaboration between functionaries and researchers which is unmatched in industrialized societies, where specialization separates the professions.

Nonetheless, the constraints upon academic technocrats force them to demand quick solutions to weighty problems, and the communication of research findings to paper-ridden bureaucrats may be difficult. In order to overcome this obstacle, Koenjarantragrat suggested that the popular media be utilized to reach decision makers and at the same time foster better understanding among citizens divided along ethnic and religious lines.

Commenting on the ethical issues raised by participants, Kelman noted that the social scientist has multiple responsibilities—towards the people studied, the larger society, the authorities, and the wider scientific community. He can attempt to reduce the group's dependency or powerlessness by actively involving its members in his research and by helping them use its findings. He should also be responsive to the needs of society and achieve a balance between theoretical and applied research, but he must to some degree stand outside the system. Finally, his interaction with colleagues and the wider scientific community should result in the building of equal research capacities.

Several non-Western participants viewed with skepticism the possibility of social scientists' maintaining an independent role vis-à-vis their governments. It was suggested that anthropologists in political difficulties as a result of their professional activities should not be viewed as individuals in a personal crisis. Their situations should receive professional concern in the same manner as cases involving the betrayal of our professional code of ethics. For this reason, international solidarity among anthropologists should be promoted simultaneously with attempts to form a world scholarly community.

Although these discussions only scratched the surface of questions concerning new roles and ethical considerations of indigenous anthropologists in non-Western countries, a clearer picture should emerge with increased communication and collaboration among scholars facing these new situations and expectations.

**NOTIONS AND PROPOSALS**

Throughout the conference, participants advanced provocative notions and concrete proposals. Colson indicated that the discussions had shown the need to break the monopoly of anthropologists from a few countries, mainly Western ones, over the present and future prospects of the field. She called for an international anthropology and emphasized that regional and international communication among anthropologists requires the development of a common conceptual language. Madan, on the other hand, called for a nationally advanced, self-conscious anthropology within a shrinking world. He argued that anthropologists cannot continue to work within compartments, but must have a concept of the minimum requirements of all mankind.

Barriers to worldwide exchange and cooperation, especially among Third World anthropologists, were repeatedly acknowledged and stimulated the formulation of strategies to overcome them. Fahim proposed that systematic and substantive reports regarding the current status of anthropological inquiry be prepared for the purpose of comparison among developing countries. These reports would include descriptions of the activities of anthropologists in each setting, research trends and publications, historical development, and needs for future development. Reports might be published in Current Anthropology as they were completed and later compiled in a single publication. The initial collection need not provide worldwide coverage and should be published in a modest, inexpensive format to serve as a model for future efforts of a more comprehensive nature. Such reports would perpetuate the exciting exchange generated by the Burg Wartenstein conference and, at the same time, reach a much larger audience.

Grappling with similar concerns and new expectations, social scientists of the developing world should be able to conduct collaborative research on a basis of equality and reciprocity.
which has frequently been lacking in joint projects between Western and non-Western researchers. Fahim suggested that collaborative research not be limited to advanced scholars, but be extended to the training of graduate students of Western and non-Western countries. This would promote a corrective, international dimension within the educational process, prevent the perpetuation of negative, prejudicial attitudes, and encourage new perspectives. Such a program might entail bringing together students from the West and elsewhere for joint training and fieldwork and would eventually result in a two-way flow of information between the West and non-West and, perhaps more importantly, directly among developing countries. Unlike much training in the West, it should be oriented towards the application of social research, preparation of students for nonacademic employment, and a more interdisciplinary approach appropriate to the development of a broader and more practical perspective. Such collaborative efforts could only be implemented by professionals who had first “reeducated themselves” concerning the contributions of major centers outside the West.

The exchange program between the University of Bergen, Norway, and the University of Khartoum, Sudan, most closely approximates the type of cooperation needed between Western and Third World institutions. As Sorbo explained, Norwegian and Sudanese students may study one or more years in either university and then conduct research in the Sudan under joint supervision. Kelman noted that such cooperation at the interinstitutional level would perhaps provide the best means for dealing with logistic problems and be the best model for assuring continuity and a sense of responsibility towards the program. Since such exchange programs reinforce the tendency for students from developing nations to return home for their field research, efforts should be made to encourage them to undertake fieldwork in the West so that they might profit from a comparative perspective when studying their indigenous institutions.

A third proposal consisted of a series of problem-oriented and perhaps region-specific conferences, held whenever possible by institutions outside the United States and Europe, at which foreign and indigenous anthropologists and scholars from related disciplines might meet to exchange views on issues of common interest. Three topics for such conferences were suggested: (a) indigenous anthropologists’ perspectives on rural development (in specific regions), its study, policies, and implementation, and the potential impact of Western research on rural development policies; (b) the adaptation of traditional patterns of architecture and habitat to the requirements of modernization; and (c) the theoretical bases of cross-cultural comparison and the potential for extending the use of concepts elaborated by indigenous savants to cultural areas other than those for which they were originally formulated.

Through the comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of indigenous status in the field, it was concluded that foreign and indigenous scholars have different abilities to create roles for themselves in the local setting, to gain access to information, and to understand the values underlying behavior. Since their potentialities are complementary, collaborative research between foreign and indigenous researchers was proposed as both a remedy and an exciting possibility, with the condition that this collaboration be on egalitarian and reciprocal terms.

In view of these proposals, the conference functioned as an initial phase in the formation of an international network that would provide channels for future communication and continuity in the exploration and development of ideas.

**Summary and Concluding Remarks**

The discussions indicated that indigenous anthropology, even as a working concept, could constitute a potential danger to the epistemological unity of the discipline. Most of the conference’s participants did not favor the institutionalization of a separate branch of “indigenous anthropology” in non-Western countries, but they expressed the opinion that the contribution of Third World anthropologists could substantially alter the substance of anthropology by broadening its underlying ideas and perspectives. Nonetheless, some argued for the need to see Third World anthropology totally separate from the Western traditions of the discipline. Kashoki, in particular, held that “indigenous anthropology” should be taken as a synonym for Third World perspectives: “How else is the Third World to contribute to the anthropological enterprise if it does not bring its perspectives to bear on the matter?” According to him, the basic questions are what qualitative change is called for and how much of a contribution non-Western peoples will be allowed to make to the betterment of anthropology before they are labelled disintegrationists or fragmentalists.

While local and foreign anthropologists may have, by and large, common theoretical perspectives and orientations, local anthropologists in non-Western countries may encounter settings that foster different professional activities. Their work and problems should be neither overlooked nor undermined. Many participants were concerned that, although Third World anthropologists may be involved, by choice or necessity, in development-oriented research, other interests also be encouraged and initiated. Undoubtedly, there is growing concern and appreciation for the contributions of Third World anthropologists, but these contributions should not be viewed solely as feedback for existing Western anthropological knowledge. Third World anthropologists should have the opportunity to contribute on an equal basis with their Western colleagues in international organizations and journals which aim to develop a worldwide discipline of anthropology.

In a round-table appraisal of the conference, participants expressed mixed views. Many had found it useful in terms of identifying and discussing several issues critical to the current state of the discipline and its future prospects. Nonetheless, they felt that it had fallen short in its treatment of other issues. Some had anticipated more critical and explicit discussion of what non-Western anthropologists can contribute and suggested this topic as a theme for a future conference. Barnes, on the other hand, thought that a significant accomplishment of the conference lay in its pragmatic emphasis on individual experiences and the problems implied by doing anthropology at home. “Theory must come to grips with reality for it to become useful,” he said. It became apparent that the conference’s theme could very well have provided topics for two separate ones, the first dealing with the practical and ethical aspects of conducting research within one’s own society and the second relating to the epistemological implications of contributions from the non-Western world.

Reflecting on the conference in terms of its future impact, Cohen mentioned that it had provided him with insights that would benefit him in revising aspects of the anthropology curriculum at Rutgers University. Osmundsen felt the symposium had generated challenging questions and worthwhile proposals and expressed her hope that the Foundation would carry out some of the proposals—for instance, publishing the reports on “anthropology around the world” and developing the broadening base of fellowships granted to students from countries outside the Western world. Warmen reported having gained the realization that the problems facing Mexican anthropologists were not unique to Mexico. The conference assured him that anthropology is taking a new course, with people from different nations and backgrounds taking the discipline into their own hands and utilizing it within an appropriate framework.

The fundamental question, Kelman concluded, is how to advance anthropology in the developing countries, and more specifically in one’s own country, especially in regard to social
problems. The conference reaffirmed his belief in the importance of interdisciplinary orientation and activities. Social psychology and anthropology are in similar periods of crisis in relation to ethical considerations, a disaffection with traditional means in inquiry, and the need to incorporate non-Western perspectives. The fact that conferences on comparable issues have recently been held in the two disciplines emphasized the utility of collaboration.

From the organizer’s point of view, the conference accomplished its philosophical goal of substituting a constructive dialogue for Western-versus-non-Western polemics and making it possible for participants to think realistically about the discipline’s complex problems. It was not intended to provide final answers to long-standing issues. It did bring ideas to the consciousness of participants and prod them to consider alternatives to existing patterns. “Anthropology is about all of us and its findings ought to apply to all of us equally” (Colson 1976:263).

In the organizer’s opinion, the realization of that conception of the discipline by all anthropologists is essential to the fulfillment of their responsibilities and commitments to the discipline’s advancement.

by Elizabeth Colson
Department of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley, Calif. 94720, U.S.A. 1 x 79

Anthropologists from Japan, India, Mexico, Brazil—what do they have in common with anthropologists from Zambia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the Tonga Islands? Or with those from Greenland, Puerto Rico, Indonesia, Egypt? At least, what do they have in common that they do not share with anthropologists from Britain, France, Norway, and the United States?

This paper is the result of mulling over what was said and implied at the Burg Wartenstein conference. The majority of the participants were anthropologists from countries in which anthropology either is a relatively new and undeveloped intellectual subject or is associated with an influx of foreign social scientists or, in some cases, is an old field of intellectual activity based on some tradition other than that which has been associated with the growth of sociocultural anthropology in Britain, France, and the United States, the three countries which have dominated the discipline for much of the first portion of this century. For convenience they can be referred to as “Third World” anthropologists—“indigenous” is a misnomer, for all of us are indigenous somewhere and the majority of anthropologists at some time deal with their own communities.

The Search for Identity

Support for research varies from one country to another of the Third World, as do the size of the academic community and other features that affect the role of social scientists or of intellectuals in general. Nevertheless, the majority of Third World anthropologists see themselves as plagued by a poverty of research funding and by a lack of respect for anthropology as an intellectual discipline or as a profession relevant to their countries’ futures. Frequently they see themselves as restricted in their research by the sensitivities associated with political insecurity. They find themselves intellectually isolated, with few local colleagues in their own field and perhaps with few local colleagues of any kind who know anything about the social sciences. In some Third World countries the shortage of educated people is still such that the anthropologist, once trained and eager to begin work, is drafted into administration.

In Western Europe, the United States, and other favored areas, anthropologists may suffer from a shortage of research funds and currently from a shortage of jobs, but in comparison with the support available in the Third World they can only be envied. And they are. While they may not be able to get funds to carry out certain kinds of research, or in some cases may be refused access to do such research, they suffer from many fewer restrictions when they work at home than do Third World anthropologists, whose research interests only too frequently must be tailored to projects regarded as of immediate practical importance by a national authority or an international agency.

This in itself involves the Third World anthropologists in a dilemma, a dilemma they share with many other social scientists throughout the world when faced with involvement in applied programs. They are divided among themselves on how they should respond. Some believe that they should use whatever skills they have to further the various plans of their government for rural development, urban development, or the creation of new industrial opportunities which may offer new jobs and new alternatives to their compatriots. Others are ambivalent or hostile to such involvement. Third World people in general see development as involving the importation of alien ways. The anthropologists have no desire to see their own countries become an echo of France, the Soviet Union, Britain, Canada, the United States, or any other country. By and large they believe in the importance of their own traditions. Therefore they do not want to work, as anthropologists, to speed a process which will cut their people free from their past.

Some take the stand that models of development currently available stem from either the capitalist or the communist world and query whether they are applicable to local conditions. Since the models come associated with alien assumptions which deprecate local institutions and local traditions, they are still more concerned. Those who implement programs based on these models frequently are able to do so because of the desire to push forward with change. Development is also likely to increase local dependency upon international economic institutions and vulnerability to economic fluctuations. As Mott and Warman pointed out, many anthropologists today ask if in fact development schemes contribute to the well-being of those whom they are supposed to serve even in the material sense: in too many instances the programs have resulted in further impoverishment, both cultural and economic.

The failures of the Green Revolution and other major programs have led to a widespread questioning of the assumptions of the 1950s and 1960s about how development can be induced and about what can be regarded as constituting development. The anthropologists are not the only ones who are unhappy about the failures and the unforeseen consequences of different schemes. Indeed, these very failures have led other specialists to turn to the anthropologists, as specialists of the grass roots, for a better understanding of the social and cultural milieu within which development must take place. This comes at a time when anthropologists themselves are doubtful of the existence of any anthropological or social science theory which can provide a basis for happier intervention, even if they do not question the morality of such intervention. They are querying both goals and methods.

Some go so far as to refuse to engage in any further field research, even of an ethnographic nature, until they know what they are about. Especially among Latin American anthropologists, appalled at what has been happening in their own countries in the name of economic development, this stance is now common even among those once associated themselves with various government programs. They are unwilling to be technicians helping to implement ends which they question. They are engaged, therefore, in a reexamination of the philosophical bases upon which anthropology rests, and this involves them also in an extensive critique of national and international politico-economic organization.

The role of social critic or moral philosopher is an old role in anthropology, but it is more easily assumed in Western Europe.
the United States, or other countries with a tradition of freedom of discussion than it is in the Soviet bloc or in many parts of the Third World, where one may criticize foreign but not home institutions. Some governments give short shrift to independent critics who challenge basic political or economic assumptions or query the bases of social institutions. For that matter, some anthropologists who see the fragility of their current regime's support and fear the turmoil of revolution are themselves wary of the role of public critic. They are prepared to raise questions from inside the system but not to mount a public attack.

If they are not to be applied social scientists or social critics, however, Third World anthropologists find it difficult to say what their role should be or to find support for their activities. Those in political power and other intellectuals in their own countries see little need for anything like an anthropologist's service as a disinterested enterprise, though they may support historical studies as a support for national identities. The political leaders want technicians who can tinker with a program rather than those prepared to give them a broadly based evaluation. They do not turn to anthropologists, as did colonial administrations, for basic descriptions of the various societies and cultures to be found within the country, for they assume that as local people they are already experts on such matters. Few realize how alienated they have become from the people at the base of the system. They do not think they need anthropologists to help them achieve an understanding of the peculiarities of people of other countries, given that ideology frequently provides an adequate explanation for any difficulties of communication with the rest of the world. Given the common experience among intellectuals of partial alienation from their home communities through years of study abroad, anthropology has little additional power to stir the imagination by a confrontation with the unexpected into a speculation upon the adequacies of inherited wisdom or the meaning of the spectrum of human variation. Given the rapidity of change, the classical anthropological descriptions of the people of Third World countries are out of date, of little use in planning current action, and too recent to be regarded as hallowed historical records. The anthropologists therefore cannot justify their profession by reference to its historic accomplishments, especially when these are seen as linked to the colonial past.

These very monographs, written as they usually were by foreign social scientists for a foreign audience, may be part of the case against the Third World anthropologists in their own country, branding them by association. The monographs were written from the outsider's point of view and evaluate local behavior and knowledge in alien, and often condescending, terms. Even if this were not so, every community would prefer to present itself to the outside world in terms of its ideal of itself, even though its members know how frequently it fails to reach that ideal. When it fails, they justify that failure and see it in the context of the overall vision of what a good society should be. Members know pragmatically how little ideal and behavior match, and in their cynical moments they can give a realistic account of how they bypass the rules and pursue individual ends. This does not mean that they want that knowledge put in the public record and used against them. The anthropologist's account, if well done, confronts the ideal with the pragmatic compromises and raises questions that are disruptive, to say the least, when members of the community described look at themselves in public undress. The social survey which faces them with only anonymous statistics is easier to bear. No wonder that so much anthropology is now carried out in Third World countries under the rubric of sociology or taught in Third World universities under that heading.

The detailed field study written by the foreigner is bad enough, but it can be dismissed as based on inadequate knowledge or as reflecting foreign prejudice. A comparable account written by a fellow citizen is more difficult to brush off and constitutes a betrayal of privileged information. Third World anthropologists who write for an international professional audience are thus caught between the expectations of their fellow professionals and the expectations of their home audience. Until they can forge new standards of what constitutes good research and impress these standards upon the profession at large, they will continue to face this dilemma unless they are prepared to settle for purely local reputations.

Those who have been able to carry out field research abroad—as Koentjaraningrat, Hau'o'afa, and Nakane have done—find it much easier to write with dispassion and without reservation in reporting their findings from such research. But this lays them open to the charge so commonly laid against the foreign anthropologist: that they are dealing with people as objects. They also share with other anthropologists who work outside their home countries by the rest of the foreign encounter, a zest which is absent from field research on home ground. As Nakane commented, the one has all the excitement of reading a detective novel, while the other has the routine quality associated with regular housework. One knows what is coming next. They also have the reward of fresh discoveries, which may be taken seriously by the people among whom they work, as are John Ogbu's findings from his study of minority education in Stockton, California (Ogbu 1974). Unfortunately, opportunities for fieldwork abroad do not exist for many Third World anthropologists, who are ineligible for the research funds available in Europe and Anglo-America through government foundations and other agencies and have little chance to generate funds at home to carry out research in other countries.

It is no easy task that faces the Third World anthropologists in their endeavor to build a well-founded professional role at home. It is not to be wondered at that some of them join the brain drain and try to make careers for themselves in international agencies or in European or Anglo-American universities, where some of them are now making notable contributions. Nor is it to be wondered at that some seek intellectual reputations through a critique of earlier work rather than through new research embodying the standards which they find lacking in the work of their foreign colleagues—after all, we can only benefit from such a critique. The wonder is that so many of them refuse to become expatriates and instead try to pioneer new roles for themselves at home. But this means that they are asking what anthropology is all about, what it has to contribute to their countries, and what it has to contribute to a better understanding of human life in general.

A Querying of Old Premises

A frequent comment among Third World anthropologists is that they will introduce new premises into anthropology, in contrast to the old premises grounded on European and Anglo-American experience (Hsu 1973), and already they have been active in questioning certain classic assumptions of social and cultural anthropology. Vilakazi (1978:249), for instance, has written, "The postulates of cultural resistance and cultural conservatism were always viewed with suspicion by Africans in South Africa." If this is true, and the observation can be extrapolated to other parts of the world and to Third World anthropologists in general, then we should be able to look forward to the development of theoretical models which deal with humans as forward-thrusting explorers of the possible rather than as conservators of the past. Attention should come to focus on factors which prevent change, assumed to be the normal state of affairs, rather than on the discovery of external factors which today are seen as inducing change. We may be asking what it is that attaches people to one place rather than asking about the forces which set them in motion. If so, this requires a good deal of rethinking of basic assumptions about the nature of social order and a recognition that culture refers to phenomena which humans create and can alter when they will. The shift should be away from treating cultural systems as
logical systems or as symbolic systems. Such a position would not be congenial to many anthropologists, who are weared by the continual assertion of technicians and administrators of development programs that those they have sought to influence have refused to adopt new practices “because of their culture.” Those anthropologists engaged in long-term studies of the same communities (Foster et al. 1978) have also seen the need for new models which incorporate the willingness shown by everyone to experiment with new ways, even though these may involve drastic departures from current practice.

Such thinking has larger implications. It puts in question cherished positions held by both Third World and other people who have reacted against the doctrines of assimilation and cultural homogenization associated with theories of modernization. The adherence to the idea of culture as the precious heritage of a folk which gives them their true identity and their unique role in human history is our inheritance from the German Romantic movement. It lies behind the politics of nationalism, the idea of the nation-state, the drive to preserve and create folk traditions in the United States and elsewhere, and the cries of ethnic pride raised in the last few years. Third World anthropologists who adopted such a position would therefore find themselves at odds with many intellectuals. They might also find themselves opposed by their own political leaders, who find it easier to look to the traditions of their peoples than to the defects in their own policies and the weaknesses of their economic position to explain the lack of rapid economic growth or resilience to their programs. The shift in political rhetoric in the countries of Africa as the independence movements led to independence and then to the current situation exemplifies a shift from a belief in the ability of people to transform themselves profoundly when stirred to do so into a belief that they are bound by their past. Thus intellectuals and political leaders alike play upon those very postulates of cultural resistance and cultural conservatism which Vilakazi sees as suspect among Africans in South Africa.

This emphasizes the fact that the Third World is not one world. Vilakazi is responding to his own experience as a South African revolted by the indignities perpetrated under the doctrine of apartheid in the name of cultural traditions which are held to separate one population from another for all time. There is no reason to believe that his assumptions are acceptable to all Third World anthropologists or other intellectuals or that all of them will share a theoretical stance. Those who met at Burg Wartenstein argued freely about whether a high value should be placed on the maintenance of cultural values. Some chose to focus upon factors which inhibited development as the crucial interest for anthropologists of the late 20th century. Others looked for factors which would inhibit a jettisoning of beliefs and institutions which they regarded as the unique qualities of particular peoples.

The differences reflect, at least in part, the fact that Third World countries are a diverse group, having little in common except an experience of colonialism, which was anything but unitary in its impact, and a fear of economic and political domination from Western Europe or Anglo-America. Their intellectuals start from different backgrounds, speak different languages, have different purposes, and face different degrees of poverty and affluence at home. They communicate with each other, frequently enough, through languages derived from Western Europe, and their most common link today is an intellectual heritage derived from education at one of the universities of Europe of Anglo-America, though many Latin Americans have escaped this moldling experience. As they continue to tailor their work to the situation at home and anthropology becomes increasingly a home-grown phenomenon in Third World countries, we can expect a variety of theoretical positions to emerge, each having its base in a different country or a different linguistic region. Latin America and the Near East are likely sites for a regional scholarship to develop, based on commonalities in language and in religious background. Elsewhere there is no such basis. The theoretical positions as they emerge no doubt will reflect the existential experiences of the citizens of the country or region, but they will also incorporate implicit assumptions imbedded in their traditions: they will operate from different key concepts.

This fact was hard to accept for many of the anthropologists at Burg Wartenstein, who claimed that science is one and universal and saw no place for a parochial discipline. But differences in the theoretical systems which will emerge within the Third World no doubt will be as great as, or greater than, the differences that have made difficult the exchange of ideas between British, French, and American anthropologists, who start from different key concepts—social structure, structure, and culture. It is still too early to say what the new key concepts will be. The number of professional anthropologists in most Third World countries, or even regions, is just beginning to permit the creation of an intellectual community within which the new theoretical models will emerge.

**The Impact on Methodology**

The impact of Third World anthropologists on methodology is much easier to discern at present. They are already raising questions about standards of fieldwork as they point to the limitations of the fieldworker. In this they are joined by those anthropologists who have now had long experience with a given community and by the experience that many anthropologists now have of working within their own countries in Europe and Anglo-America.

Schneider (1968:vi), in justifying his study of American kinship, has pointed to some of the gains from working in familiar situations:

> ... this is a society and culture that we know well. We speak the language fluently, we know the customs, and we have observed the natives in their daily lives. Indeed, we are the natives. Hence we are in an especially good position to keep the facts and the theory in their most productive relationship. We can monitor the interface between fact and theory where American kinship is concerned in ways that are simply impossible in the ordinary course of anthropological work. When we read about kinship in some society foreign to our own we have only the facts which the author chooses to present to us, and we usually have no independent source of knowledge against which we can check his facts. It is thus very hard to evaluate his theory for ordering those facts.

Third World anthropologists claim these gains for themselves when working on their home ground: they know the terrain, they know the language, they have an understanding of nuances and ambiguities which escape the foreigner. And they are highly critical of what has been written about them by the foreigner. Owusu (1978) has recently had a look at the existing ethnographic work on Africa and finds it sadly deficient, a deficiency which he attributes in great part to “the lack of familiarity with the local vernaculars, which results in serious errors of translation of cultures” (p. 311). Admittedly, he says, the number of errors and their magnitude decrease with the length of time the observer stays in the area and with increasing command of the local language, but even then “where there are yawning cognitive and cultural gaps, as is frequently the case between the ethnographer and the natives under study, there is bound to be hardly avoidable working misunderstanding between the ethnographer and his subjects” (p. 318).

If this is true, why is there good evidence that Third World anthropologists can make major contributions when they carry out field research outside their own countries? The majority work in countries where they have already acquired some mastery of the local language, either through training as a student in local universities or through intensive work on the language. They also begin with no false notion that they will
be the sole experts on the region and expect to spend a good deal of time working on published sources on the area. They can turn to novels and other literature within which natives of the region have reported upon themselves. And they find colleagues with whom they can discuss their findings who, as natives of the country, have no hesitation in raising questions or flatly refusing to believe the reported phenomena. They know that their work will be judged by the local people against the best scholarship that those indigenous to the area themselves produce. No such challenge has existed in the past for most of the world’s anthropologists, who have worked abroad under conditions where their only colleagues in the inquiry were likely to be their informants and field assistants, perhaps in fact illiterate and uninterested in the wider theoretical framework guiding the work.

That era is clearly over. Those anthropologists who work abroad are going to have to prepare themselves much more carefully than in the past. They will be expected to be familiar with the region’s literature as well as its geography, to know something of its modern political and economic history, and to learn the language of local scholarship as well as the language or dialect spoken by those whose social order they research. They can expect to spend appreciable periods of time acquiring this background knowledge and to be held to longer periods of field research if they expect to have their work respected. What else they will need to know or do will depend on the particular intellectual problems they pursue. And they can expect at every step to meet the criticism of local scholars, who will judge the work of foreigners by the criteria of their own best work and their knowledge of the local scene.

This is a daunting but exciting prospect. Lengthened involvement in field research should improve our handling of the study of process, since we will be able to follow events over longer periods of time. Increasing familiarity may blunt perception, but it should also lead to an appreciably better understanding of how people use their institutions and their symbolic systems. By their very presence, the Third World anthropologists force such growth upon the profession, while by their own experimentation they are adding to the theoretical and methodological tools by which culture and society may be studied.

Emergent Problems

In recent years there has been much talk about shrinking possibilities for foreign field research as one country after another restricts entry to the foreigner who would study its people. This is certainly a problem, but it may be a relatively short-lived one associated with the recovery from colonial domination and the turmoil of the contemporary period. What has not been faced squarely is the danger that anthropology will lose the cross-cultural perspective basic to the discipline at the same time that it fragments into a number of regional schools each loyal to its own key concepts.

In the past almost every anthropologist has looked forward to field research outside of his or her own community and trained to that purpose. Each has worked on the assumption that the data collected were of direct interest to people who might be living somewhere; that an understanding of the Yurok, the Trobrianders, or the Tallensi had a universal message. This is no longer true, and there is even less likelihood of its being true in the future. Anthropologists who study themselves are caught up in their own communities and its problems and assume that the interest in those problems is local.

Already the very number of active anthropologists is a barrier to cross-cultural experience as a basic part of training. Costs and logistics are against it, however receptive other communities may be to foreign investigators. Many younger Europeans and Anglo-Americans now plan to spend their entire careers in research at home, either because they seek to avoid possible confrontations elsewhere in the world or because they genuinely believe that the biggest challenges lie in the study of complex industrial societies. As their number grows, they tend increasingly to write for each other. Given the fact that most Third World anthropologists also work at home, they face the same danger of parochialism.

It is quite possible, as various participants pointed out at Burg Wartenstein, to train young anthropologists in the comparative approach by familiarizing them with good published studies of other societies. In the past most anthropologists as students read the same small number of key monographs, which gave them a common touchstone in vocabulary and knowledge of the cultures described therein. Whatever their theoretical differences, they all knew about the Trobriands, the Crow, and the Nuer. Today the mounting volume of regional studies stands between the young anthropologist and a general knowledge of societies across the world. Already in the United States it is becoming rare to find anthropologists with the breadth of ethnographic knowledge that characterizes their seniors. They may know the regional literature in depth, but they know little about humanity in general. The proliferation of professional journals encourages the drift towards intensive specialization and away from a discipline based upon shared concerns.

With the growth of Third World anthropological traditions, we can expect an increasing diversity of theoretical interests and the development of new vocabularies making difficult the communication of ideas across the barriers of experience and interest, adding to the difficulties already experienced among the anthropologists trained in the different traditions of Britain, France, and the United States.

In the emergent world of the latter part of the 20th century, the only hope for an anthropology that has some claim to universality lies in the possibility of developing a means of bringing people together. Current Anthropology as an international journal is one such resource. Conferences such as those at Burg Wartenstein which draw upon the international world of anthropology are another. Finally, we need some way of financing fieldwork abroad for Third World and other anthropologists alike to continue our involvement in the cross-cultural experience and the cross-cultural perspective.

by T. N. Madan

Institute of Economic Growth, University of Delhi, Delhi 110007, India. 4 x 79

The conference was convened to discuss indigenous anthropology in the non-Western world, but it was quite clear on the very first day that the genuine enterprise was to invent and build a unified world anthropology rather than to promulgate many anthropologies. Distinctions between indigenous and nonindigenous anthropologists might be meaningful in a variety of ways, but a similar bifurcation of the discipline would be a retreat from its true mission.

The agenda of the conference was to explore the concept of indigenous anthropology and examine its implications for anthropological work done over more than 100 years, being done now, and proposed for the coming years. Though this

4 In agreeing to Hussein Fahim’s request that I try to pull together the threads of discussion as it had developed over several days, I cautioned him that my presentation would focus on just a few of the major themes, and that a comprehensive and hopeful summation would be beyond my competence. I also explained that I would have to speak on the basis of my notes of the discussions, as there was no time to prepare a well thought-out and carefully written text. What follows is an edited version of the transcript of my statement, which was tape-recorded. I have altered the tense, taken out nearly all references to the names of the participants, reduced the anecdotes that somehow always enter into my oral presentations, and omitted a concluding portion on the need for contact and communication among anthropologists the world over. I have also added a few clarificatory sentences.
would naturally have to be a collective endeavour involving anthropologists everywhere, a basic rethinking of the issues involved seemed to be the particular responsibility of the anthropologists of the non-Western world, since they were faced with certain common urgent tasks: hence the title of the conference. The so-called Third World countries, it was argued, were united by their historical experience, in which imperialism and colonialism had played a very notable part. They were also united by their poverty, by their dependence on the First and Second Worlds of development, by their scarce resources (in which I would like to include time), and in their common aspiration to a "better" future. These aspirations were the concern of all intellectuals and policy makers everywhere, not only of anthropologists. The task before the conference was to spell out what anthropologists in particular might contribute to this endeavour.

We were 20 at the conference, drawn from 17 countries spread all over the world, representing many cultures, subcultures, languages, educational systems, etc., and yet we pretended—rather, we took it for granted—that we were one closely knit group, brought together by Hussein Fahim's intention and Lita Osmundsen's invitation. These, then, became our myth of genesis, our charter of organization, the basis for our belief that we all were one species, one tribe—anthropologists—even as Tikopians are Tikopians or Tallensi are Tallensi. We spoke a common language—the jargon of anthropology—and invoked the same authorities, if not gods. We might well have been compared to a jamboree assembled in a rain-making ritual so that the harvest might be bountiful—the hoped-for harvest in this case being not only a new anthropology but also, and in fact more importantly, modernisation and development in the non-Western world.

The doubting Thomases were there, however, seated round the big green-topped table, from the first moment. Who were we? What were our credentials for addressing ourselves to the problems outlined by Fahim? Were we not faced with an identity crisis? Were we the children of the Enlightenment, the inheritors of its high ideals, or were we a condemned race, conceived in original sin, born a set of triplets comprising capitalism, colonialism, and anthropology? Had anthropology been a vast act of arrogance on the part of Western man which had created savages and primitives out of peoples, Orientalists out of Asians, pagans out of believers, prelogical creatures out of rational human beings? The tide had later turned the other way, and situational logic and cultural relativism had become fashionable paradigms. These, however, were really cruel jokes, for anthropology had, by and large, helped to preserve international systems of social stratification and, within countries, national systems of exploitation, exclusivism, and injustice.

The past did not detain us too long: the principal preoccupation of the conference was with the world as it is today. What did we understand by anthropology in the context of today's problems? One of our colleagues spoke of the quest for generally and eternally valid laws, of the need to construct a scientific discipline. Several others supported this view, though not in exactly the same terms. Some emphasized the importance of historical specificity, human experience, and the imperatives of understanding. While some underscored the importance of application, of a "development" anthropology, there were others who spoke of social criticism and the need for the anthropologist to stand outside, if not above, politics. Hau'ofa confessed that though he wrote poetry about the traditions of his people and the loss of their heritage, for him doing so was politics and that he was otherwise also involved in politics. My repeated query why politics should exhaust praxis produced no answer that seemed satisfactory to me, but many participants were appalled that I should ask such a silly question.

It was clear, then, that there were impediments to communication among us, that we did not always succeed in penetrating easily understood conversation to capture (in Lionel Trilling's beautiful phrase) the hum and buzz of its multifarious implications. We were separated by our conceptions of anthropology and its office, our cultural backgrounds, our political ideologies and class interests, our visions of the future and the tasks of today. Mott was so impressed by this diversity that he quickly strung together definitions of anthropology from the papers presented at the conference to pose the question, "Anthropology or Anthropologies?"

The question of the nature of anthropology arose time and time again in diverse guises. Those of the participants who wanted to get away from it and concentrate on what they considered the more concrete and urgent tasks of development in fact came back to it—or were driven back to it. On the one hand, it was argued that intentions, rather than achievements, were important and that anthropologists could and should aspire to have something of practical value to say to policy makers in developing countries. Extending Comte's dictum that one seeks to know in order to predict and then to control, it turned out that several participants defined this act of control as the "liberation" and the "service" of the people. A few others detected in this the mortal danger of manipulation of the people, for "liberation" and "service" are loaded concepts.

This inevitably brought in the basic question of values and value commitments. A generalising science which spoke in the name of the universe and the whole of humanity would deal with this problem at too high a level of abstraction and would therefore tell us very little about specific situations and particular problems. We perhaps needed to reverse the process of generalisation and feed culture-specific data back into models to attend meaningfully to the problem of values and lead from there to action programmes. The Indian trichotomous framework of space-time-actor (sthāna-kāla-pātra) seemed to find an echo in some other formulations on the subject made by various participants at the conference. This in turn led to the theme of "insiders" and "outsiders" among the fraternity of anthropologists.

It was felt that each category of anthropologists perhaps enjoyed some advantages over the other in the pursuit of our common goals. Outsiders were perhaps better able to deal with the observable dimensions of behaviour and were more likely to produce "objective" statements, that is, statements with intersubjective validity. For the insider this was relatively difficult, because for him happenings in his society were neither politically neutral nor ethically opaque. He had to come down on the side of the fence where the grass seemed greener to him from his own particular perspective. The important thing to remember here was that there were many insiders (just as there were many outsiders)—defined by their class interests, political associations, ethical beliefs, etc.—and therefore many perspectives.

Another element in the situation was the professional networks every individual had which had in the past often linked him more to some outsiders than to other insiders. What is more, the outsider-insider relationship had generally been ingenuitarian in character; in fact, it had been a relationship between masters and pupils. Could this state of affairs be allowed to continue without destroying anthropology?

Further, two types of triangular relationships which obviously obtained in the anthropological domain in the non-Western world were identified. First, there was the relationship between insider and outsider anthropologists and the people being studied. Second, there was the relationship between the anthropologist, the sponsor of research, and the people.

About the former relationship, a proverb I had often heard in the course of my fieldwork in the villages of the Kashmir Valley (North India) seemed to say, not all that needed to be said, but still something very crucial: "One guest hates the other, the host hates them both!" The people who are made the objects of anthropological inquiry, it was pointed out,
were generally taken for granted; anthropology was assumed to be for their good, and they were exploited and used. Ethical questions underlying social inquiry remained unasked or at best spoken in whispers. Speaking for anthropology, one of the participants asked, "What precious things do we take away from people?" "Time," was the pregnant one-word answer he received from Naderi. But the "rustic" informants were sometimes cleverer than the "heroic" anthropologists and not only took them for a ride, but charged them for it in the bargain. Lurid stories about two men fighting over a dead woman's body, the one to eat its flesh and the other to have carnal knowledge of it, perhaps illustrate this point well. In India, I have reason to believe, imaginative informants have created certain insoluble problems of ethnography by making statements to outsider anthropologists which the latter scientifically recorded on tapes that do not lie.

As for the second triangular relationship, the question was asked whom the anthropologist served—the thugs he studied or the government which commissioned the study to eradicate the thugs. This was, of course, a hypothetical example—the proverbial limiting case—but it brought out clearly the point that was sought to be made. The ethical question obviously had many dimensions.

In either of these two situations, the "marginal" character of the insider anthropologist seemed to require close examination. What had his education as an anthropologist done to him? Had it produced alienated intellectual schizophrenics who could see nothing in its entirety, who were caught, not between tradition and modernity, but between fragments of unintelligible cultural discourses? Had it produced apologists for the Brahmans of the cultures of the world? Or had it produced the self-aware social critics who (as Paul Baran has pointed out) are troubleshooters and a nuisance to the ruling classes? The insider's role as social critic was considered very important, but it was pointed out that being a social critic took a lot of courage and doing. The critic's life was a life of challenges, hesitations, and dilemmas. Did he help preserve cultural diversity? But then what was so beautiful about the traditional cultures? What were the criteria for evaluating cultural competence and excellence? Did one debunk all that was traditional (indigenous systems of medicine, for instance) for fear of being dubbed a revivalist or, worse, a reactionary? Did one espouse all that was modern, even when this meant destruction of the environment and art and culture? Did one choose the path of eclecticism, and, if so, what were to be one's guidelines? Did one retreat into what one of the participants gently called anthropological "coconuts" or what others more bluntly called "academic ghettos"? Whichever way it was put, the conference seemed to underscore, though without achieving unanimity, the role of the insider anthropologist as a mediator, as the man not merely with a message but also a mechanism.

The outsider anthropologist, it was felt, could of course set his sights elsewhere. Thus, for him theory construction might lead him to seek complexities which the insider found at best baffling but oftener unnecessary, irritating, and even pernicious. One was reminded of the not very bright African student who told Edward Sapir that women priestesses tended the shrines of war gods in his tribe at times of intertribal warfare for the simple reason that all the able-bodied men were at war, and therefore an appeal to psychoanalysis, while intellectually exciting, seemed unnecessary to him. (I was told the story by Murdock in 1972.) He had point there; so, surely, had Sapir.

Acknowledging the value of the study of other cultures, it was pointed out that the outsiders helped in bringing out the richness of cultural life even if they did not help in the practical tasks of immediate concern. I recalled being introduced to a Japanese audience at Tokyo University by Chie Nakane. She had spoken of how flexible and relaxed she had found interpersonal relationships in the Hindu joint family to be and how much love there was between siblings. I had almost frozen in my chair, for what Western writers on the Hindu family had taught me about was its rigidities, hostilities, and authoritarianism. Thus there was this immense advantage of having cultures interpreted mutually, one in terms of many. Such multiple interpretations helped the insider more than anybody else to see his own culture in the round.

The conditions under which outsiders worked had, of course, changed drastically, in some countries at any rate. What had been advantages in the past—the association with a ruling power, Western origins, etc.—had now become disadvantages. (The research visas that were now a condition for the outsider anthropologist's ability to study an alien people were, I pointed out, a present-day version of the sleeping mat of the Nayar visiting "husband" in South India: when a woman had had enough of one such man, she would put his mat outside the hut, and he knew the mating game was over! Even Max Gluckman had not been allowed into New Guinea by Robert Menzies's Australian government.)

This did not mean that the plums of research careers were now for insiders only. Even if governments wished it that way, insiders should know better than that and appreciate the immense value of intercultural dialogue. The heightened self-awareness of the insider was best cultivated not within many enclosed worlds, but in a single shrinking world, the resources, risks, and rewards of which were indivisible so far as the people were concerned. Anthropology in the non-Western world would defeat its own purposes if it did not concern itself with the Western world as well. The crises we faced today were not of the West or the East, of the North or the South, but of the whole world. It was not for us, as Arnold Toynbee had once so poignantly put it, to create a worldwide apartheid. We had been brought to the brink of disaster by the world-destroying ideologies of consumerism and maximisation of utility. Those who advocated time-bound programmes of basic needs were not seeing far enough and would not save mankind. Nothing short of the revolutionary vision of a Gandhi would do: There is enough in the world for everybody's need, but not for everybody's greed.

What was anthropology in this context? It was not revelation. It was not a Western discipline which was to be enriched (as Sol Tax was quoted as having suggested) by feedback from other parts of the world. Nor was it the rhetoric of counterattack from the Third World. It was an empirical discipline the data base of which had to be broadened to take in the whole world, without locating its centre today in the place of its historical origin. And data meant not merely information about behaviour, but also understanding of values and norms, of intentions and consequences, and, ultimately, of implication and significance.

Anthropology would contribute to a better understanding of mankind's present predicament to the extent to which it succeeded in steering clear of the Scylla of ethnocentrism and the Charybdis of cultural relativism. It was a discipline which had to deal with particulars but in terms of universals. Anthropologists were social scientists, but they ought to be above all social critics. Colson had asked during the discussion how many social critics a society needed. Barnes had answered, "As many as possible." I agreed. Let a thousand flowers bloom!

by HERBERT C. KELMAN

Department of Psychology and Social Relations, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 02138, U.S.A. 26 xx 79

My comments on the conference are written from the perspective of a "foreign anthropologist" who has recently returned from a field trip to the tribe of Anthropologos. The conference was largely a tribal affair, and I was one of the very few outsiders privileged to join it as a participant observer. This was not my first field trip to tribal territories (I had visited them

Vol. 21 • No. 5 • October 1980
extensively during my graduate-school days and periodically over the years), and I certainly hope it will not be my last. I like to believe that I am a stranger who has become a friend.

In keeping with the best anthropological practice, I want to share some of my own experiences as well as my field notes from the recent visit with the indigenous population. Specifically, my paper is devoted to two tasks. First, I shall describe some of the recent developments and "crises" in my own discipline of social psychology, pointing up the similarities and differences between our experiences and those of anthropologists. I hope that this review will provide another perspective, from a neighboring discipline, on the issues discussed at the conference. Second, I shall identify what I see as some of the methodological, theoretical, and ethical issues confronting social-science work in developing countries. My view of these issues is based on an effort to relate the papers and discussions at this conference to some of my earlier experiences.

ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

I was greatly impressed, throughout the conference, with the continuity between the fields of anthropology and social psychology. Participation in the conference has reconfirmed my commitment to an interdisciplinary approach in social science. What I have in mind is interdisciplinary work in an organic sense, i.e., whenever it is relevant to the particular problem under investigation. I see increasing convergence between anthropology and social psychology as we focus on applied problems and especially on problems of social change.

The two disciplines differ, of course, in many important ways. They derive from different intellectual traditions; they rely on different sources of data; they use different methodological approaches. Yet I find them to be very similar in their basic purposes. Both disciplines focus on social relations—although anthropologists are more concerned with the way in which these are organized, whereas social psychologists emphasize the interaction processes by which social relations are conducted. Both disciplines explore the relationship of the microsystem to the macrosystem; I find it interesting that many anthropologists describe social anthropology as sociomicroscience—a term that also captures at least one face of social psychology. Furthermore, both disciplines give detailed attention to the system as the basic unit of study. Finally, both disciplines can be defined as continuations of moral philosophy in a new form; I have increasingly come to view social psychology in these terms, and I was delighted to see Colson (1976) make the same point about social anthropology.

When we deal with applied problems, the differences between the disciplines become less important, since the sources of our data and our methodological approaches are determined by the problem. At the same time, the differences in tradition and orientation between the disciplines remain useful because they enable us to bring different perspectives to the same problem.

Given the many parallels between the two disciplines that I have noted, it is not surprising that the sense of a crisis in anthropology which pervaded our Burg Wartenstein discussions echoes the sense of crisis expressed by social psychologists about their own discipline in the last few years. In fact, we have to distinguish between two crises, corresponding to the major division in social psychology: that between psychological social psychology, which is by far the larger and more dominant branch of the field, and sociological social psychology.

In sociological social psychology, the crisis is primarily one of identity (see Liska 1977, House 1977). On the one hand, sociological social psychologists feel overwhelmed by and isolated from psychological social psychologists. On the other hand, they feel that their special contributions (with the exception of symbolic interactionism) have been absorbed by general sociology in ways that leave little room for the development of social psychology as such. Thus, for example, topics (such as collective behavior), theories (such as role theory or exchange theory), and methods (such as the sample survey) that are essentially social-psychological have been incorporated into the larger discipline. Many sociological social psychologists, then, are concerned with the problem of maintaining their own identity—their own unique role—vis-à-vis both psychological social psychology and the parent discipline of sociology. It seems to me that this concern about their unique identity—particularly vis-à-vis sociology—is also an element of the crisis felt by anthropologists as they move away from the study of distant, small, traditional communities and focus on social organization and social change in national, urban, and often industrial societies.

In psychological social psychology, the crisis of the past few years is largely related to the laboratory experiment, which has become the dominant methodological approach for psychologically trained social psychologists. There is an interesting parallel here to the crisis in anthropology as discussed at Burg Wartenstein. Ethnographic work has largely focused on the self-contained community, which can be studied in its totality. There are obvious advantages to this approach, but anthropologists have increasingly become aware of its limitations. Similarly, in social psychology, the laboratory method has unique advantages. It has enabled investigators to create their own self-contained world, over which they can maintain complete experimental control. Increasingly, however, social psychologists have become disaffected with this method and hence with the field as a whole. I might note here that I am less disaffected than many of my colleagues because—though trained to a large extent as an experimental social psychologist—I always saw experimentation as a method, rather than as the method, for the field. Many others, however—in the decades after World War II—came to see social psychology as an experimental science, and this image has now been shattered for them. The disaffection with the experimental approach and with social psychology more generally is based on several interrelated considerations: considerations of method, theory, ethics, and social relevance.

Methodologically, social psychologists have become increasingly aware of the weaknesses of the experimental method itself. For example, methodological research on experimenter effects has demonstrated the extent to which the biases and expectations of the investigator influence experimental findings. Although such effects can be counteracted through careful experimental design, they illustrate that experimental control—one of the great strengths of the experimental method—is itself quite fragile. Furthermore, many social psychologists have become aware of the limitations on what can be learned when we use experimental methods. Because of the requirements of experimental control, social-psychological experiments typically ignore the relationship of the microprocesses of social interaction to the macrosystem; interfere with spontaneous, reciprocal interaction between the participants; and do not address themselves to continuing, long-term relationships. Thus, experimental situations are typically marked by a high degree of artificality, and the generalizability of findings is severely limited. In my own view, these limitations do not invalidate the laboratory experiment as a tool for social-psychological research, but they suggest that experimentation alone is not a proper basis for building the discipline.

Because of these methodological limitations, as well as for a number of other reasons, social psychologists have increasingly come to question the generality of the theories that have emerged from our research. There is concern that the constraints of the experiment on which so much of the theorizing is based may foster a biased view of social interaction—one that emphasizes a nonreciprocal relationship between a manipulative agent, exercising control, and a passive recipient, adapting to that control (see, for example, Argyris 1975). More generally, questions have been raised about the extent to which
social-psychological theories emphasize stability, conformity, and adjustment at the expense of social change and minority influence (see, for example, Moscovici and Nemeth 1974). There is growing awareness among social psychologists that our theories may be limited by the cultural, political, and social-class background of those who carry out the bulk of social-psychological research and set the tone for the field.

A third source of malaise among social psychologists is linked to ethical problems generated by the process and products of research. In social-psychological experiments, ethical concerns have focused primarily on the use of deception, particularly when participation exposes subjects to stressful experiences. Deception of experimental subjects, however, is only part of a larger concern with the rights of subjects in social research (see, for example, Kellner 1972). Attention to the rights of subjects is closely linked to the increasing emphasis on human rights in general. Such links are especially appropriate because so much social (as well as biomedical) research has drawn its subjects disproportionately from powerless, disadvantaged, or captive groups—such as minority populations, prisoners, the aged, or the poor. Questions have arisen about the exploitation of such groups, whose members are least able to protect their own interests. In addition, the social consequences of such research have become a matter of ethical concern. For example, research demonstrating group differences in intelligence or in other characteristics—though often based on culturally biased instruments or interpretations—can be used as a basis for policies detrimental to disadvantaged groups (see, for example, Ryan 1971). These ethical concerns have often coincided with theoretical and methodological concerns; the use of deception or of culturally biased instruments raises not only ethical questions, but also questions about the validity or generality of research findings.

Finally, there has been growing dissatisfaction with social-psychological research, particularly research in the experimental tradition, because of its limited relevance to the solution of pressing social problems. The younger generation of social psychologists, in particular, has been frustrated by the relative paucity of experiences and resources within their discipline for dealing with problems of national development, social change, reducing inequalities, resolving conflicts, or improving the quality of life. In the last few years, these concerns with the relevance of the discipline have also intersected with career concerns. With the shrinking academic market, social psychologists have felt frustrated that their discipline has not prepared them adequately to take advantage of opportunities in applied work, where the demand for trained personnel (at least in some areas, such as evaluation) has actually risen.

These, then, are the elements of the crisis that social psychologists—particularly those coming out of a psychological tradition—have been experiencing for the past decade or so. What I see as the essential steps for dealing with this crisis are increasing emphasis on applied research, with special reference to social change; diversification of research methods, thus reducing the disproportionate reliance on laboratory experiments; development of participatory research models, which offer the "subjects" greater reciprocal benefits and more active involvement in the research process; and democratization of the research community, so that all segments of the population have an opportunity to carry out research and utilize its findings. (I shall return to the last two points later.) The need for change along these lines is now widely acknowledged among social psychologists, and movements in these directions—though still slow and uncertain—is clearly perceptible.

One of the important similarities between the crisis in social psychology that I have just described and the crisis in anthropology as it emerged from the discussions at the conference is the dissatisfaction with the excessive reliance on a single methodological approach. Moreover, the criticisms of the dominant approach—i.e., of the laboratory experiment in social psychology and of the study of self-contained, traditional communities in social anthropology—are strikingly similar. In both cases, critics express the feeling that these methods are not ideally suited to the study of relationships between microsystems and macrosystems, to the analysis of processes of social change, and to the development of research that would be applicable to social problems.

A second important similarity in the discontent voiced within the two fields is the concern with their pervasive cultural bias. Both anthropology and social psychology are disciplines that have their origins in Western culture. They continue to be dominated by the West, not only because most of the research and training are done there, but also because the prevailing assumptions, theories, and approaches are rooted in the Western experience. For example, it appears, in fact, the dominating influence has been even narrower than the West; social psychology has been largely developed and shaped in the United States (although several of the most important contributors to the development of the discipline in the United States were Central European émigrés). It is only in recent years that an independent Western European tradition of social psychology has been taking form.

Along with these important similarities, there is one major difference between anthropology and social psychology that has produced some interesting differences in their respective efforts at self-examination. Anthropology is a discipline that is built heavily on research carried out outside of the investigators' own culture. Although, as Colson (1976) points out, there is an old tradition of anthropological research carried out in one's own country, "outside research" has always been one of the distinctive features of the anthropological enterprise. By contrast, social psychologists have typically worked in their own cultures. In fact, one of the major limitations of the field has been the relative paucity of comparative cross-cultural research.

Social psychologists, for whom the norm has been to work at home, have been particularly concerned in recent years about the ethical and methodological problems that arise when one works abroad. The small cadre of cross-cultural researchers, in particular, has been concerned about the special problems that arise when one does research outside of one's own culture—such as, for example, the methodological problems of comparability and translation of research instruments or of assessing the meaning of experimental manipulations in a different cultural context and the ethical problems of invasion of cultural privacy or intervention in the lives of other societies. Similar concerns have been generated by research within one's own society when the investigator belongs to a different subculture than the people studied—particularly when, as so often happens, members of the majority population in a society carry out research in ethnic minority communities. In short, what social psychologists find especially problematic, from an ethical and methodological point of view, is research outside of their own culture. This concern was quite evident at an international conference on social-psychological research in developing countries held at the University of Ibadan at the end of 1966—a conference focusing on issues that overlapped heavily with those considered at Burg Wartenstein (cf. Kelman 1968, DeLamater, Heffer, and Clignet 1968).

Problems of the outside researcher, of course, also arise for anthropologists, and they have been matters of debate within the discipline. What struck me, however, is the many discussions of the conference is the extent to which anthropologists consider research inside their own cultures to be uniquely problematic. The very use of the term "indigenous anthropology" in the title of the conference reflects that orientation. This turned out to be an interesting and instructive reversal of focus for me, coming out of a social-psychological background. It helped me see more clearly the special ethical and methodological problems that arise when one does research on one's
own culture—and, by the same token, some of the ethical and methodological advantages of working outside of one's own culture.

**ISSUES FOR RESEARCH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES**

My experiences in social psychology formed a major part of the perspective that I brought to the papers and discussions of the conference. From that perspective, I shall now note what I see as some of the major issues emerging from the conference.

The fundamental question facing the conference, it seems to me, was how to advance anthropological research (or, from my point of view, social research more generally) in developing countries. It might be more appropriate to speak of developing communities, in order to include such subnational units as Greenland or the black community in the United States, which are "dependent" relative to the rest of their countries. Closely linked to the question of how to advance anthropological research in developing societies are the questions of how to advance indigenous anthropological research and how to advance anthropological research on applied social problems.

Throughout the conference, we were working with three separate but overlapping distinctions: the distinction between foreign and indigenous researchers, the distinction between Western and non-Western researchers, and the distinction between researchers from dominant or developed societies and those from dependent or developing societies. Clearly, the groups distinguished by these three dichotomies are not always the same. Though we often use "non-Western" and "developing" interchangeably, we must remember that non-Western societies, such as Japan, may be highly developed, whereas some Western societies, as in parts of Latin America, Western Europe, or the United States, may best be characterized as developing. Similarly, when we speak of foreign investigators, we generally have in mind those from industrialized, Western countries, but there is no necessary correlation between these dimensions.

To be sure, many of the issues that have arisen in social research in developing countries have involved concurrent divisions along all three dimensions—that is, the role of foreign investigators coming from dominant, Western countries into developing non-Western societies. Yet each of these distinctions brings certain separate issues to the forefront. At the risk of gross oversimplification, I would propose that the *methodological* issues discussed at Burg Wartenstein centered primarily on the foreign vs. indigenous distinction, the *theoretical* issues on the Western vs. non-Western distinction, and the *ethical* issues on the dominant vs. dependent distinction. Following this scheme, I shall comment, in order, on each of the three sets of issues.

**Methodological issues.** Anthropologists have traditionally focused their research on societies distant from their own. It is not surprising, therefore, that most anthropologists have not considered a social scientist's status as outsider to reduce the validity of the research. Some, in fact, have regarded the outsider's stance to have distinct epistemological advantages. These assumptions were challenged at the conference. Thus, we joined a long-standing debate in the sociology of knowledge about the differential access to social truth by insiders and outsiders (Merton 1972).

I would start with the general proposition that the various statuses and group affiliations of investigators—in short, where they come from—make an important difference in how they approach particular problems. One of the dimensions of status that clearly has a significant impact on social research is the nationality of the investigators relative to that of the people studied—in other words, their status as insiders or outsiders. In order to assess the effects of this distinction, we must keep in mind that it does not represent a rigid, clear-cut dichotomy. It is much more reasonable to think of the insider-outsider dimension as a continuum with many gradations between the two extremes. On the one hand, investigators who are insiders, in the sense of having the same nationality as the group they study, do not necessarily represent the same culture or the same social class as the members of that group. Thus, at best, their status can be characterized as a mixture of insider and outsider. Moreover, it can be argued that all social scientists, by virtue of their status as social scientists, are in some respects outsiders to the people they study. On the other hand, investigators who are outsiders, in the sense of coming from a different country than the group they study, can—through their general training as social scientists, their immersion in the group's culture, and their long-term experience in the other society—acquire the kind of insight into the group and establish the kind of relationship with its members that are usually associated with insiders. In sum, any claim of methodological superiority for the indigenous—or the foreign—investigator must be tempered by the recognition that even indigenous researchers may in some respects be outsiders to the people they study and that foreign researchers may in some respects achieve the status of insiders.

Despite these ambiguities, I have no doubt that there are real differences in the kinds of data that can be obtained by indigenous and by foreign researchers. There is no reason to assume, however, that the advantages, from a methodological point of view, are all on one side or the other. Instead, I would argue that the insider and the outsider each bring certain distinct advantages, as well as certain distinct disadvantages, to the research enterprise. The relative balance between advantages and disadvantages for the two types of investigators is likely to vary from situation to situation, depending on the kinds of questions asked and the kinds of information sought. Thus, in some cases, we would expect indigenous researchers to obtain richer, more valid, and more reliable information than their foreign counterparts, while in other cases the reverse may be true. A good illustration comes from those situations—very common in both anthropological and social-psychological research—in which respondents are asked to reveal behaviors or attitudes that are subject to strong social norms. A major concern for respondents in such situations is how the investigator will evaluate them. Depending on the particular domain in question, they may be more sensitive to this evaluation—and hence more inhibited in their responses—if the investigator is a member of their own group, or they may be more sensitive if the investigator is an outsider. For example, respondents in a developing country may feel freer to discuss their dietary or child-care practices with indigenous investigators, since they may be concerned that foreign investigators would be particularly disapproving of any indications of insufficient "modernity"; on the other hand, they may be freer to discuss their adherence to religious or other traditional customs with foreign investigators, since they may be concerned that their compatriots would disapprove of any signs of deviation or reduced commitment. Each type of investigator brings a different set of norms into salience and tends to inhibit responses in the domain of behavior governed by those norms.

The problem, then, to quote Merton (1972:36), is not to "ask whether it is the Insider or the Outsider who has monopolistic or privileged access to social truth," but "to consider their distinctive and interactive roles in the process of truth seeking." At each step in the research process, there are certain requirements that can best be met by the indigenous researcher and others for which the foreign researcher is better suited. Analysis of these different requirements can give us a basis for specifying the unique contributions that each type of investigator is capable of making to the common enterprise. The different contributions of insiders and outsiders can be illustrated by a brief look at three steps in the research process: establishing a productive working relationship with the people to be studied, eliciting honest information from them, and interpreting and evaluating the information obtained.
In establishing a productive working relationship, indigenous researchers have certain obvious advantages. Insofar as they share a common culture and language, common values and experiences, with the people they study, they can engender trust, establish rapport, and enter into communication more quickly and easily. Moreover, they are likely to be more sensitive to the social norms that govern interpersonal relations in the community they are studying, and therefore they are less likely to act in ways that the local people would find threatening, insulting, irritating, or suspicious. There are other requirements for establishing a productive working relationship, however, that may present greater difficulties to insiders than to outsiders. Insiders may find it more difficult to disentangle themselves from their various roles within the society (e.g., roles based on age, sex, social class, occupation, or region) and to relate to people strictly within the role of investigator; foreigners are largely outside of the local role system and are therefore freer to relate to people in terms of the requirements of the investigator role. Furthermore, social research may require some deviations from social norms, such as norms against probing into certain areas of people's lives; insiders are likely to find themselves more inhibited by these norms than outsiders. Outsiders also have greater freedom in asking naive questions, which may produce significant new information; similar questions asked by insiders might be considered strange and inappropriate.

In eliciting honest information, insiders clearly have certain advantages over outsiders. Most groups have private views or practices that they are reluctant to discuss with outsiders. Access to such intimate information, thus, is usually restricted to indigenous researchers. On the other hand, it has been noted that people may share private information of a personal kind more readily with strangers. With regard to behaviors and attitudes that are governed by strong social norms, I have already indicated that neither insiders nor outsiders have an advantage across the board. Which type of investigator is most likely to elicit honest information depends on the domain of behavior and the particular norms that govern it. Insofar as the research focuses on practices that are quite common within the society but that people see as deviating from some universal norm, they will feel more inhibited by an outside investigator. On the other hand, insofar as the research focuses on practices or views that may represent deviations from norms strongly held within the society, the indigenous investigator may have a more inhibiting effect.

In the interpretation and evaluation of the information obtained, we find again that the insider and the outsider have certain distinct advantages of their own. Indigenous researchers have a more intimate knowledge of cultural values and symbols and of the inner workings of social institutions; they have better access to private information; and they usually have a fuller understanding of the larger societal context of the behavior they observe. As a result, they may be more attuned to nuances of the behavior and better able to see a variety of connections and implications. On the other hand, outsiders may be better able to distance themselves from the problems that they are investigating, to take a comparative perspective, and to understand the global context of the processes they are observing. Most important, precisely because they are not as familiar with the society and not caught up in its cultural assumptions, they are more likely to raise questions about certain phenomena that insiders would simply take for granted. For all of these reasons, outsiders may be in a position to develop new insights about the sources and dynamics of patterns that insiders would regard as self-evident.

Awareness of these distinct advantages of insiders and outsiders can help us determine which type of investigator would be best suited to carrying out a particular piece of research. For example, if the community to be studied is highly suspicious of strangers or if the information to be sought is of a culturally private nature, then indigenous researchers would be most likely to succeed. On the other hand, if the research focuses on changing patterns within the society, particularly if these are surrounded by controversy, then an outside researcher may be better able to obtain valid results and new insights. Overall, I would argue strongly that the ideal strategy for research in any society involves a combination of studies done by insiders and outsiders. Whether they collaborate on the same study or conduct separate studies, coordinating and communicating with one another, the total product is likely to be richer and more valid when it derives from these two sources and from the interplay of their differing perspectives.

Theoretical issues. Our discussions at Burg Wartenstein highlighted the limitations inherent in the currently established theories in social science stemming from the fact that they are largely the products of Western, metropolitan, dominant, industrialized societies. As such, they reflect biases based on the particular cultural values of these societies, on their unique historical experiences, and on the positions they occupy in the global stratification system. For example, it was pointed out that these theories reflect systematic biases in favor of the instrumental aspects of social relations as against the sentimental aspects; in favor of individualistic orientations as against collective ones; and in favor of social stability and social order as against social conflict and social change.

The theoretical models that have typically been used in the analysis of Third World societies are biased because they are rooted not only in Western culture, but also in a colonial relationship. The conceptions of Third World societies developed by Western scholars (which still dominate the field) may well reflect the relationships between their own societies and the societies studied—that is, the relationship between colonial powers and their colonies. It is quite likely that such models would be biased toward a view of these societies as passive, dependent, traditional, and unchanging. They are likely to miss the dynamic potential of these societies and to underemphasize the occurrence and the possibility of social change. It might be argued that foreign investigators, in general, tend to be biased against the observation of change in the societies they study, because they are inclined to look for stable characteristics of these societies and to be less attuned to the situational forces that shape their day-to-day functioning. Whether or not there is such a general tendency to deemphasize change, it clearly seems to characterize the Western models of Third World societies.

The issues is not simply that Western theories are invalid when applied to societies and cultures different from those in which they were developed. Rather, the issue is that they are generally flawed—even when applied to the societies in which they were originally developed—because they are based on a limited, biased perspective. This does not imply that they are entirely wrong; rather, they are incomplete, since they tend to minimize dimensions of human behavior and societal functioning that are less central to the cultural traditions and historical experiences of the societies from which they emerged. Since the purpose of social science is to develop general theories, any model that systematically excludes certain dimensions is inadequate.

There is no way of avoiding cultural biases in theory construction, since all theories are biased by the perspectives of those who create them. The only way to build truly general and valid theories in social science, therefore, is through the consideration of different perspectives rooted in different cultural traditions and historical experiences, which can help to correct for the limitations and systematic biases contained in each. These different perspectives have to enter into the assumptions on which research is based, the kinds of questions that are asked, and the ways in which the problems are defined.

According to this view, the alternative to Western-dominated theories is not the development of African, Asian, or Latin
American theories, on the assumption that such theories would be better suited to the analysis of Third World societies. I would argue that such theories too would be based on culturally and historically limited perspectives. What is necessary, instead, is the introduction of African, Asian, and Latin American perspectives into the process of developing general, universal theories in social science. By drawing on their own cultural sources, value orientations, historical experiences, and intellectual traditions, Third World scholars can introduce new dimensions, categories, and problematics, thus correcting and extending existing models and enhancing their generality. In so doing, they would be participating in the confrontation of different perspectives that is essential to theoretical development in social science. The alternative of developing separate theories for the Third World would sacrifice the multiple perspectives that theoretical development requires and would thus produce theories that are not only less universal in their application, but also less adequate for the societies for which they are specifically intended.

The confrontation of different perspectives is important, not only for the scientific community, but often also for the individual scholar. It has been argued that the creativity of social scientists depends on the authenticity of their work—on the extent to which it draws on their own cultural roots. Reliance on Western models has been described as “colonization of the mind.” Yet, for those social scientists who have been trained in the West, personal authenticity also requires taking that training into account. Total rejection of their own cultural framework in favor of a Western one could, indeed, be described as inauthentic—and, moreover, it would limit their ability to contribute the unique perspective that their own cultural backgrounds might otherwise provide. But the alternative to total rejection of one’s own cultural framework is not necessarily total abandonment of the Western framework. The most authentic, as well as the most productive, alternative, it seems to me, would be the active confrontation of these two perspectives within the same individual.

Ethical issues. The ethical issues that arose, directly or indirectly, in our discussions focused primarily on the conflicts that can arise in social research between a variety of powerful and powerless actors. Thus, the ethical issues are closely tied to and often indistinguishable from political issues. One source of conflict, for example, relates to the possible and actual use of social science in perpetuating a repressive status quo. The major ethical concerns focus on protecting the interests and reducing the dependency of the powerless elements—whether within societies, across societies, or within the profession. From this perspective, I shall briefly review five sets of issues: those having to do with our responsibilities to the people studied, to society, to the authorities, to our colleagues, and to the scientific community at large.

1. Responsibility to the people studied. A central concern for social scientists is with the impact of the process and products of our work on the people we study, particularly when they are members of powerless groups and therefore especially vulnerable. We must insure that their interests are adequately protected—for example, that the information they provide us does not expose them to possible penalties or lead to policies detrimental to their welfare. We must avoid exploiting them, making sure that their participation in our research provides them benefits commensurate with the costs imposed upon them. At the very least, participation in the research should add to their enlightenment; preferably, it should entail some concrete benefits for themselves or their group. When powerless groups are asked to participate in applied research relating to their condition of powerlessness, then the principle of empowerment can provide a useful guideline; that is, one of the benefits that research participation should ideally provide for these participants is an increase in their power—in their ability to pursue their interests and control their lives. Another responsibility of investigators is to enable the people they study to utilize the findings of the research; they should share information in ways that are meaningful to the people studied and, whenever possible, train and use intermediaries who can interpret the findings to the population. In all of these respects, research by foreign investigators may be particularly problematic, since they may be less sensitive to the vulnerabilities and needs of the research participants and less bound by norms of reciprocal obligation. Foreign investigators, therefore, have special responsibilities to insure that the interests of research participants are protected, that they derive some benefit from their participation, and that they (or at least their societies) can utilize the research findings (see Tapp et al. 1974).

Many of the ethical problems in social research can be alleviated to the extent that we develop participatory research models (Kelman 1972), which call for the active involvement of the people studied in a joint effort with the investigator. One example of a participatory model is provided by action research, in which the research is directly linked to an action program and governed by the requirements of that program. Another example of participatory research is the “elite interview,” which is based on the same philosophy as the anthropological tradition of treating informants as wise teachers.

2. Responsibility to society. Social scientists, as a profession, have some obligation to carry out research that is relevant to social needs, particularly to problems of national development and social change. This is not only true for investigators in developing countries, though their situations are obviously more pressing. At the same time, we must keep in mind that one of the major contributions of social scientists is their ability to maintain a critical role vis-à-vis the society—to provide independent analyses of institutions and policies and to question basic assumptions. Thus, social scientists must be able, to some extent, to stand outside the system. This requires developing and maintaining the integrity and independence of the discipline. This, in turn, means that there must be the freedom and opportunity to develop research tools and theories without the pressure to demonstrate their immediate social relevance. It must be left to individual scholars to decide on the balance between applied and purely theoretical research in their own work. Similarly, it must be left to each society to decide on the balance between applied and theoretical research in the allocation of its resources. Clearly, theoretical development may be a luxury that some societies can ill afford. I would argue, however, that no society can afford to disregard theoretical development entirely.

3. Responsibility to the authorities. I agree with the general view that social scientists should not necessarily see themselves as standing in opposition to the authorities. Where we stand must vary from situation to situation, depending on the nature of the state, the particular policies it pursues, the problems faced by our society, and our own values. I do consider it vital, however, for social scientists to maintain their independence. At least some segment of the social science community must have this independence in order to perform the analytical, critical role of social science. In this connection, social scientists must have the capacity to carry out research on the authorities and on elites more generally—that is, on the powerful elements of the society.

I regard participation of social scientists in the development process as highly commendable, where this process is governed by policies designed to meet human needs and enhance social justice or where participation provides social scientists with an opportunity to mold national policies in these directions. But even in this situation, an important part of the function of the social scientist is to evaluate the development process and to assess its consequences. Social scientists must, therefore, preserve their ability to question and criticize and not merely carry out policies formulated by the authorities. Thus, even at best, a certain tension exists between the social scientist and the
authorities. At worst, there is the danger that social science may be used as an instrument of repression; we must always be alert to this danger, whether we are functioning as indigenous investigators or as foreign investigators (cf. Wolf and Jorgensen 1970).

4. Responsibility to our colleagues. The major problems in this category arise in the relationship between foreign investigators coming from dominant, metropolitan countries and their colleagues in developing countries (see Tapp et al. 1974). Collaboration between such colleagues must be governed by the principles of equality and reciprocity. Equality means not that the amount of this or that resource contributed by all the parties will be equal, but that the contributions of all will be equally respected. Equality in research collaboration, for example, implies that both participate not only in the data collection, but also in the definition of the problem, in providing the theoretical perspective, in the interpretation and publication of results, and in sharing the final credits. Reciprocity means that the interaction is one from which both sides derive benefits, rather than one in which one side benefits disproportionately at the expense of the other. Perhaps the most important benefit that research collaboration should provide for colleagues in the host society is an increase in their capacity to do independent work. Foreign investigators from richer and more powerful nations can contribute to this end by helping in the development of human and material resources and in the building of relevant institutions.

5. Responsibility to the scientific community. The major problem for the scientific community, in the present context, is the imbalance that now exists in the resources and capacities for social-science research. The primary ethical imperative, which I see as a responsibility of the international scholarly community, is the development of independent research capacities in powerless countries and communities. Social scientists in all societies must have the opportunities and the capacities—both individual and institutional—to define their own problems for research, to carry out the research, and to utilize the findings. Only then will they be able to participate in collaborative efforts as equals and to help direct such efforts to their own needs and the needs of their societies. Furthermore, only then will they be able to contribute their own perspectives to the process of building general theories. Essentially, then, I am calling for the democratization of the research community, both within national systems and within the international system, in order to insure that the interests of all groups will be protected, that the research will be relevant to their needs, and that they will increasingly be able to participate in the enterprise on a basis of equality and reciprocity.

The process of institution building requires communication and collaboration, not only between dominant and developing countries, but also among developing countries themselves. Through such efforts, social scientists in the Third World can develop the capacities and resources to play an independent role in two respects: in relation to their own societies and governments, so that they can contribute most effectively to the process of national development; and in relation to colleagues in metropolitan centers, so that they can contribute most effectively to the process of social research and theory building.

by Talal Asad

Department of Anthropology, Hull University, Hull, England.

6 IX 79

I was unable to attend the conference at Burg Wartenstein, but, having read its proceedings, I am impressed by the interesting and important questions that they raise. In what follows I shall not try to deal with these questions in a comprehensive manner (in any case, this is a task that has been admirably performed by others), but concentrate instead on a few general points which seem to me to be worth elaborating on a little. Most of what I have to say is fairly obvious, but the obvious sometimes needs to be restated where there is a possibility of its being forgotten.

The contrast between “Western” and “non-Western” anthropology is of course central to the theme of this symposium, but should we not ask ourselves whether, and if so to what extent, there is such a discipline as Western anthropology? In asking this question I do not want to enter into the epistemological argument that scientific knowledge is essentially neither Western nor non-Western but universal. (Such an argument is in any case open to the rejoinder that anthropology is closer to the humanities than it is to the natural sciences.) My point here is much less complicated, and it is not a philosophical one. I am simply asking whether all the Westerners who call themselves anthropologists share the same theoretical assumptions or approach their conceptual problems in the same way. I think if we look carefully at the anthropological work published in English and French journals and books, we are bound to conclude that there are great differences (and often contradictions) between the general perspectives and types of explanation to be found in “Western anthropology.” I am not questioning the value of the work that we lump together as “Western anthropology,” nor am I suggesting that any two pieces of work which are fundamentally different can never have anything to say to each other. I am simply repeating something that we should all be aware of: that there is in fact no single discipline which defines the work of people who are called Western anthropologists. And this applies just as strongly, if not more so, to “non-Western anthropology.” Now, if this is true, another question that might be worth asking is: What do different kinds of anthropological work have in common? I’m sure it will come as no surprise if I say, even before we try to answer this question in detail, that many works by Western anthropologists have more in common with certain works by non-Western anthropologists than they do with other products of “Western anthropology.” Whatever the reason for this, we ought not to assume too quickly that being a member of a given nationality or ethnic group always makes one’s perspective similar to that of one’s fellow-nationals. In certain important contexts some of my fellow-nationals may be more foreign to me than some people who are citizens of another country.

It has been suggested that the distinction between Western and non-Western anthropology is misleading. For this reason, some people prefer to talk instead about local and foreign anthropology, arguing that the significant thing about anthropological fieldwork is whether or not it is carried out in one’s own country. The practical advantages and disadvantages of being a foreign fieldworker have been well enumerated by several contributors. But anthropologists don’t only do fieldwork; they analyse ethnographic material, make cross-cultural comparisons (based on other people’s reports), and even, on occasion, criticize the work of other anthropologists. Therefore we might consider whether being a “foreigner” applies with equal force to each of the phases of intellectual work that anthropologists individually or variously engage in. Alternatively, we might ask the question another way: Does the fact that I might be, say, a Sudanese citizen make my nationality equally relevant to everything I do as an anthropologist in the Sudan? And, more important, does the fact that I share my nationality with the object of my research ensure for the results of my work an unquestionable authority?

One of the distinctions that we should try to make as clearly as possible in this context—even if it seems difficult—is between anthropological work (accounts, arguments, recommendations, etc., which are usually contained in books, articles, and reports) and the anthropologists who produce this work. I would like to support the idea expressed at the conference that although it is not very useful to distinguish between Western and non-Western anthropology (except in a purely
pragmatic sense, as the work produced by Westerners or non-Westerners), the distinction between Western and non-Western anthropologists may be significant—and not only because Third World anthropologists have a special responsibility towards national development projects, as many contributors have pointed out, but for other reasons which I shall come to in a moment.

Many of the papers have stressed the importance of self-criticism in order to overcome “ethnocentric (or subjective) bias.” No doubt what is meant by this is not so much criticism of oneself, but criticism of the anthropological work one is producing. Here again, we might consider the following question: Must we assume that only I am capable of criticising my own work with this desirable end in view? Or even: Am I necessarily better at criticising it than other people? Now, even if it turned out to be true that we were better at criticising our own work, wouldn’t this have to be demonstrated rather than assumed? What applies to my own work applies here also, of course, to the work of my collectivity (ethnic group, nation, etc.). In other words, it should not be assumed that work produced by non-Western anthropologists is always and necessarily best understood, evaluated, and criticised by non-Western anthropologists. What is required is a continuous process of argument in which the work that is produced (regardless of its origin) is tested and, if necessary, reconstructed; and this process should be recognised and encouraged not only in relation to what is often called “applied anthropology,” but also in relation to the so-called pure kind.

Now that I have raised the question of criticism, I would like to stress that criticism should not be thought of merely negatively—as at best something that is needed to get rid of “subjective bias.” Where anthropologists are interested in the work of others, criticism is inevitably involved in evaluating the account, interpretation, or explanation contained in that work. More importantly, an argued-for rearrangement of the available “ethnographic facts” should be seen as no less constructive than the previous arrangement—which is also always argued for (implicitly if not explicitly). In other words, it is not enough to call for “indigenous paradigms,” as some non-Western anthropologists do. There is, after all, no guarantee that “indigenous paradigms” will be any better. This is a complicated question, but I would suggest that it is only through a critical reworking of what already exists in the field of knowledge (problems, methods, assumptions, facts) that we can decide, however provisionally, that one “paradigm” is better than another. It is not the origin of given theories, methods, and explanations which will tell us whether they are more suitable (however that is defined) than the ones we have, but some attempt to demonstrate that they are indeed more suitable. Here the distinction between “Western” and “non-Western” anthropology is not of much help, any more than that between “Indian” and “non-Indian” or “Arab” and “non-Arab.”

Having so far apparently been concerned to undermine the opposition between “Western” and “non-Western” anthropology, I would like to reintroduce it at the level of those who produce the work. Most anthropologists from Western countries have, until now, been concerned to study communities or institutions in non-Western countries—and virtually all non-Western anthropologists have tended to carry out studies in the Third World. (The category “Western” here basically includes the industrial capitalist countries of Western Europe and North America.) What are the reasons for this asymmetry? It might be due to the relatively affluent circumstances of Western universities, on the one hand, and the commitment to national development in the ex-colonial countries, on the other. There may, however, be other reasons which are worth thinking about a little more.

Couldn’t Western anthropologists apply the insights gained from their study of other cultures to a study of their own? It will be answered that they could and that they are already doing so, but the fact remains that most of them are not and that those who are find it very difficult to investigate certain areas—the relationships and behaviour of the very rich and the very powerful. On the other side, couldn’t non-Western anthropologists carry out studies in Western societies and cultures? It will be answered that they can’t afford to do so, that they are under moral and political pressure from their own developing countries to deal with more urgent problems at home, but the fact remains that anthropology students from the Third World who are studying in Western universities are rarely encouraged to carry out studies on the West. Does this perhaps mean that Western academics are not really as interested in how people from non-Western societies see Western cultures as they are in studying non-Western cultures for themselves? I think it does. This is not a simple question, but it is worth considering whether the asymmetry with which we are all familiar (between most Western anthropologists who study “other cultures” and most Third World anthropologists who study their own) hasn’t also something to do with the problem of cultural imperialism—i.e., with how cultural products of all kinds which are created in Western societies gradually replace or radically transform those created in non-Western societies. This process may contribute towards the curious attitude on the part of non-Western anthropologists that it is their own cultures which need to be studied and explained because it is these that are problematical (however this may be rationalised).

If anthropologists from non-Western countries took up the study of Western social and cultural forms, wouldn’t this help them in various ways to understand their own social and cultural problems too? Regardless of whether one thinks of anthropology as being colonial import, indigenous product, or universal truth, a critical understanding of Western societies and cultures, which occupy such a dominant place in the world today, should be a problem of the greatest interest to intellectuals in Third World countries. And, as I said earlier, it should not be assumed that Westerners will necessarily be the best people to interpret and evaluate their own societies and cultures simply because they are their own.

References Cited


KELMAN, HERBERT C. 1968. Social psychology and national develop-
Paleoecology of the Arctic-Steppe Mammoth Biome

by Vincent Stanley

2931A Fillmore St., San Francisco, Calif. 94123, U.S.A.
27 II 80

A Wenner-Gren conference on the paleoecology of the arctic-steppe mammoth biome was held at Burg Wartenstein, Austria, June 8–17, 1979. It was organized by four scientists—David M. Hopkins, John V. Matthews, Jr., Charles E. Schweger, and Steven B. Young—whose work in reconstructing the natural history and ecology of Beringia in the late Pleistocene had led them to a paradox central to all studies of the unglaciated Arctic during the last Ice Age: that vertebrate fossils from 45,000 to 11,000 years ago indicate an environment considerably more diverse and productive than exists at present, while the botanical record, where it is not silent, speaks for a far more conservative appraisal of the region’s capacity to sustain any but the sparsest forms of plant and animal life. In the face of the botanical record, fossil evidence dating from the glacial maximum of 25,000 to 14,000 b.p. shows that mammoth, horse, bison, reindeer, and saiga (steppe antelope) were present and that during the relatively mild mid-Wisconsin or Kargin Interstadial (45,000 to 30,000 b.p.) camel, musk ox, mountain sheep, moose, and rhinoceroses were also present. We know, for instance, that the Asian elephant, which is more closely related to the mammoth than to its modern African cousin, requires about 100 kg of food per day and that, though bulls may subsist alone, cows and calves travel in nursery herds of 8–15 animals. How did the late Pleistocene Arctic support gregarious mammals of this size? What caused their extinction? How do we proceed in our understanding of this region’s paleoecology when the current reconstructions by its most knowledgeable students range from polar desert to tall-grass prairie? How and when could man have survived here? Did his presence and hunting activities affect the region’s ecology?

These are the questions that faced the organizers and the small international group of geologists, paleontologists, botanists, and archaeologists interested in Beringia’s prehistory. The purpose of the conference was to confront these questions not just among representatives of the core group, but with the assistance of specialists with whom Beringian scientists normally have very little communication. This second group included two climatologists, two ecologists with expertise in the productivity of modern tundra and grasslands, a range-management analyst specializing in the digestive physiology of ungulates, a student of the ecology, demography, and behavior of modern elephants, and an ethnologist with a working knowledge of modern aboriginal hunting tribes.

The cathode-ray of the guest list reflects the two intellectual approaches to the composition of the Beringian environment that have, in part, led to the paradoxical view of apparently depauperate vegetation and comparatively abundant mammal life. The first approach is largely historical and looks strictly to the botanic, largely fossil pollen, record for the presence or absence of species in the vegetation. The second approach is rooted largely in ecology and permits the vertebrate paleontologist to reconstruct the landscape from the assumed food requirements of and climatic limitations for a number of the large, gregarious herbivores once present. This inductive and circuitous approach to history, speculative as it is, has been crucial to the development of Beringian studies. Indeed, the first entirely convincing argument for the prior existence of a land bridge between Siberia and Alaska was published in 1937 not by a geologist, but by botanist Eric Hultén to explain the distribution of many plant species.

To explore for a moment the difficulties inherent in an orthodoxy historical approach, Beringia is now considered to include the entire Amerasian isthmus that had the land bridge at its center and extended westerly to the Kolyma River in Siberia and easterly to the Mackenzie River in northwestern Canada. Since the land bridge is now submerged under politically sensitive international boundary waters, research has been limited largely to Beringia’s eastern and western extremities. Contact between Soviet and North American scientists during the last 20 years has allowed the first practical consideration of the region as a whole but has served also to reveal the magnitude of the task facing the field scientist in a vast and largely unexplored territory. Ritchie, for example, urging caution in the interpretation of his and Cwynar’s palynological data from the Yukon, warmed that approximately six reliable core sites could not be expected adequately to represent the Yukon’s 350,000 km², let alone all of Beringia.

Ritchie’s caveat reflected his suspicions of an idea that had been central to the formation of the conference but proved tangential to its discussion: that Beringia had once been simply the easternmost segment of a single treeless biome extending from western Europe through the Ukraine, Soviet Asia, and northeastern Siberia and across Beringia to the edge of the North American ice sheets in Alaska and Canada. This concept of an extinct holarctic biome that contained features of modern tundra and modern steppe but differed in character from both was first espoused by Guthrie in 1968, was developed by...