THE SHAPING OF NATIONAL ANTHROPOLOGIES

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ETNOGRAFISKA MUSEET • STOCKHOLM 1982:1-2
Introduction: The Shaping of National Anthropologies

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...it could be argued as an absorbing paradox that the internationalism and transcultural nature of anthropology lie precisely in its plurality of national viewpoints. (Maurice Freedman 1979:14)

In this special issue of Ethnos, our concern is metaanthropology; an anthropology of anthropology. Or actually of anthropologies. For we are inquiring into the bases of unity and diversity of international social and cultural anthropology. Anthropologists from six countries — India, Poland, the Sudan, Canada, Brazil and Sweden — will portray the discipline as practiced in their own nations.¹ (From Canada we have two contributions, having been advised that Quebec and Anglophone Canada ought to be discussed separately.) They have been asked to write not so much as chroniclers but rather as analysts and perhaps to some extent as critics. After their articles, we have a concluding comment by George W. Stocking, leading historian of anthropology. What we hope will emerge from the combined efforts of our authors is an understanding of some of the forces which shape national anthropologies, so that as communities and cultures, they turn out in some ways similar, in others different. In these introductory comments, we who have been editorially responsible for the issue will attempt a preliminary sketch of what we take to be some major points of interest.

Center and Periphery

Many of our questions will of course involve factors specific to the various national anthropologies — the influence on anthropology of the national situation, style of thought or climate of opinion; the peculiarities of academic structure in different countries; the characteristic background and training of anthropologists; degrees of diversity within the discipline in a country;
long-term trends; and so forth. But to begin with, we should give some attention to the larger whole, the "world order of anthropology".

If international anthropology is defined by the plurality of national viewpoints, as suggested by the late Maurice Freedman in the quotation above, these viewpoints hardly carry equal weight. Look at any of the recent texts on the history of anthropology (they are almost all American). There are some noteworthy Germans in the nineteenth century, but after that almost only the British, the French, and the Americans. Take a quick look at a book named *Reinventing Anthropology* (Hymes 1972). Obviously what is being reinvented is *American* anthropology. Listen in discreetly for instance at some more or less chance encounter between a Scandinavian anthropologist and an Indian colleague, meeting each other for the first time. Quite possibly they will try to place one another by way of common acquaintances at Chicago or Cambridge, rather like Australian aborigines identifying each other by searching for kinship links when they meet as strangers.

It seems that the map of the discipline shows a prosperous mainland of British, American, and French anthropologies, and outside it an archipelago of large and small islands — some of them connected to the mainland by sturdy bridges or frequent ferry traffic, others rather isolated.

On the mainland, people can go through their professional lives more or less unaware of what happens on the islands. The reverse seems not so often to be the case. If international anthropology to a great extent equals American + British + French anthropology, in other words, then these national anthropologies need hardly take external influences into account to more than a very limited degree. To find a more intricate interplay between national and international anthropology, and perhaps also some tension between them, we have to go ashore on some of the islands. This is what we have chosen to do in this issue. (Although Stocking, based at the University of Chicago, offers the final remarks from the mainland).

To put it bluntly, one of our interests is in the inequalities of international anthropology; in the ways the strong influence those relatively weaker. For such purposes, it is tempting to draw on recent thinking about "center and periphery", or (with more particular implications) "metropolis and satellite".² Such conceptual adoptions, however, must not be made uncritically, and for the moment we must emphasize that we will use these terms loosely, without committing ourselves to entire analytical packages. Anyway, it may be one of the advantages of these terms that through their connotations we are sensitized to "the big picture", to the interconnections between on one hand relationships among nations, on the other hand relationships among national anthropologies, and more generally perhaps to the entanglement of facts of macrosociology and microsociology. As far as British,
French, and American anthropologists are concerned, there are quite many of them, their research traditions are long-established, and they are often very good at what they are doing. This may impress those of us who dwell at the peripheries, and it contributes a great deal to the dominant role of these anthropologies. But they have not developed in a vacuum, and at least partially their influence continues to be embedded in a more general pattern of linkages between nations.

The point most often made along such lines recently — and in this issue especially in Abdel Ghaffar Ahmed’s article on the Sudan — is that anthropology is a child of colonialism, and while the specific evidence bearing on collaboration between anthropologists and rulers is rather more ambiguous, the validity of the general argument can hardly be denied. So let us note this first: if France and Great Britain had not had their empires, and the United States its internal colonies of Native Americans, they would not have developed such strong anthropologies either. It is not primarily such understandings concerning the relationship between anthropology and society we are after at this very moment, however, but rather relationships between anthropologies, more or less contextually mediated. Nor are we only interested in old colonial connections. What we broadly describe as the periphery of international anthropology includes a great many other countries as well, apart from old colonies.

One can look at this structure of center-periphery relationships more or less in network terms, as a kind of sociometry of world anthropology. Which anthropologies, and anthropologists, do people in this discipline attend to across national boundaries, if any, and in what ways? Perhaps with some oversimplification, what we have said suggests that this is the pattern:

(a) metropolitan anthropologists largely confine their attention to what goes on at home, or possibly in one or more of the other metropoles;
(b) the anthropologists of the periphery are concerned with what happens in the discipline in their own country, and in one or more metropolitan anthropologies. To some the former is of greater interest than the latter, to others it is the other way around, rather in line with the familiar distinction between "locals" and "cosmopolitans" (Merton 1957:587 ff.);
(c) the anthropologists of different countries of the periphery take little note of each other’s work, at least unless it is brought to their attention through metropolitan anthropologies.

We will come back to exceptions and qualifications. What we will ask now is through what channels the periphery is reached from the center.

The simplest, and most widespread, form of influence must surely be through publications. *Man, American Anthropologist, American Ethnolo-
gist, Ethnology, L’Homme (if one can cope with French) and a few others tend to be regarded as the central journals of the discipline probably wherever anthropology is practiced. (Current Anthropology is of course a special case but turns out to be rather American despite its internationalist ambitions.) The proliferation of sub-disciplines — applied, medical, educational, urban — with journals of their own is centered in the United States. Monographs reach least parts of the periphery from the metropoles quite readily. The number of non-British anthropologists who shop rather regularly, in person or by mail, for example at Blackwell’s, Dillon’s or Heffer’s bookshops must be quite large. Last but not least, many of the introductory textbooks published at the center are used in the periphery as well, as smaller national anthropologies may never, or only belatedly, manage to publish their own texts.

We could just note this, but there may be reason to insert here some comments about the significance of language. English and French are world languages; since World War II, English has left all other languages far behind. There are thus no “natural barriers” around anything that British, American or French anthropologists write and publish in their native media of expression. Their colleagues in other countries, where national or regional languages are strong, on the other hand, have to choose whether to aim for an audience of countrymen or the international community of anthropologists. It is probably in the nature of anthropology that the latter choice is often made. Through our occupational socialization, we tend to become tuned in to “the outside”. This is one reason why a journal such as Ethnos is published wholly or almost wholly in English, rather than turning inward to an exclusively Scandinavian readership. But just how often this is the choice may also depend on the possibilities of local first languages as alternative media. If a rather impressive amount of anthropological writing appears in Spanish or Dutch, for example, it is obviously because a satisfactorily large number of anthropologists can be reached through them. When the national or regional language community is small, on the other hand, and moreover the anthropologists in question have widely dispersed ethnographic and theoretical interests, it becomes less useful to view them as a main reference group for professional writings. Anthropological writing in the national language may then be popularizing or practical rather than academic, something one does to meet one’s obligations to society and so as not to cut oneself off altogether from one’s bases.

The advantage of metropolitan anthropologies as far as language is concerned, then, is in part that their entire literatures, academic as well as more popular, are in principle internationally accessible. Especially as far as more academic writing is concerned, it is true that the smaller anthropologies can
talk back, and communicate with one another, by using the world languages themselves. Yet they may do so somewhat reluctantly, and less fluently.\textsuperscript{6} And if the "second tier" of national anthropologies — not quite centers in their own right, but with sizeable and somewhat self-sufficient occupational communities — find it possible to use their own languages also for professional written discourse, it may be added, their contributions also become internationally less visible, so that the relative dominance of metropolitan anthropologies increases even further.

Language, naturally, is not only a medium of writing and publishing, and so with regard to other kinds of linkages as well, we may keep in mind how the widely known languages of the metropolis facilitate contacts between the latter and the peripheries. Frequently the contacts have been face to face. The representatives of the center have gone to the peripheries, or those of the peripheries to the center. Yet who goes where does not reveal the hierarchy of the relationship, for those of the center usually go away to teach, and those of the periphery more often than not come in order to learn. There seem almost always to be some foreign students in the major university departments of anthropology of the metropolis, who as they return home may come to play a prominent part in their national anthropoligies; occasionally even as "founding fathers" (or mothers), and if not that perhaps as "Young Turks" in opposition to what has gone on before.\textsuperscript{7} As for metropolitan scholars travelling as missionaries for their way of doing anthropology, there is no more obvious example than Radcliffe-Brown's extended stays in Cape Town, Sidney, Chicago, São Paulo and elsewhere (in his view, Chicago may have been peripheral, too). But such excursions can also be much briefer, visits for a week or two, or appointments for only a term. They come about mostly because the anthropologies of the periphery recognize the quality of metropo-litan anthropology, or individual exponents of it; at times also perhaps simply because with a slot to fill and no worthy local candidate in view, one is habituated to look toward the center for an ensured supply, with quality guaranteed.

This openness toward the authoritative metropolitan versions of the discipline (with regard to both reading and personal contact — they tend, of course, to go together) can be a generalized one, with more or less equal attention to all the centers, or it can entail a clustering of relationships between one of the centers and a periphery of its own. One commentator (van Teeffelen 1977, 1978) has noted the stamp of the "Manchester School" on Israeli anthropology during its years of institutionalization and expansion. In a more general and quite different way, there have been times when the university systems of almost the entire Commonwealth — with some clear exceptions — have seemed like training grounds for the major British anthropolo-
gy departments, temporary homes for academic spiralists (cf. Watson 1960). Under such circumstances, it may be of special interest to look into the organizational bases of the influences in question.

In the instance of Israeli anthropology, there was the highly specific interest of Max Gluckman, coupled with the financial support of the Bernstein Fund. In the Commonwealth case, there has been a large-scale export not only of teachers and researchers, but of an entire academic system with disciplines, departments and forms of instruction, to large parts of the world (cf. Carr-Saunders 1961). Obviously quite personal concerns and contacts can play a part in creating strong international links (note for instance also, in our Sudanese contribution, the ties of Khartoum to Hull and Bergen), but to get the full picture of connections between center and periphery, we would in addition have to consider international political alignments, agreements concerning cultural and academic exchange, and the policies and decisions of scientific foundations. There are many examples of this as well in the articles which follow. After World War II, Polish anthropology, and the social sciences in general, have been reoriented toward the socialist countries (even if at time Diamat has had to co-exist with Parsonian structural-functionalism). Anglo-Canadian academia has little autonomy vis-à-vis that of the United States, while that of Quebec obviously often casts glances toward Paris — the number of graduates of French universities teaching in French Canadian anthropology departments is conspicuous. With regard to the apparently notable influence of French currents of thought also on Brazilian anthropology, as discussed by Velho, we must be aware of the long-standing cultural and academic relationships between France and Brazil (which, as we learned in Tristes Tropiques, once brought Claude Lévi-Strauss to South America). Without the British Council and without Fulbright professors, too, center-periphery relationships may not have been what they are. Access to publications is involved here as well. What libraries get may be a function of international cultural policies, and the editions of metropolitan textbooks used in Third World universities may be comparatively inexpensive because they are subsidized (cf. Altbach 1975).

How are we to view those influences of the center on the anthropologies of the periphery? Undoubtedly it is tempting to the representatives of the latter to proclaim the necessity of "two, three, many anthropologies" — a rebellion in the backlands against the chains of dependency. It is in this direction we are led also by the vocabulary of "metropolis-satellite relations", as ordinarily used. An example of such an argument is that of one of India's leading anthropologists, J.P. Singh Ubero (1968:120), in his well-known "Science and Swaraj":
There is no "world community of science", unless that phrase be another name for the national and international science of rich nations. Scientific internationalism is a bridge of illusion, a cloak of comfort across the chasm. The existing system of foreign aid in science, to which the internationalist notion of collaboration lends credence, in truth upholds the system of foreign dominance in all matters of scientific and professional life and organization. It is nothing but the satellite system, with an added subsidy. It subordinates the national science of the poor to the national and international science of the rich. It confirms our dependence and helplessness and will not end them. The reasons for these effects are simple and fundamental: the national and the international systems inherently are synonymous for the rich but opposites for the poor.

We may need to give some further thought, however, to the complexity of the results of metropolitan influences, and it is far from certain that they are everywhere the same. With reference to intellectual relations, the ordinary notion of "exploitation", for example, does not appear directly useful, for the economics of consciousness works out rather differently from that of material goods. (In this case, it is the periphery which appropriates the ideas of the center. Yet the center can still retain them, for ideas are the kind of strange things you can keep at the same time as you give them away.)

At worst, it would seem, the metropolitan anthropologies may be overly generous, crowding the consciousness of anthropologists elsewhere with conceptualizations and styles of work which are less relevant, or less suitable, in other national contexts than those where they originated. Anxious to find a place within the framework of "international anthropology", the scholars of the periphery could then abstain from research on problems which are otherwise close at hand. They might try and force themselves to think along lines which remain alien and uncomfortable to them (as Left Bank literati, say, although in the midst of the great northern forests), refrain from using locally available assets because they would be unorthodox, and fail to cultivate their own creativity. It is also under similar circumstances, but especially where the understanding of metropolitan anthropology is uncertain, fragmented and unevenly distributed, that one may occasionally find individuals who seem to base much of their academic reputation on being able to act as cultural brokers, by virtue of a slightly greater although perhaps quite imperfect knowledge of the practice of the discipline in the outside world. All this amounts to one kind of provincialism, an inferiority complex vis-à-vis the center manifested in slavish following of every signal from the metropolis.

We see here a special tension, then, in the peripheral anthropologies, to which metropolitan anthropology is not subjected — a tension between local needs and possibilities and the more or less internalized demands of an international scholarly community, largely identified with center. Even so, it is
hardly obvious that the tension is best resolved (if indeed it should be resolved) by trying to close out the metropolitan influences. "Nationalist" forms of theory and research sometimes turn out to be susceptible to mysticism and a rhetoric certainly no less shallow than that of internationalism, and a small professional community may not have the "critical mass" needed to develop on its own the skills and the standards which are readily available in the metropolis. Closing itself to the outside, it may handle its tasks less well and become only a safe haven for mediocrity. This would be a second kind of provincialism.  

National anthropologies would seem to be better off, then, if they can manage both to draw on the resources of international anthropology and to feel unconstrained and undistracted from exploring whatever may be their own particular potentialities. This, of course, may be more easily said than done. Our contributors give us some idea of the factors involved. We do not want to leave our discussion of center-periphery relationships here, however, without noting a couple of ways in which the pattern is modified.

Metropolitan anthropologies may be indisputably dominant as wholes. They have the leading general academic centers of the discipline, and to scan its overall state and direction one does well to look at them. But as far as more specialized developments are concerned, with regard to topics or theoretical orientations, they occasionally turn out to have their own small centers elsewhere, even to the point of drawing recruits from the metropoles. Through the multitude of smaller, non-localized, specialty-orientated networks of the discipline — "invisible colleges" in Crane's (1972) terms — with their emphasis on particular skills and experiences, and on personal contacts, metropolitan anthropologies may reach out to particular individuals in the anthropologies of the periphery and claim their allegiance. Yet at times it may also be through these networks that people of different national anthropologies meet on more equal terms, and perhaps set up new links among themselves.

The concern with "the field" may also serve to forge other kinds of links. The academic institutions in the countries where we carry out our field work, if we do not do it at home, may take on a special significance to us, even if by other standards they are of the periphery. Much important information may be available there, about local conditions and about research going on in the area (cf. Cole 1977). It could be, here again, that the visits of foreign researchers merely become another way in which the metropolitan anthropology reaches into the local scholarly community. It also happens, we know, perhaps for this reason as well as others, that relationships become somewhat tense between the resident scholars of these institutions and the visitors passing through on their way to or from the field. But at best, the same institu-
tions can play a special part, for both categories, in the discussion also of theoretical and methodological matters with a special relevance for local research. Where this happens, we can recognize another kind of center.

National Styles and Issues

Let us now turn from the metropolis/satellite model, with its sinister connotations of exploitation and power differentials, to a more liberal view simply delighting in cultural diversity. Anthropology is an interpretation of culture. Could it be that this interpretation is itself shaped by culture? Could some of the differences between national anthropologies be derived from differences between the cultural systems which have formed the anthropologists? Are there perhaps pervasive mental habits, cultivated within national cultures, doing their subterranean work regardless of the conscious theoretical designs of the anthropologists?\(^{10}\)

It is tempting to reply affirmatively. No doubt, there is a distinctly British style of anthropology, a no less clearly French one, and perhaps a somewhat more blurred American style. So why should there not be also a Polish style, a Sudanese one or a Swedish one? To an anthropologist accustomed to view things — myths, marketplaces, morals or whatever — in their cultural context, this seems a highly plausible proposition. But style is an elusive concept, difficult to use analytically. It is one thing to identify a cognitive style, quite another to explain it. Galtung (1981) has broken new ground in identifying and describing a number of ideal-typical intellectual styles which can then be associated, more or less closely, with a national culture. Nipponic style is, of course, typical of Japanese intellectuals, but it may also be found elsewhere. And conversely, many Japanese academics may be more at home in the saxonic style. This provides for some flexibility in the analysis. But is it possible to go beyond identifying intellectual styles? Is it possible also to account for their origin?

Before trying to answer that question, we must deal with a fundamental objection. Although it would seem to be in the very nature of a social science that it should be sensitive to the social conditions of its own existence, this is not always or even often the case. As Lepenies (1981b:325) has argued concerning sociology:

Still less than other disciplines can sociology deny that the choice of its subjects, the development of its theories and the establishment of a specific organizational structure in research and teaching are conditioned by the socio-cultural setting, a setting, furthermore, that has often provided considerable resistance to the growth of the social sciences.
However, this very fact is often regarded by sociologists as a sign of the distance still separating sociology from the desired status as a mature science. This is also the reason why it is not uncommon in histories of sociology published after World War II to find "the triumphant declaration that there is no more a German or a French sociology, only the mainstream of international research" (Lepenies 1981b:325).

Even among anthropologists one sometimes finds an over-emphasis on the uniformity of their science that is seen as divided only by theoretical tendencies, not by national characteristics. In the introduction to a recent volume on anthropological traditions, Stanley Diamond (1980:11-12) claims that contemporary anthropology, no matter where practiced, is a reflex of the major traditions. In this sense the discipline is about as universal as the Singer sewing machine. It is a diffused technic that can even be fabricated abroad.

And he continues:

An Indian or African anthropologist, trained in this Western technic, does not behave as an Indian or African when he behaves as an anthropologist. He may be a structural-functionalist, an evolutionist, a cultural historian or an eclectic combination of these, and he lives and thinks as an academic European.

In the same vein, but more specifically, Milton Singer (1968:528) shows how various national traditions have intermingled throughout anthropological history to found dominant theoretical schools:

The national labels are out of place, since the "British" Radcliffe-Brown derives from the work of Morgan and the French sociological school, while the "American" cultural anthropologists derive from Tylor and, through Boas, the German diffusionists.

It would be foolish to deny that Diamond and Singer have a point. Much in anthropology, in fact most of it, is really international: not only a diffused technique but also a diffused body of theory. But it is also obvious that this is not the whole story.

There are both cosmopolitan and local strands to any national anthropology, i.e. traits that are more or less reflexes of the major international traditions, more or less products of purely national conjunctures. A national anthropology may, in fact, receive much of its distinctiveness from the relation of forces between cosmopolitan and local characteristics. Although these typical orientations are found both in centers and peripheries, it may be the case (as already indicated) that a country's position in the center/periphery
model has an influence on the particular balance struck in that country between cosmopolitanism and localism.

The relative importance of these two orientations may also be affected by the general structure of intellectual life in a country. Two extremes may be mentioned. On one hand, one can imagine a situation in which intellectual life is rigidly compartmentalized so as to encourage the formation of international links within each specialty. On the other hand, intellectual life may be integrated to such an extent that the significant others for most academics will be found within their own society: in other disciplines or among the nation’s intellectuals at large.

In most cases, no doubt, cosmopolitans will be the theoretical leaders in a discipline, but the opposite could conceivably be true in others. One would also expect that, sooner or later, truly innovative research emerging among the locals would become an export commodity. Such a course of development may turn one-time locals into cosmopolitans without substantially affecting the nature of their anthropology. France might provide an illustrative case of this process. Its Marxist anthropology remained for almost a decade a very local Parisian affair, paying little attention to both Marxism and anthropology outside the French hexagon. During the 1970’s, it was gradually assimilated by the Anglo-Saxons through such journals as Critique of Anthropology. Although this Marxist anthropology was a distinct theoretical school, it was at the same time somehow very "French", a quality that clearly persists even in an English or Swedish translation.

The reluctance to admit the existence of national anthropologies, in any other sense but the purely geographical, may have its roots in an understandable skepticism towards the notion of national character. Just like the concept of cognitive style, national character is a descriptive label, a summary of imputed traits, not a thing in itself, and thus devoid of explanatory power. National characters are common sense descriptions of mental and emotional habits. Only if we can locate the sources of these habits somewhere outside the habits themselves are we breaking out of a circular use of the concept. Let us look at three factors which seem to be of some importance in this connection. They are the national educational system, the general characteristics of intellectual life in the country concerned and, finally, the particular constellation of events and circumstances which seem to give rise to special sensibilities, to the "decisive experience" of a particular generation, for example.

To understand the first two of these factors, we would do well to turn to Pierre Bourdieu and his work in the sociology of knowledge. The most important result of one's education, he insists, may be not the precise knowledge one has acquired but, rather, the general methods one has assimilated
of how to go about acquiring knowledge: certain mental habits, certain ways of posing a problem, certain theoretical positions regarded as so self-evident that they are not even perceived as positions.

What individuals owe to their school is above all a fund of common-places, not only a common language and style but also common meeting grounds and grounds for agreement, common problems and common methods of tackling them: the cultivated men of a given age may have different opinions on the subject about which they quarrel but they are at any rate agreed on quarreling about certain subjects. What attaches a thinker to his age, what situates and dates him is above all the kind of problems and themes in terms of which he is obliged to think. (Bourdieu 1969:115)

Although Bourdieu (1969:116) speaks here in rather general terms about the "unthought element common to all individual thought" during a given period, a certain age, there is no doubt that the same reasoning applies also to nations and that it can account for some of the differences in cognitive style so often remarked upon: French rationalism, English empiricism, German profundity, etc. Bourdieu and Passeron themselves (1967) have produced such an application in their study of French sociology. In this analysis we find a slight shift of emphasis from the influence of the school itself to the effects of what they call the "intellectual field". In France the intellectual field is characterized, among other things, by the high degree of intercommunication among the different categories of intellectuals. The organization of the intellectual field in France undoubtedly provides more opportunity for contact than is the case elsewhere. The best known periodicals are, in fact, distinguished by their undifferentiated receptivity, which enables them to print, side by side, a structural analysis of a myth and an article on twelve-tone music or modern painting. Such periodicals encourage and attract a special class of intellectuals — specialists in generality — who are often marked by their ability to move, always at the same level of generality, from one area to another — from electoral sociology, for example, to structural anthropology. (1967:176)

A rather similar picture is provided by pre-war Vienna. As Janik and Toulmin (1973) demonstrate, Wittgenstein's philosophy grew out of common concerns of Viennese intellectuals in very different specializations, and it was therefore partly misunderstood when transplanted to the very different intellectual climate of Cambridge.

The intellectual field in Sweden provides an altogether different case. Here the demarcations between various specialists are very clear and the sanctions against trespassing forbidding. Hence the proverbial unwillingness, not to say inability, of Swedish intellectuals or academics to enter into a discussion of anything not squarely within the field of their own competence.
Educational systems and intellectual fields are factors which seem to belong to the more permanent features of the intellectual make-up of nations. Borrowing Fernand Braudel's (1958) concepts, one might regard them as belonging to la longue durée of intellectual history. Of a totally different order, perhaps part of l'histoire événementielle, are the particular experiences which seem to mark certain generations. Such phenomena are well-known from the history of literature and art, and we should look for them also in the history of anthropology. Such formative experiences may range from macro-events of a political nature to such seemingly undramatic micro-events as a decisive text, intensely read and passionately lived. "It is 'the book in the pocket' which matters, the espousal of a text as radical and pivotal to private impulse and social stance," as George Steiner (1981:63), in a different context, has expressed it. Conceivably one might find, now and then, entire generations of anthropologists shaped by such common experiences. The books in the pocket may be hard to trace, but the macro-events offer themselves more easily to inspection. Let us mention briefly some examples.

To the outside observer, at least, it is difficult to interpret South African (Afrikaans) anthropology, with its specific "ethnos theory", as anything but "an outgrowth of Christian-National ideology" (Sharp 1981:26), as an anthropological adaptation to the political reality of apartheid or even as its justification. Such a view is, of course, indignantly rejected by the anthropologists concerned who view their discipline and its theoretical apparatus from an exclusively internalist perspective. Assuming that the outside critics are closer to the truth than inside apologists, Afrikaans anthropology furnishes a clear example of how a national anthropology may be shaped, in its very theoretical core, by the national situation.

Similar claims have been made for British anthropology. As diagnosed by Perry Anderson (1969) in his daring (but perhaps not entirely convincing) analysis, the flourishing of the characteristically holistic British anthropology is only understandable against the background that it was "useful to colonial administration and dangerous to no domestic prejudice" (1969:265). The first part of the answer is, of course, a commonplace and yet debatable. The second part is what concerns us here. Anderson contends that the holistic perspective of British anthropology was a consequence of a peculiar displacement due to the national situation. The idea of totality — dangerous to any bourgeoisie because it would make the contingent nature of bourgeois hegemony evident — was not allowed to develop at home but instead exported abroad. The corollary of this explanation of anthropological brilliance is the account for sociological dimness.

British culture never produced a classical sociology largely because British society was never challenged as a whole from within: the dominant class and its intellect-
uals consequently had no interest in forging a theory of its total structure; for it would necessarily have been an 'answer' to a question which to their ideological advantage remained unposed. (Anderson 1969:264)

This explanation, both in its powerful vision and in its reductionism reminiscent of George Lukács (1923), is then given a final twist by the use of a psychoanalytical metaphor: "Suppressed in every obvious sector at home, the idea of the totality was painlessly exported abroad, producing the paradox of an anthropology where there was no sociology." (Anderson 1969:276)\(^1\)

Another example of national fact shaping an anthropology may be found in the works of the first generation of Israeli anthropologists. Both the inventory of the different versions of Jewish culture that suddenly became next-door neighbors through the policy of the "ingathering of the exiles", and the study of their integration into contemporary Israeli society are, of course, in a trivial sense determined by the Israeli experience. But one analyst, van Teeffelen (1977), has gone considerably further. The reasoning may be as controversial as Perry Anderson's analysis, but it is less dependent on the prior acceptance of a full-scale social philosophy. Using concepts forged by Gouldner (1975) and White (1973) in their analyses of sociological and historical texts respectively, he attempts to show how "Israeli anthropology implicitly expresses concerns similar to post-statehood Zionism" (1977:53). Van Teeffelen demonstrates how basic assumptions, provided by Zionism, enter into the very dynamics of field work interaction between the anthropologist and his informants and how they frame the story that is then told by the anthropologist. Through this analysis he can account both for the kind of plot that structures many Israeli monographs and for the actors' style in playing their parts. It is hardly surprising — but it does contribute to the persuasiveness of van Teeffelen's analysis — that he finds basically the same relation between Israeli Arab anthropology and Palestinian nationalism as between Israeli Jewish anthropology and Zionism.

As a contrast, let us refer to the case of Quebec anthropology, as presented by Gold and Tremblay in this issue. Although the francophone anthropologists seem to have identified closely with Quebecois nationalism, there is no clearly "nationalist" pattern to the anthropology that has emerged. There is even a lack, or at least a notable scarcity of precisely the sort of study one would have expected, i.e. investigations of the specifically Quebecois in Quebecois culture.\(^1\) Similarly, the changes affecting Polish anthropology as a consequence of political events seem rather indirect. Anthropology in post-war Poland has been shaped less by a radical reformulation of its theoretical approaches than by a policy of relative isolation and through administrative reforms regulating its relation to other sciences.
Others among our contributors give incontrovertible evidence of the deep impact of macro-events. Sudanese independence has given Sudanese anthropology a more activist character. As native anthropologists strive to make anthropology relevant to their own society, they find that this means abandoning the traditional interests of colonial anthropology in favor of a greater concern with development issues.

Saberwal's somber reflexions on the state of Indian anthropology provide an example — with far-reaching implications, it would seem — of how the general situation of a country may set the limits for its anthropology. In a society where the budding anthropologist's field work will have to be confined, for economic and political reasons, not only to his own society in general but perhaps also to some fairly well-known corner within it, he will not get much of a "stretching experience" out of this rite de passage. Instead, the kind of anthropology ultimately emerging from his immersion in the already familiar will be all too determined by the stock of knowledge shared by the anthropologist and his subjects. Later on, as a fullfledged anthropologist, he will speak in a restricted code — to use Bernsteinian parlance — rather than an elaborated one. The over-all effect, if one follows this interpretation, may well be a national anthropology with as bleak a chance of making it on the international scene as a working-class student in a middle-class educational system.

Let us end this sample of anthropology and its sister sciences embedded in their respective social settings by something much less dramatic. Swedish anthropology in the 1970's was preoccupied with social inequalities of various kinds: those between centers and peripheries in the world economy, those between social classes, and those between men and women. The intellectual history of that generation of Swedish students and academics remains to be written, but it is quite clear that such a concern must be seen against the background of the politicization of the second half of the 1960's. Leaving sexual inequality aside — the history of the awareness of it is a separate chapter and a complicated one at that — the first kind of social inequality that liberally unpolitical students discovered in the 1960's was the widening gap between "us" and the Third World. That this fact came to be seen as the product of Western colonialism (instead of, for example, Third World lethargy) was in no small measure the merit of a slim volume called An Unjust Consideration. Written by Göran Palm (1966), a leading Swedish poet and critic, hitherto "unpolitical" as far as one knew, this "book in the pocket" suddenly made Western exploitation of the Third World into an inescapable fact. Shocked by this discovery, many readers started to regard their more immediate surroundings with suspicion and in due course they discovered social inequalities closer to home: then it was already 1968.
Unity and Diversity in National Anthropologies

Of course, not all national anthropologies are characterized by a homogeneity of interests and working styles. Some seem to be going off in all directions at once, microcosms of just about everything that has ever been part of world anthropology. Others may include two or three "schools" of quite different characteristics. An obvious example may be Dutch anthropology, at least as it was until a more recent period — there has been a Leiden anthropology, more linked to Dutch colonial history by focussing on Indonesia (where several of its founders had in fact been working in the colonial administration), and drawing much of its theoretical inspiration from linguistics and from French structuralism; and an Amsterdam anthropology, with its origins in the comparativist and evolutionist armchair sociology of Steinmetz and Nieboer, later aligning itself more with Anglo-Saxon anthropology, and doing its field work partly in Surinam but also to a significant extent in Africa and Europe (cf. Köbben 1952; Geertz 1965; de Josselin de Jong 1965; Kloos 1975).

What can be the factors behind such unity or diversity? In large part, certainly, chance may be involved. Individuals of a founding generation and divergent interests may have established themselves each in their own institution, and even as the anthropology of each place evolves, it continues to carry its own characteristic stamp. There may be enduring linkages to different metropolitan centers, similarly set up through accidents of history. Or differences in local environments may play a part. Big-city universities, neighbors of slums as well as of public bureaucracies, may choose their anthropology differently from those which seem to be close to no social problem other than the conflict between town and gown.

It may be useful, however, to consider here also the systematic influences of the organization of academic work which may or may not foster cohesion within a discipline on the national level. The most self-sufficient "schools", it would seem, in anthropology and in sociology, to a large extent train their own staff members. They may have privileged access to a field. And they may control their own publication outlets. Manchester anthropologists shuttled to Central Africa and published through the series of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute. The old "Chicago School" in sociology had their field in their back yard, and ran the American Journal of Sociology. The Durkheimians became synonymous with l'Année sociologique (and stayed at their desks).

On the other hand, a variety of forms of interaction and mobility may favor integration. Where there is an exchange of examiners between institutions there will probably be less leeway for divergent developments and uneven standards. Examination systems open to public inspection in other ways
may have similar effects. Funding agencies (foundations, research councils) and publication outlets on which many are dependent can sometimes also play a part, creative or constraining, in establishing goals and criteria of quality. Professional meetings can contribute to the development and fixation of common interests. And as Boissevain (1974:226) has noted, the departmental seminar where visitors from other universities come to present papers may have been an instrument of some importance in maintaining the unity of British anthropology.

Such contacts between institutions may be characterized by equality and reciprocity, even if they are at the same time competitive. But they can also be marked by inequality. National anthropologies, no less than world anthropology, can have their center and their periphery. If one university in a country has much higher prestige than others, any interests or styles established there may come to be dominant elsewhere as well. Its representatives talk to each other; they may talk at their colleagues from elsewhere. Although hardly in such terms, Saberwal points to the leading role of Delhi in Indian anthropology. If we look at American anthropology, it is taught in hundreds of colleges and universities, and seems to contain a variety of orientations. Yet it might have been even more diverse but for the fact that a relative handful of graduate departments train not only their own and each other's future staff, but also a large part of that of other departments; while those coming out of the other departments may never again be involved with graduate teaching at all (cf. Hurlbert 1976).

Varieties of Discipline Boundaries

As we turn to focus more directly on questions concerning the organization of the discipline of anthropology, as constituted on a national basis, the first thing to take note of may reasonably be the different ways in which its boundaries can be drawn. This, of course, relates to variations in terminology — between different national and continental traditions as well as over time, there has been little consensus over the meaning of "anthropology", "ethnology" and "ethnography". Fundamentally, perhaps we can discern three different ways of defining the territory of anthropology in the landscape of academic disciplines.

One of these makes of it a grand empire, including the provinces of physical anthropology, linguistics, archaeology, and whatever we call the branch concentrating on the study of ongoing ways of life and thought. This is a magnificent nineteenth-century conception of a unified science of humanity. Its origins may have been in London and Paris, and august bodies like the
Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland may still embody it. In academic life, however, it has hardly been fully institutionalized anywhere but in the United States. It has its vocal defenders. Others seem merely to pay lip service to it, or accommodate to it in other ways as an accomplished historical fact. As teachers, people may have to cope with the entire field thus defined when entrusted with an introductory course. Otherwise, it is commonly accepted that the last person whose expertise extended over all of it was Franz Boas.

In Europe, generally, it seems that the four fields of study in question have generally been separate. Looking at things from the point of view of the discipline mostly known as "ethnography" or "social anthropology" or "cultural anthropology", as we do here, the boundaries with archaeology, linguistics, and physical anthropology seem on the whole neither more nor less sharply defined than boundaries with any other disciplines. On the other hand, in European universities — and museums — we have the variously strong tendency to separate the study of local cultural traditions from that of more distant ones. In other words, the Volkskunde/Völkerkunde split. The former, of course, tended to develop in the last century as a scholarly expression of cultural nationalism. It is the study of folklore and folk music, customs and costumes, housing and handicrafts as they existed in peasant society. The latter, the Völkerkunde, was in the lineage of discovery and exploration in foreign lands.

The degree of separateness of these two, and their relative strength, have varied. France and Great Britain, with their colonial involvements, naturally had a strong interest in the study of "others", while for a different set of historical reasons, the inward-turning of national traditions appear to have had more emphasis in most of Eastern, Central and Northern Europe. Poland and Sweden offer examples in this issue. In recent years, the changing pattern of international contacts has led to an intensified interest in African, Asian and Latin American societies for example in Scandinavia, as our Swedish study shows. In other places, however, the real opportunities for engaging in such studies, at least through travel and field work, may rather have decreased.

Clearly, both the Volkskunde and the Völkerkunde are in a way parts of a "social and cultural" anthropology. But within the various national contexts, it is the latter which has more often claimed the term anthropology or any of its derivatives for itself.

In neither Europe nor North America has the boundary between anthropology and sociology really been much at issue. It may not always have been easy to define and defend with intellectual precision, but it has been there as an established fact, and the sociological and anthropological communities
have tended to be quite distinct. There may be some slight exception to this in Great Britain, where a number of postwar universities have only sociology departments which are, however, populated in no small part by social anthropologists (including the incumbents of some chairs). Yet this appears not so far to have led to a real breakdown of the separate professional identities.

In the Third World, on the other hand (or at least in much of Asia and Africa), this boundary is often blurred, and the separate territory of anthropology consequently not so well-defined. This may be less the case where an American-type definition of a unified anthropology serves as a source of inspiration, and where the particular identity of anthropologists may depend in part on their expertise (real or supposed) in areas with which sociologists hardly ever concern themselves. Where physical anthropology, archaeology or linguistics do not form part of the package, on the other hand, the merger of social and cultural anthropology with sociology may occur more readily. And since anthropology carries the burden of being seen as a "colonial science", the label of sociology is then often held more acceptable. The third major way of defining anthropology, to put it differently, is to define it away. The Indian example is prominent here, while the same tendency may have been rather less strong in the Sudan.

This does not necessarily entail an "end of anthropology" as a complex of ideas and practices. The relationship of this sociology-with-anthropology-included to the distinctively institutionalized anthropology and sociology elsewhere becomes, on the other hand, a bit complicated. There may be individuals who switch readily between ideas originating in sociological and anthropological traditions, or integrate them without much ado. They may use both labels as they see contextually fit. Others may feel more at home within the confines of one of the disciplines as separately constituted, due perhaps to the influence of imported textbooks, or to their having acquired a significant part of their training abroad.

There is also the question of what society one studies. Third World scholars obviously for the overwhelmingly greater part conduct their social and cultural research in their own countries: India, the Sudan, Brazil. It is not, then, anthropology in the sense of investigation of "other cultures". Their relationship to the materials, it would seem, rather parallels that of the typical European or American sociologist, similarly inclined, as Everett Hughes (1971:475) puts it, to "stay-at-homeism". Or if the work is more descriptive, self-consciously culturally specific, and motivated perhaps by the concerns of salvage ethnography, it tends to be Volkskunde rather than Völkerkunde.

This may have important implications for the kind of work that gets done, the sorts of issues which are raised. Yet it does not necessarily mean, of course, that a Third World sociologist/anthropologist has more "in
common" with a European Volkskunde scholar, or with a European or American sociologist, than with a European or American anthropologist of "other cultures". For to the extent that the former deliberately or unwittingly limit their attention to their own societies and their cultural traditions, what we get may not be one boundary-transcending sociology or Volkskunde, but many parallel but separate ones — "East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet". Certainly not all sociology is so culturally limited. But at the level of substantive materials, at least, it may more often be the European or American anthropologists and the Third World sociologist/anthropologist who have shared concerns. What is one's "other culture" is the other's own; at best, an informed dialogue can be carried out based on the complementarity of insider and outsider perspectives. At worst, the relationship is deformed by the inequalities of center and periphery. There is, naturally, a sizeable literature of controversy on this already.22

Do the different ways of drawing discipline boundaries matter to what kind of research actually gets done — not only to how it is labeled? We have no definite answers to this question. It seems quite possible, however, that such boundaries can sometimes be serious obstacles to the flow of ideas. They may decide, or at least strongly influence, what we read and what we do not read, whom we talk to and whom we do not talk to. From this point of view, it would seem better to have fewer boundaries rather than more. It may be that African and Asian sociologists/anthropologists are in an advantageous position, being free to move as they please in a field which a quirk of academic history has divided into two for their American and European colleagues. And perhaps the study of one's cultural tradition may benefit from being included in a discipline of wider comparative perspectives, rather than a fairly isolated Volkskunde. It appears quite likely, too, that evolutionary thinking has maintained a more prominent position in American sociocultural anthropology because the latter has had its institutionalized links with archaeology and physical anthropology, and that Americans have developed a field like ethnoscience and done the pioneering work in linguistic anthropology because linguistics have also been a part of the wider discipline.

On the other hand, as we have intimated before, such a large field may be much too inclusive and heterogeneous for anyone to handle competently. To the extent that one is forced to try, one may be too exhausted to explore other frontiers which potentially have equally interesting offerings. Perhaps we would be as well off with more and smaller disciplines, provided that individuals do not hesitate (and are preferably given some encouragement) to experiment with the variety of combinations they make possible.23 It could also be argued that some diversity in the ways the boundaries of anthropology are drawn in various national habitats contributes to the totality of such experi-
mentation. The price we have to pay for this, in terms of some confusion in international communication, may not be too high.

The Making of Anthropologists: Backgrounds, Training, Careers

We move now to factors which may influence the interests and skills of anthropologists as they move into and through the internal structure of the discipline; factors which may differ between one country and another. Can anything be said about the characteristic personal background of a nation's anthropologists? Are there any extra-academic experiences which a significant number of them have shared? Do they tend to combine anthropology with particular other subjects in their university studies? How are anthropologists trained? Is the academic structure, including the structure of departments, such as to encourage conformity to established thinking or innovation, broad knowledge or narrow knowledge?

The fact that a number of the founders of the Leiden version of Dutch anthropology, as mentioned above, had a background in the colonial service in the East Indies, would exemplify one sort of answer to the first of this list of questions. But it is, of course, easier to find occasional clusterings like this than more generally shared personal attributes, and as usual most of what has been said on the issue concerns metropolitan rather than peripheral anthropologies. In Britain, it has been said, anthropologists have tended to have a higher class background than sociologists. We do not know whether this actually was true, and whether it still is. If so, we suppose this would have something to do with the greater cosmopolitanism of the upper classes, and perhaps more specifically with their greater personal involvement with colonialism. More than a few British anthropologists seem to have been influenced in their occupational choice by some earlier personal experience somewhere in the Empire.

If the class background of anthropologists is similar in other countries is also unclear. There are countries, of course, where one can hardly have any higher academic training without an origin in the upper class. To take the question beyond the level of gossip, anyway, one would also want to have some sense of how the facts of class would influence the conduct of anthropology. Will the aristocrat-turned-anthropologist tend to take a Brahmin view, from the top down, of the social order (cf. Berreman 1979:163); of any social order he comes to observe? In rigidly stratified societies, will social sciences anchored in one class be characterized by thin description and top-heavy theorizing, as Galtung (1966) has suggested has been the case in Latin America?
As we have already seen, it is also a fact that minorities and immigrant groups have been well represented in the major national anthropologies. And this has been true of the human sciences generally. The contributions of scholars of Jewish background — Marx, Simmel, Freud, Durkheim, Lévi-Strauss and others — have been noted by more or less controversial commentators from Veblen (1948:467-479; first published 1919) to Cuddihy (1974). It does seem that the sensibilities of some kind of "double consciousness", the simultaneous availability of two ways of looking at things, can play a great part in developing original insights, and may also have some influence on the recruitment of people to anthropology and related fields. Perhaps there are further examples of this in other national anthropologies. It is true, certainly, that such consciousness can come about in other ways than through ethnic minority status, and that it may well be a result of anthropological training itself. There is also a lot of bread-and-butter anthropological work which may not require it.

Less grandly, there are questions concerning what academic structures do to the people they have somehow drawn to themselves.

Are university curricula so organized that the path leading into anthropology also necessarily passes through particular other subjects? Where this is the case, ideas from these subjects may tend to become incorporated into anthropological work and thought as well — unless it becomes a part of anthropological training to unlearn them. Quite frequently, however, it is apparently possible to move into anthropology with very variable academic baggage. Such differences in the range of recruitment possibilities could have consequences for the amount of variety of concerns and styles of thought exhibited by a national anthropology. Conceivably, there is often more variety of academic backgrounds in the early stages of institutionalization of anthropology in a national habitat; the personal "discovery" of anthropology may then be more a matter of chance.

At what stage, or stages, can an anthropological education start? In some countries, the subject is well established in the undergraduate curriculum. Students fresh out of secondary school may take it up and commit themselves to it. And a strong concentration of anthropology in undergraduate work may be a requirement for acceptance into a graduate anthropology program, as is the case for example in Sweden. In other countries, or in particular universities, there is little or no interest in undergraduate anthropology teaching, and a large proportion of the students going into graduate work have had very limited exposure to the discipline before. The implications of this may vary. It is possible that students of the latter kind may benefit from the broader knowledge of other disciplines which they have acquired instead. As late starters, they may on the other hand have little time to cover much
anthropological ground. Boissevain (1974:227) has suggested that British anthropology students working toward an advanced degree tend to become narrowly read for this reason; they get a one or two year "crash course" in the essentials of the discipline, strictly supervised by a tutor, and hardly find a chance to stray from the path. It may be added here, surely, that within its limits this type of coaching has indeed been very effective. The tutorial institution is evidently central to one kind of national anthropology. In the United States, it is also possible to begin serious anthropological studies in graduate school, but one tends to stay in the classroom longer, for a variety of courses and seminars. In contrast to both these solutions to the problems of graduate training, there are clearly a great many countries where work toward a higher degree is a much more lonely business, perhaps with occasional advice from an extremely limited teaching or museum staff, and without much in the way of functioning intellectual peer relationships.

A little later on the path of professional development there again seems to be an instructive contrast to be drawn between British and American anthropologies. It has been sketched with greatest clarity, and quite convincingly, by Robert F. Murphy (1971:17ff), who proposes that the different constitutions of departments in the universities of Great Britain and the United States tend to make one anthropology narrow, the other wide in its scope. The British university department (which is in this respect of a widespread European pattern) is a pyramid with one single individual, the incumbent of The Chair, at its apex. This creates powerful centralizing tendencies, as everybody who hopes for continued academic advancement must remain close to the core of the discipline. The holder of The Chair, Murphy notes, need not personally play a part in enforcing this tendency - it enforces itself. In this situation, there is some likelihood of involution.

In the American case, on the other hand, the number of full professors in a university department need be little lower than that of people in junior ranks, and departments tend to avoid duplication of specializations among their appointees. The effect of this is an increasingly complex division of labor, inventiveness as far as personal specialties are concerned, and perhaps some eclecticism invoking ideas from other disciplines as well.

The interpretation is elegant, although possibly somewhat oversimplified. Adam Kuper (1973:154 ff), in his history of the golden age of British anthropology, also draws attention to the powers of the professoriate, but shows at the same time that some departments developed more of a "party line" than others, probably depending in no small part on the force of personality of the incumbents of the chair. More recently, the multiplication of professorships seems to have begun reaching into British anthropology departments as well. We would add, too, that it seems like a happy coincidence that American-
style anthropology got American-style departments. Who, again, would now want to have personal responsibility for all four branches of the superdiscipline?

Anyhow, the contrast may be useful for further comparisons of national anthropologies. Which, in its terms alone, are more like British anthropology, and which are more like American anthropology? But other factors need to be taken into account as well. Murphy's analysis seems to build on the assumption, for example, that the work of anthropologists is geared toward careers within academia. This is less true in the United States now than it was when he wrote, and it also seems to become less true in Great Britain. And in other countries, situations may vary a great deal in this respect.

For one thing, one would have to consider the significance of museums as major institutional settings of anthropological activity in some countries. Museum anthropology often appears to entail other priorities and commitments than university anthropology: a focus on technology and artifacts rather than social relations or ideas, regional rather than thematic expertise. In the anthropologies reported on in this issue, museums seem at present to play their most important role in Poland. Of the metropolitan varieties, it is clearly French anthropology that is most museum-oriented; it differs from the British and American anthropologies also in its rather weak position in universities, and in the rather large number of scholars employed by the large government research organizations, the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) and the Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique d'Outre-Mer (ORSTOM).

The issues we have raised in this section have mostly concerned what goes on in the offices and classrooms of the universities, and, as a brief afterthought, in museum storerooms. Yet these, of course, tend not to be the most celebrated areas of the anthropological life. In many national anthropologies, at least, the true rite de passage in becoming an anthropologist has been widely acknowledged to be an extended period of field work. That this is the core of the anthropological experience, and of the anthropological identity, has tended to be taken for granted. But field research is not, and has not always been, an obligatory part of a professional education in all national anthropologies. From the point of view of the metropolis, at least, this may often have been taken as an indicator of "strong" and "weak" anthropologies. Terence Turner (1970:419-420) has commented sharply on the issue in a review of a German monograph on a South American Indian group:

...her book raises an issue that should not be sidestepped: the disturbing condition of cultural anthropology in Germany and certain other central European countries. Funds in these countries are generally unavailable for sending graduate stu-
dents and young scholars to the field, with the result that "library studies" such as the one under review are the only alternative. Yet the theoretical apparatus provided by the university training of these students is so antiquated, provincial, and reactionary by the standards of French, British, and U.S. anthropology that they are unprepared to raise significant questions in relation to the data available to them. Lack of opportunities for young scholars to do field research in their formative period, lack of contact with the modern literature of U.S.-Anglo-French anthropology, and the provincial sterility of the German culture-historical school have doomed the great majority of young German ethnologists to producing studies like the one under review, and this is a great loss, not only to them, but for the international anthropological community.

Turner touches on more than the centrality of field work, and there may have been changes in German anthropology since he wrote (cf. Braukämper 1979). So, for that matter, have there been in the metropolitan anthropologies: funding may be increasingly hard to get there as well, and foreign anthropologists are not welcome everywhere. Just as significantly, perhaps, "fieldworkism" has been blamed more often in recent years for certain intellectual limitations in anthropological thought and practice. Granting all this, it may yet be that the position on field work is of fundamental importance to the differential shaping of national anthropologies — whether field study is regarded as indispensable, merely recommendable, or plain unnecessary and even distracting; how one feels about using other people's ethnography; what one may make of anthropology without ethnography. Possibly a more relaxed attitude to this question can at times also contribute to creating a wholesome diversity within an anthropological community, although one cannot lightly disregard observations such as those quoted above. The best armchair theorists, after all, may still have some dirt from field work under their nails.

These, then, have been some of the things — big things, little things — which we think are involved in an anthropology of anthropology. It is an introduction where we, too, have largely been armchair theorists, sometimes speculating about possibilities rather than describing realities, and picking examples partly as we have found them handy in the library shelves. Now enter the ethnographers.

NOTES

1. We have aimed for a wide geographic spread, and a variety of different circumstances. Due to lack of space we have had to exclude several other cases which might have been of special interest for one reason or other, and certain national anthropologies have of course been discussed in somewhat similar ways else-

2. Major sources here would be for example Shils (1972, especially chapter 17, and 1975) and Frank (1967); our use of "center" and "periphery" is obviously not quite that of Shils, since we deal with units of an international system. See also von Gizycki (1973).

3. See on this issue especially Gough (1968), Asad (1973), and a special issue of *Anthropological Forum* edited by Berndt (1977).

4. On the other hand, it is true that for example currency restrictions and low salaries may quite severely limit the access of anthropologists in some countries to foreign publications.

5. At least in Scandinavia, there is an instructive difference in this respect not least between historians and anthropologists. The former have tended to work almost wholly on the materials and problems of their own countries, and seem rather seldom to contemplate the alternative of publishing in an international language.

6. Metropolitan reviewers, it may be added, are often not very generous toward publications written, as it were, with an accent.

7. Some of them will in fact not return home, but linger in the metropolis and perhaps take up teaching positions there. It is tempting to see this as an instance of the periphery influencing the center, but the interpretation appears dubious; as trained professionals, they are really more of the center than of the periphery.

8. It may be noted here that our Polish contribution was written in mid-1981.

9. We acknowledge the influence of Stefan Molund, who has insistently drawn our attention in conversations to the fact that provincialism in this way can provide both a Scylla and a Charybdis.

10. For an overview of much of the literature with a bearing on this, see Scholte (1980).

11. See Johnson (1973) for an analysis of national styles in economic research where the theoretical predominance of cosmopolitans apparently holds true.

12. For a discussion of the first two of these cognitive styles or "epistemic paradigms", see Scholte (1966).

13. In Bourdieu's more recent texts, the concept of field emerges as a central analytical tool, but in this early application "intellectual field" can be glossed as the characteristics of local intellectual life, which encourages a certain intellectual style while discouraging others. Among such features are the particular constellation of self-evident truths and fundamental problems worth discussing as well
as the particular cluster of rules to be followed by intellectuals in the pursuit of
the prizes which the system offers.

14. For a detailed description of the contemporary French intellectual scene, see
Lemert (1981) as well as the whole volume to which it is an introduction. A fasci-
nating case study showing the dense network of intellectual life in Paris is Cliff-

15. Apart from Sharp’s (1981) detailed analysis of Afrikaans anthropology, there has
been an exchange of opinions between insiders and various outsiders in The
Royal Anthropological Institute Newsletter (RAIN), starting with number 35
and continuing in the three following issues.

16. The expression derives from MacRae (1961:9).

17. See references under note 3.

18. Whatever the intrinsic merit of this argument, it reminds us of the importance of
studying the development of anthropology in the midst of its social science sib-
lings. For an explicit argument to that effect, see Lepenies (1981a).

19. For a striking example of how nationalism and investigations of culture, in this
case folklore studies, may walk hand in hand, see Wilson (1976).

20. We look away here, for the sake of convenience, from the fact that Third World
nations, and actually most countries, are sufficiently heterogeneous so that one
can study “other cultures” without going abroad.

21. On this point see for example Jones (1970) and the summary by Fahim and
Helmer (1980) of discussions at a Burg Wartenstein conference on “indigenous
anthropology in non-western countries”.

22. See, among other contributions to it, the general interpretations of the insider-
outsider question by Merton (1972) and Rose (1978); the critical views of the
western anthropologist as an outsider looking at the Third World by Hsu (1973),
Hau'ofa (1975) and Owusu (1978); Morauta’s (1979) analysis of the growth of an
indigenous anthropology in Papua New Guinea and its relationship to expatriate
anthropology; and, for contrast, Cole’s (1977) account of the rather idyllic con-
tacts between scholars and visiting anthropologists in continental Europe.

23. The well-known essay by Campbell (1969), arguing for a “fish-scale model” of in-
terdisciplinary competences, is relevant here. Campbell suggests that if each
scholar defines his own area of interest so as to have only partial overlap with that
of anyone else, a maximum combined coverage of all possible connections could
be achieved. These individually selected areas would tend to cut across conven-
tional discipline boundaries, and would in effect serve to erase them.

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