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The Stage of Modernity

Timothy Mitchell

Our sense of ourselves as modern, of our time as the era of modernity, is today open to two kinds of question. One is the now familiar debate about whether modernity is a stage of history through which we have already passed. The global mobility of finance, the world-encircling webs of image-making, the contingency of social identities, and the collapse of emancipatory visions have produced in recent decades an increasing confidence that modernity has given way to a new condition. The name it is given, the postmodern, identifies it only in terms of the stage it claims to move beyond. But analyses of postmodernism have ignored another kind of question about modernity, and in this respect have inherited and passed on some very modern ways of understanding the world. The second question is concerned not with the passing of modernity but with its placing, not with a new stage of history but with how history itself is staged. Modernity has always been associated with a certain place. In many uses, the modern is just a synonym for the West (or in more recent writings, the North). Modernization continues to be commonly understood as a process begun and finished in Europe, from where it has been exported across ever-expanding regions of the non-West. The destiny of those regions has been to mimic, never quite successfully, the history already performed by the West. To become modern, it is still said, or today to become postmodern, is to act like the West.
Locating the origins of capitalist modernity entirely within the West has always been open to question. Marx saw the "rosy dawn" of capitalism not in England or the Netherlands but in the production, trade, and finance of the colonial system.\(^1\) The Egyptian economist Samir Amin pioneered the study of capitalism "on a world scale," arguing that conditions in the periphery represent not an earlier stage of development but an equally modern consequence of the continuous "structural adjustment" (Amin's 1957 phrase) to which societies outside the West have been subjected.\(^2\) Wallerstein traced the beginnings of this world-system to the transformation of a pattern of trade (from luxuries to essentials) that was already global. A proper image of its development, therefore, was "not of a small core adding on outer layers but of a thin outer framework gradually filling in a dense inner network."\(^3\) More recently, Janet Abu-Lughod has shown how this global network operated in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, long before the rise of Europe, while Andre Gunder Frank presents evidence that Europe continued to be peripheral to an Asian-centered world economy until the mid-eighteenth century or even the start of the nineteenth.\(^4\)

These more global pictures make possible a less Eurocentric account of the formation of the European modern. If modernity had its origins in reticulations of exchange and production encircling the world, then it was a creation not of the West but of an interaction between West and non-West. The sites of this interaction were as likely to lie in the East Indies, the Ottoman Empire, or the Caribbean as in England, the Netherlands, or France. Presenting what he admitted might be "a topsy-turvy view of the West," to give one example, Sidney Mintz argued that modern methods of industrial organization were developed first not for making textiles in Manchester but sugar in the Caribbean. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century sugar production demanded strict labor discipline, careful scheduling and time-consciousness, and the division of labor into work units by age, skill, and gender, to an extent as yet unknown in mainland Europe.\(^5\) The discipline and coordination, as a historian of French colonial slavery remarks, made this "a new type of work, an element of social revolution."\(^6\) Another study of capitalism's Caribbean origins argues that the very distances involved in colonial trade caused the development of the modern, bureaucratic supervision of labor, on ships and in port cities, that enabled finance capital to extract surplus value.\(^7\) And turn-
ing from the supervisors to the slaves, Paul Gilroy suggests we see the slave ships as "the living means" for articulating the new modes of political dissent and cultural production that he calls the Black Atlantic. Getting on board, as it were, "promises a means to reconceptualize the orthodox relationship between modernity and what passes for its prehistory."8

Beyond the constitutive role of slavery, the sugar plantation, and the shipping industry, many other forms of social organization and cultural production that, since Discipline and Punish, we have come to consider as important as wage labor and the factory system in the emergence of European modernity were first developed well beyond the northern Europe of Michel Foucault's analyses.9 The principle of self-monitoring embodied in Bentham's Panopticon was designed by his brother Samuel while assisting Russia's colonization of Ottoman territory, while monitorial schooling was invented in early nineteenth-century Bengal.10 The emergence of "the population" as the primary object of governmental power, as Partha Chatterjee notes in his essay in this volume, and certainly the invention of "culture" as the features embodying the identity of a population group, probably first occurred in the colonization of non-European regions.11 Uday Mehta shows that India played a sustained role in the theoretical imagination of nineteenth-century British liberalism (and in its authors' careers), exposing it to a constitutive ambivalence.12 The cultural field we know as English literature was constructed as a curriculum and tool of character formation in colonial India before its appearance in England.13 Colonial medicine, as Gyan Prakash examines in his chapter to this book, pioneered the extended governmental control of the body.14 The methods of managing persons, self-identities, space, and movement that Foucault presents as essential to the formation of European modernity in many cases came to Europe from its encounter with what lay beyond.

To see modernity as a product not of the West but of its interaction with the non-West still leaves a problem. It assumes the existence of the West and its exterior, long before the world's identities had been divided into this neat, European-centered dualism. It might be better to propose that it was in the building of slave factories in Martinique, prisons in the Crimea, and schools in Calcutta that the decisive nature of the distinction between European and non-European was fixed. Edward Said's Orientalism stands as the most powerful account of how
Europe’s sense of cultural identity was constructed in the business of colonizing and getting rich overseas. Ann Stoler has argued that Dutch settlers in the East Indies, anxious to secure their identity in relation both to those of mixed blood and to poor whites, developed a new image of themselves as European. This identity prefigured the emergence of a bourgeois, European sense of self in the metropole and was subsequently imported into the Netherlands under the influence of colonial developments. Similarly, the importance of Benedict Anderson’s landmark study of nationalism lies in showing not so much that modern collective identities are constructs of the imagination but that the most important of these imaginings, territorial nationalism, was first elaborated not, as was always assumed, in Europe but in the creole communities of the Caribbean and South America. Creoles were those local-born “whites” whose displacement overseas meant they could never quite be Europeans yet who feared the contamination of Indian, Negro, or mestizo identities. In such mixing of populations lay the origins of the desire to fix political identity in the racial categories of modern nationalism. White and non-white, European and non-European, West and non-West, were identities often elaborated abroad and only later, like nationalism itself, brought to Europe.

Even when the term “nationalism” came into currency in Europe, at least in English, it appeared only after the spread of the term “international” and was coined by an anticolonial movement. The idea of “the international” was popularized in London in 1862, when the world exhibition of that year was named the Great International Exhibition. The new word evoked the global order of imperialism that the exhibition was intended to represent. A delegation of Parisian workers sent to the exhibition met with London trade unionists and borrowed the new word, forming the Working Men’s International Association under the leadership of Karl Marx. The word “nationalism” appeared two decades later, introduced by the Irish Nationalist party as it launched the struggle against British colonialism. The trajectory of the term followed the earlier itinerary of its sister term “liberalism,” which was also coined on the continent’s colonized periphery, in the latter case in the Spanish rising against French occupation during the Napoleonic wars. The periphery, in these matters, as Perry Anderson remarks, “pioneered the terms of metropolitan advance.”

Such questions about the role of the periphery (an increasingly in-
appropriate term) in the genealogy of modernity have shown that we need to reexamine much of the critical writing on the European modern that has shaped our thinking about its passing. *The Postmodern Condition*, Jean-François Lyotard’s seminal essay, allows no place for the non-West in the defining of modernity and hence in the appearance of the postmodern.\(^{21}\) Jean Baudrillard’s account of the historical passage from the age of production and reproduction to the age of simulation has the same narrowness.\(^{22}\) David Harvey’s more broadly conceived work, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, makes occasional reference to imperialism and its crises but pays no direct attention to the world beyond the West, and the same is true of Jameson’s commanding essay on the cultural logic of late capitalism.\(^{23}\) This logic, according to Jameson, represents a new, globalized form of capitalism, in which all “enclaves of precapitalist organization” have been swept away, including the peasantry and other non-Western “residues.”\(^{24}\) Thus the non-West appears in such writing only at the point of its disappearance, when finally “everything has reached the same hour on the great clock of development.”\(^{25}\) In the work of Foucault, the absence of the larger world is even more striking. His genealogies of modern methods of knowledge, power, and selfhood provide no account of how France and northern Europe came to be defined as modernity’s location. Despite his frequent interest in how the spacing of social practice can be the source of forms of power, his writing only reinforces our sense that the place of modernity is to be taken for granted.

This limitation of Foucault is especially marked in his genealogy of that emblem of modernity, the bourgeois individual. Stoler’s important study of Foucault shows how *The History of Sexuality* entirely overlooks the colonial projects and apprehensions that paralleled and often prefigured the development of middle-class sexuality and selfhood in Europe.\(^{26}\) The silence in Foucault now seems remarkable, yet before Stoler none of the major studies of his work had brought into view what Gayatri Spivak memorably refers to as his “sanctioned ignorance.”\(^{27}\) Whether one looks at Dutch settlers in Indonesia, the English in India, or the mixture of French and other European colonizers in Algeria, colonial society was experienced as an often threatening intermixture of social ranks, genders, and skin colors. To govern these new forms of disorder, colonial discourse became preoccupied with establishing distinctions of race, sexuality, culture, and class. These
thematics were then available to be transferred back to the metropole, where in the later nineteenth century they helped form the racial, cultural, class, and sexual identities that defined the modern bourgeois self. For Foucault, race has only an oblique and unhistorical role to play in the emergence of bourgeois sexuality. By relocating modernity within empire, Stoler shows that the history of sexuality is interwoven with that of race and that the emergence of modern forms of selfhood cannot be accounted for within the boundaries of Europe alone.

These absences in Foucault and other recent theorists of modernity are doubly marked when one realizes, as Perry Anderson points out, that the idea of postmodernism itself, like the earlier idea of modernism (which did the work of the term postmodernism for a previous generation, evoking the ambivalence and contradictions of modernity) was born “in a distant periphery rather than at the centre of the cultural system of the time.”

The concept of modernismo was coined in 1890 by “a Nicaraguan poet, writing in a Guatemalan journal, of a literary encounter in Peru,” announcing a declaration of cultural independence by Latin American writers against the authority of Spanish literature. So too, Anderson adds, “the idea of a ‘postmodernism’ first surfaced in the Hispanic interworld of the 1930’s, a generation before its appearance in England or America.”

Moving to another interwar interworld, it was Ihab Hassan, the son of a provincial governor in northern Egypt (the father notorious for his violent suppression of an anticolonial revolt in 1930) who gave postmodernism its more recent currency in the United States. Beyond Hassan, one could trace the decisive role of a 1940s–1950s Arab-Mediterranean borderland, located on the historical and cultural boundary of colonialism, from the Cairo of Edward Said and Anouar Abdel-Malek (and, briefly, Roland Barthes), the Istanbul of Auerbach’s exile, the Tunis of Albert Memmi and Michel Foucault, the Constantine where Lyotard began his teaching career, the Morocco of Juan Goytisolo and Abdel Kabir Khatibi, and the Algiers of Jacques Derrida, Frantz Fanon, and more indirectly a generation of Parisian intellectuals. The critique of the European modern, like so much of the modern itself, seems continually to have emerged from Europe’s borders.

Relocating the question of modernity beyond the limits of the West brings a certain risk. There is a danger that instead of decentering the categories and certainties of modernity, one might produce a more expansive, inclusive, and inevitably homogenous account of the
genealogy of modernity. Appadurai suggests that we should dispense altogether with the picture of the globe divided into a Western core and non-Western periphery, or any other fixed geographical image, and think instead in terms of overlapping, disjunctive landscapes whose centers and perspective shift according to the different kinds of cultural, financial, and political forces one considers. Stoler is careful not to propose a simple extension and reversal of the narrative of modernization, in which in place of modernist forms arising in the West and being extended abroad, they emerge in the colonies and are reimported to the metropole. She emphasizes instead, as does Foucault in other contexts, a mobile process of rupture and reinscription. When themes and categories developed in one historical context, such as a region of the colonial world, are reused elsewhere in the service of different social arrangements and political tactics, there is an inevitable process of displacement and reformulation. At issue, then, is whether one can find a way to theorize the question of modernity that relocates it within a global context and, at the same time, enables that context to complicate, rather than simply reverse, the narrative logic of modernization.

The Force of History

To disrupt the powerful story of modernity, rather than contribute to its globalization, it is not enough to question simply its location. One also has to question its temporality. One must abandon its neat image not just of geographical space but also of historical time. The modern age presents a particular view of geography, in which the world has a single center, Europe—a Eurasian peninsula, as Marshall Hodgson remarked, that imagines itself a continent—in reference to which all other regions are to be located; and an understanding of history in which there is only one unfolding of time, the history of the West, in reference to which all other histories must establish their significance and receive their meaning. These conceptions of history and geography are related. Historical time, the time of the West, is what gives modern geography its order, an order centered upon Europe. Accounts of the modern world that introduce a topsy-turvy view of this geography, by locating important developments outside the West, typically reestablish the order of modernity by removing these irregularities from any determining local context, or any non-European regional or global context, and repositioning them within the West's uniform and
singular history. The discipline of historical time reorganizes discordant geographies into a universal modernity.

Take the example of how Mintz explains the origins of capitalism in Caribbean sugar production. *Sweetness and Power*, as the subtitle tells us, is about "the place of sugar in modern history." The book expands the history of capitalism to bring to light "a precocious development outside the European heartland," yet must return this aberrant development to its place, by putting it "in modern history." Modern history means the development of capitalist modernity in Europe. Even when the history of modernity extends to the Caribbean, it must remain the history of the West. It is the West that defines the Caribbean as precocious, something advancing ahead of its time, where time means the movement of the West.

What does the story of slave plantations tell us about the history of capitalism? I leave aside here the long debates over the significance of the Caribbean and the Atlantic trade to the growth of European capitalism, except to note that Blackburn has recently confirmed that their contribution was "decisive," and that Frank argues that plundering the New World enabled Europe not to create a world economy but to buy into an existing Asian-centered one. My concern here is with the way in which these developments outside "the West" are reorganized as part of its own history. Thus Mintz tells us that Caribbean slave plantations are important for understanding "the chain of causation that leads from one stage of development to another." Arguing that "it would be wrong to treat the plantation system as 'capitalistic' in the same way that the British factory system of the nineteenth century was capitalistic," he concludes that nevertheless "these curious agro-industrial enterprises nourished certain capitalist classes at home as they were becoming more capitalistic." Caribbean agro-industry was not capitalism, in other words, for the meaning of capitalism is defined by the factory system of nineteenth-century England; but it can have a place in modern history, because it nourished the formation of that system. Historical time, in such an account, is singular, moving from one stage of development to another. There is no possibility of more than one history, of a non-singular capitalism. The Caribbean slave plantation, although longer lasting than the nineteenth-century English factory, can be no more than a curious form of what later emerged in its normal form in the West.

The conception of historical time renders history singular by or-
ganizing the multiplicity of global events into a single narrative. The narrative is structured by the progression of a principle, whether it be the principle of human reason or enlightenment, technical rationality or power over nature. Even when discovered acting precociously overseas, these powers of production, technology, or reason constitute a single story of unfolding potential.

The use of the idea of a singular historical time to reorganize the dispersed geographies of modernity into stages of Europe's past finds its first clear expression in the work of Marx, where discrepant developments outside Europe are translated into something else: expressions of time itself. More forcefully than any other nineteenth-century writer, Marx constructs an idea of "Europe"—defined by the emergence there of modern bourgeois society—as the singular center of all other histories. The singularity of history, in Marx's case, derives from the development of the material forces of production, which periodically outgrow the social relations in which they are organized.39 Singular does not mean uniform. In different countries, the historical process "assumes different aspects, and runs through its various phases in different orders of succession, and at different periods."40 But these differences can only be thought of as different in relation to an underlying uniformity. One can gather together a diversity of local histories and describe them as different, in sequence, aspect, place, and period, precisely because they are imagined as the possible variations in a single process of development.41 Presenting them as variations establishes the concept of a universal history, in relation to which all local histories—delayed, displaced, blocked, or rearranged—receive their meaning.

When he comes to explain capitalism's origins, however, Marx is forced to step outside this singular time. The step is taken at the very point where his narrative is pushed for the first time outside the boundaries of Europe. The general law of capitalist accumulation explains how capital produces surplus value and surplus value in turn produces further capital. But the law cannot escape this "vicious circle" to explain how capital is produced in the first place.42 After six hundred pages on the workings of capitalist society illustrated almost exclusively by the case of England, the final section of volume one of Capital, on the origins of industrial capitalism, moves outside Europe and locates its beginnings in the colonial system.43 "The discovery of gold and silver in America," a familiar passage explains, "the
extirpation, enslavement, and entombment in the mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the hunting of black-skins, signalled the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production.” The production of wealth overseas then gave rise to the protection of trade by the state, the colonial wars, the creation of a national debt, and the introduction of taxation to service it. In the systematic combination of these different colonial elements lay the beginnings of industrial capitalism.

This original accumulation of capital, however, did not seem to derive from any general principle of the development of the material forces of production. Its origins were dispersed around the globe and required a variety of new social forms and processes: slave-based production, colonial ports and settlements, genocide, international finance, modern warfare, and the organized power of a central state. How could such a dispersed multiplicity of social and political developments be turned into “economic phenomena,” meaning not events related to the economy (a conception that does not exist in Marx’s writing) but events revealing the economy of history—history’s singular logic? How could these global influences and innovations be gathered back into the linear story of capital?

Marx’s answer to this problem is first to leave aside an economic explanation for the origins of capital accumulation and to focus on what he calls the means. This enables him to find a single factor that characterizes all these developments: the use of force. “We leave on one side here the purely economic causes,” he says. “We deal only with the forcible means employed.” His account then presents the origins of capitalism by describing it as a system of force. It consists of both “brute force, e.g., the colonial system,” and what he describes as “concentrated and organized force,” namely “the state power.” The narrative moves between descriptions of colonialism’s physical violence—capital comes into the world “dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt”—and precise images of mechanical force, especially the metaphor of the lever: the colonizing corporations are “powerful levers for concentration of capital,” the national debt becomes “one of the most powerful levers” of capital accumulation. This focus on the image of force may seem unremarkable. Marx’s preceding analysis of capitalism, after all, brings to light all the machinery of compulsion and forms of barbarism concealed
within the free exchanges of the market system. In the explanation of
original accumulation, however, every factor is reduced to a question
of force. There is no analysis of the social organization, the methods
of discipline, or the techniques of production that characterize the
slave plantation, the shipping industry, the colonizing corporation, the
colonial settlement, or the power of the army, to compare with his
painstaking analysis of the nineteenth-century English factory. There
is nothing except the use of force.

The absence of detail is not, I would argue, an innocent one, for
characterizing the colonial system solely in terms of force has an im-
portant consequence. It enables Marx's writing to fold these heteroge-
nous overseas developments into the history of the West. Having told
us first that force is just a means, not an historical-economic cause, he
reveals at the end that force operates upon history itself; contributing
to the movement of history, it is therefore something "economic" after
all. The effect of colonial force, Marx explains, is "to hasten, hot-
house fashion, the process of transformation . . . and to shorten the
transition. Force is . . . itself an economic power." The unusual
social forms of the colonial system—slave production, protectionism,
colonial militarism, the new compulsions of state power—are not
diversions from the singular path of capitalism's history. Deprived of
their complexity and diversity and reduced to mere expressions of
force, they serve the purpose of forcing history, the way a greenhouse
forces plants. Colonial developments whose difference in social form,
disrupted timing, or displacement across the globe seem to undermine
the effort to make history homogenous become simply the unlawful
force that forces history ahead. Their separation abroad appears as no
more than the mechanical distance of a lever, whose very length en-
ables an outside event to propel the West forward.

It is not a matter of rejecting, in the terms in which he says it, the
truth of what Marx tells us about the violence of modernity's origins.
It is a question of asking what other histories must be overlooked in
order to fit the non-West into the historical time of the West. To ac-
knowledge the constitutive role of these other histories, as Ernesto
Laclau among others has argued, would be to deny history—and
capitalism—its singularity and to see modernity instead as a contin-
gent process. This does not mean arguing that its history is random,
or simply "repudiat[ing] . . . the capitalist restructuring of the modern
world," as critics of this kind of questioning have argued, or treating
capitalism as a "potentially disposable fiction" held in place only by our acceptance of its categories. Whether we want to or not, we accept these categories into our argument the moment we attempt to question them. They are fictions, if one wants that word, of the nondisposable sort. But even if we cannot escape the necessity of writing history as the story of capitalism, even if we must give in to it, as Derrida says in another context, it does not follow that all ways of giving in to it are of equal significance. A writing that simply documents in increasing detail an ever-expanding globalization of capital, as Prakash argues, simply reiterates and reinforces the process one wants to question. The alternative is to borrow from capitalism the tools with which to deconstruct it. In particular, one can borrow capitalism's notion of the non-capitalist, the West's notion of the non-West, and modernity's notion of the non-modern, and ask what these nondisposable fictions suppress.

The apparent rationality and coherence of capitalist modernity can be constructed only through an interaction with forces and events that seem to stand outside its own development. This "constitutive outside," however, cannot be referred back to any unfolding principle or internal contradiction, or be contained by an underlying causal or dialectical pattern. If Caribbean slavery, for example, introduced into what we call capitalism's development, among other things, the dynamics of West African societies, the ecology of the Caribbean, the culture of slave households, the politics of genocide, and mass addiction to sugar, then that development can no longer be predicted or accounted for in reference to the endogenous unfolding of a rationality or potential, which would provide capitalism's essence and make modernity something monadic and fundamentally the same everywhere. Developments and forces external to any possible definition of the essence of capitalist modernity continually redirect, divert, mutate, and multiply the modernity they help constitute, depriving it of any essential principle, unique dynamic, or singular history.

A Specter Haunting—Europe

The concept of historical time recaptures histories happening overseas and returns them to the historical home of the West. Such representations construct the capitalist modern as a temporal object as much as a spatial one, giving it the coherence of a single parentage and unique abode. Uncovering the plural genealogy and ecology of what we unify
under names such as capitalism or modernity puts this coherence in question. Each new context can reveal another parent, another logic. The identity claimed by the modern is contaminated. It issues from too many sources and depends upon, even as it refuses to recognize, forebears and forces that escape its control. To overlook these differences requires a constant representing of the homogenous unity of modernity's space and time. More precisely, it can be argued, the experience of modernity is constructed as a relationship between time and space. It is a particular way of expressing one in terms of the other. A way to begin to uncover this interdependence of space and time in the construction of the modern is to ask whether Foucault's failure to engage with the colonial genealogies of modernity is merely an oversight. There are enough occasional references to French colonialism in Foucault's work to suggest that his writing was silently aware of the significance of empire in the origins of modernity. Is it possible, then, that the silence is not accidental but plays a role in the production of Foucault's argument? Foucault's genealogy of sexuality and the bourgeois self does not entirely ignore the question of race—the element that provides the critical link with empire. Instead, as Stoler points out, he treats race as an anachronism, representing a pre-modern aristocratic concern with the purity of blood and the legitimacy of descent. In his 1976 lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault expanded this idea, arguing that a pre-nineteenth-century debate about purity of aristocratic descent was recovered and reinscribed in the late nineteenth century to serve the new technology of biopower (the large-scale management of life and death) developed as the characteristic governmental technique of the modern state. This argument represents a double overlooking of empire, for eighteenth-century racism, as much as the later nineteenth-century forms, was a product of colonialism. As Rolph Trouillot tells us, Buffon, Voltaire, and other figures of the Enlightenment helped shape a scientific racism whose impetus came from Caribbean and North American opposition to the abolition of slavery. Homi Bhabha has suggested that it is Foucault's very treatment of race as an anachronism, rather than a discrepant yet very contemporary discourse developed beyond Europe, that provides a clue to the significance of this silence about colonialism. Treating race as an anachronism preserves a particular way of thinking about modernity, in which the modern is constructed not just as an historical era but as a particular relationship between space and time.
A distinctive feature of many experiences of modernity is what can be called its contemporaneity or presence. The modern occurs as that form of temporality that Walter Benjamin calls homogenous empty time, in which time is apprehended as the uniform, unfilled spaces marked out by the calendar, the timetable, and the clock. Developing this notion, Benedict Anderson suggests that it gives rise to a new experience of simultaneity, in which people living unconnected lives can feel themselves joined by occupying the same homogenous temporal moment. His now-familiar argument proposes that this simultaneity is represented in the structure of the nineteenth-century European novel, in which characters whose lives never meet play roles together in the same narrative, and in the phenomenon of the mass-circulation daily newspapers of the same period, through which thousands of readers shared the experience of reading the same ephemeral material on the same day. What underlies these apprehensions of simultaneity or co-presence is that both the characters in the novel and the readers of the newspaper can be thought to share the same space. They can be imagined as members of the same sociological entity, Anderson suggests, defined as a geographical space in which all co-exist at the same moment.

Benjamin seems to have borrowed the idea of homogenous empty time from Henri Bergson. In his *Essai sur la données immediates de la conscience* (1889), Bergson discusses the Kantian theory of space and time, in which these apprehensions are considered not properties of things in themselves but the two pure forms of human intuition. Bergson agrees that space is “the intuition, or rather the conception, of an empty homogeneous medium,” but argues that temporality consists of heterogeneous, interpenetrating moments of duration, which our consciousness can reconfigure as homogenous time only by laying out in a *spatial* sequence. Through this mental contrivance, “in place of a heterogeneous duration whose moments permeate one another, we thus get a homogenous time whose moments are strung on a spatial line.” The conception of time in “the illusory form of a homogeneous medium,” Bergson argues, “is nothing but the ghost of space haunting the reflexive consciousness.” In contrast to Bergson and following Benjamin and Anderson, I would attribute the modern apprehension of time as a homogenous medium to new forms of social practice, rather than to the tricks of a universal Kantian consciousness. But it is useful to borrow from Bergson the insight that the ex-
The experience of homogenous empty time rests on giving temporality a spatial expression. As Anderson's examples of this temporality seem to suggest, the contemporaneity of time is haunted by the ghost of space.

One can ask whether, in fact, the multiple social experiences of modernity are all expressed within a single conception of time, as Veena Das does in chapter 7 of this book. One can also question, as several critics have, Anderson's focus on print culture as the most important mechanism of the experience of contemporaneity. Indeed, the second edition of *Imagined Communities* widens this focus by pointing in later chapters to the significance of such practices as census taking and map making in constructing the homogenous space of modernity and hence (it could be added) its temporality. Anderson's argument, moreover, is concerned with one specific consequence of these practices, the emergence of territorial nationalism. The more general point I want to draw from his analysis, however, is that modernity can be characterized, among other ways, by a sense of presence or contemporaneity created by the spatialization of time.

Putting empire back into the history of Europe, we first suggested, enables us to reverse the narrative of modernization and see the West as the product of modernity. We might rephrase things again now and suggest that modernity is produced as the West. The "now" of modernity, its culture of contemporaneity, the particular sense of simultaneity that is taken as modernity's experience, depends upon the representation of an homogenous space. The inhabitants of this space, almost all of whom never meet one another, can be conceived as living the same empty moment, as occupying the same time-space. This effect of simultaneity makes it possible to construct the idea of historical time: history is the story of a civilization, culture, or people whose diverse lives are imagined to share a singular epoch and to progress as a unit from one contemporaneous moment to the next. It is only this effect of a unitary, punctual, contemporaneous present, as Bhabha points out, that enables Foucault to present racism as an "anachronism." Race is an element recuperated from a pre-modern past and reinscribed in an otherwise homogenous present. The West is the space that haunts this presence.

This is the clue to Foucault's spectral silence about colonialism. The narrative of history, even in the brilliant revisionism of Foucault, is the story of Europe. To stage this homogenous time-space, there can be no interruptions from the non-West. The non-West must play the
role of the outside, the otherness that creates the boundary of the space of modernity. This otherness, Bhabha argues, takes two forms. The non-West, as its name implies, represents the non-place, terra incognita, the wasteland "whose history has to be begun, whose archives must be filled out." But it also stands for the place of timelessness, a space without duration, in relation to which the temporal break of modernity can be marked out.\(^64\) In this sense, the colonial is not something absent from the story of modernity that Foucault tells. Or rather, Bhabha suggests, the colonial is a constant absence essential to Foucault's text. By relegating the non-West to the margins and footnotes of his account, Foucault reproduces the spatialization of modernity. The homogenous time of modernity, its characteristic contemporaneity, is preserved by the way Foucault respects the territorial boundaries of the modern. Thanks to the boundaries of this time-space, he can portray a synchronic discourse around the theme of the bourgeois individual and see race as an anachronism, rather than as the discrepant product of colonial developments whose otherness, in announcing the homogeneity of the modern, haunts it.

The Stage of Modernity

"What is this 'now' of modernity?" asks Bhabha. "Who defines this present from which we speak? . . . Why does it insist, so compulsively, on its contemporaneous reality, its spatial dimension, its spectatorial distance?"\(^65\) How can one approach such questions in a way that does not simply produce a more global and more homogenous narrative of modernization, and inevitably end up retelling the story of the West? Is there some way to address the time-space of European modernity that does not end up remapping, as Foucault seems to, the contours of that time-space? Any adequate response to this problem must begin from what I would argue is the most powerful aspect of the production of the European-modern, and what at the same time exposes it to specters of difference and displacement that deny it the originality and coherence it claims: the way in which the modern is staged as representation. There is a tendency in recent scholarship to see the proliferation of media images, sign systems, simulations, and other forms of representation as the defining characteristic not of modernity but of the postmodern. Jameson defines the era of postmodernism or late capitalism as the age of the simulacrum, in which the real has been transformed into so many pseudo-events.\(^66\) Baudrillard describes it as
The Stage of Modernity 17

the age of simulation. It is no doubt the case that what Appadurai usefully calls "the work of the imagination" plays an increasingly important role in the postelectronic age. Yet it is important to remember that the orchestrating of image and imagination, the managing of the place of meaning in the social world and the experience of personhood, and the manipulating of populations and ecologies by their reduction to technical schemes and disciplinary programs, were already characteristic features of modernity in the colonial period. As I have argued in Colonising Egypt, consumerism and the great world exhibitions, tourism and Orientalism, urban planning and compulsory schooling, forced migration and mass conscription, global militarism and imperial commerce—all the novel institutional forms and political practice of late nineteenth-century Paris and London, or Cairo and Calcutta—were organized around the simulation, diagramming, and replication of the real. From this perspective, the postmodern would have to be understood not as a disruption of meaning or loss of certainty that comes after the modern but as an instability always already at work in the production of modernity.

To claim that the modern is always staged as representation is not to argue that modernity is concerned more with image-making than with reality. It is to argue that the colonial-modern involves creating an effect we recognize as reality, by organizing the world endlessly to represent it. Representation does not refer here simply to the making of images or meanings. It refers to forms of social practice that set up in the social architecture and lived experience of the world what seems an absolute distinction between image (or meaning, or structure) and reality, and thus a distinctive imagination of the real. This dualism of the real can find certain roots, no doubt, in early modern social thought and practice and may draw upon and transform earlier traditions. Since the nineteenth century, however, it has been generalized in modern architecture and urban planning, social engineering and the management of nature, organized schooling and literature, entertainment and tourism; in military order, imperial pomp, and the disciplines of colonialism and nation-making; in all the mundane forms of self-monitoring and self-presentation that shape the lives of modern subjects; and, quite pervasively, in the organization of production and the prestidigitations of the market mechanism. In sphere after sphere of social life, the world is rendered up in terms of the dualism of image and reality. This corresponds, in turn, to a series of other simplifications,
each of which stages the complexities and antagonisms of social experience in terms of a simple binarism: life and its meaning, things and their exchange value, activity and structure, execution and plan, content and form, object- and subject-world. In each case an immediacy of the really real is promised by what appears in contrast to be the mere abstractions of structure, subjectivity, text, plan, or idea.

The passage from pre-modern to modern is always understood as a rupture and separation, whether of a rational self from a disenchantment world, of producers from their means of production, or of nature and population from the processes of technological control and social planning. Each of these so-called ruptures is a way of accounting for a world increasingly staged according to the schema of object and subject, process and plan, real and representation.

The significance of this world-as-picture for understanding the colonial-modern lies in the fact that representation always makes a double claim. On the one hand, something set up as a representation denies its own reality. The representational text, image, model, game, structure, or project, however realistic, always asserts that it is only a text, a mere picture, a copy, a play, a scheme, a framework, an abstraction, a projection, not something real. It defines itself by what it lacks, its missing originality, its immateriality, its want of immediate presence, by the gap in time, space, and substance that separates it from the real thing. On the other hand, in asserting its own lack, a representation claims that the world it replicates, projects, reorganizes, enacts, or endows with meaning and structure must be, by contrast, original, material, immediately present, complete in itself, without lack, undelayed, filling its own time and space—in a word (what we imagine as) real. Colonial European modernity stages the endless set-up that pictures and promises us this complete, unmediated, self-present, immediate reality.70

If we return for a moment to Anderson’s examples illustrating the creation of homogenous empty time, it is clear that they all share a common feature: the modern novel, newspaper, census, map, and museum, as well as the many other, more invasive practices that create the punctual time-space of modernity, are all methods of representation, in the specific sense just defined. The newspaper claims to capture a record of the present and make this passing presence available through a form of replay. The map and census provide figures that are imagined to picture the nation as a real and knowable totality. The
theater, novel, and museum stage objects and characters to create simulations of a real world. Anderson considers the significance of these proliferating representations to lie in the experience of replication, meaning not simple copying but endless serialization. In its new social practices the modern state does more than count and classify the elements of the nation, he says. Since almost every state by the late colonial period was beginning to replicate similar procedures of statistical and cultural representation, the idea could emerge that the nation exists as a particular instance of an almost infinitely replicated series of nations. More recently, he has argued that the logic of serial replication underlies the creation of all modern political identities and is therefore essential to the modern "imagining of collectivity."

I do not doubt that the representation of community is made more effective by the repetition of such representations from one country to the next, across a world that can now be imagined for the first time as a horizontal plane of equivalent social units. The effect is probably stronger in the case of numerical representations of the nation, which make it possible repeatedly to compare nation states and arrange them in groups and sequences. The twentieth-century invention of national-income accounting and the idea of the "national economy" is the most important example of this. Representation always gathers its strength from the way one picture is echoed and confirmed by another, so that each image forms part of a world-encircling web of signification. Yet the effectiveness of this world-as-picture lies not simply in the process of serialization. It lies in the apparent contrast created between images, which are repeatable, serializable, hyperlinked, open to endless imitation, and the opposing effect of an original, of what appears to be the actual nation, the people itself, the real economy. The act of representation, constantly repeated, makes each of these referents—nation, people, economy—appear as an object that exists prior to any representation, as something given, material, fixed in its unique time and space, not fissured by replication, not open to serialization and interlinking, and to the difference, instability, and misrepresentation that endless repetition might introduce.

It is this novel myth of immediate presence, of an original, material reality, a world prior to and apart from all work of replication, difference, antagonism, meaning, management, or imagination, that defines the peculiar metaphysic of modernity. It is this metaphysic in turn, that theories of postmodernity in most cases continue to reproduce.
The postmodern is typically understood as a world of images and replications that have lost touch with this supposedly original reality. The real, it is said, has been replaced by the pseudo-real. In other words, such accounts continue to assume the unproblematic nature of a distinction between the real and represented, even as they announce its historical disappearance. For this reason, most theories of postmodernity remain within the binary metaphysics of the modern.

The Mysterious Thing
If the presence of modernity occurs only as representation, this representing is not a phenomenon limited to the deliberate methods of making meaning on which accounts of the modern and the postmodern tend to focus, such as the modern novel, news reporting, museum displays, mass media, or the organization of medical, statistical, and other forms of official knowledge. Much of the best recent writing on modernity and postmodernity has been developed in the field of cultural studies, which tends to focus on these intellectual and cultural forms of representation, together with related spheres such as architecture, music, and fashion. As I have already suggested, however, modernity's methods of staging and representation structure much more than what we designate as the cultural and intellectual spheres. I will briefly discuss three broader aspects of the experience of modernity that can be understood in relation to the staging of the world as representation. Representation is the key, first of all, to how we imagine the construction of modern selfhood. On the one hand, the world-as-picture demands a spectator. It typically positions the person as the subject for whom the social world seems to exist as a view to be observed, an experience to be had, a set of meanings to be interpreted, or a code to be followed or deciphered. On the other hand, in the Western philosophical tradition, as Dipesh Chakrabarty's essay in this volume reminds us, the modern individual came to be defined as the one who could occupy such a position of disembodied observer of the world. Freed in this way from the traditional constraints of habit or belief and transcending their localism, it was said, modern subjects could discover a universal faculty of reason and employ it to represent to themselves the experiences and feelings of others and to submit their own interior life to its pedagogy. These individual powers of representation, moreover, were to be cultivated through literature and other imaginative social forms, shaping the modern sensibility through
a further recourse to the process of representation. Conversely, in the racialist discourses of colonialism, the backwardness of the native population could be analyzed in terms of a weakness of the mental power of representation. French colonial psychiatry in North Africa, as Stefania Pandolfo explains in her essay here, diagnosed the pathology of the indigenous mentality as an inability to symbolize. Unable to produce abstract representations, the colonized mind was said to be trapped in the mimetic faculty, the prisoner of images from which it could not obtain a spectatorial distance and thereby establish itself as a subject. Such analyses opened up the space for the twentieth-century project of psychiatry to produce the modern subject, by freeing the mind from this imprisonment in images and enabling it to represent truthfully the self and others. Similarly, Lila Abu-Lughod’s essay on television considers how the contemporary powers of the mass media seem to produce a subject defined by what Raymond Williams has called “the dramatisation of consciousness.” Under the influence of mass media, and television drama in particular, selfhood comes to be understood as something fashioned by staging one’s life as a story, in a continuous representation of oneself to oneself and to others.

Second, among the most pervasive examples of the way experience is rendered up in the dualism of image and reality is the simple, seemingly material form of the commodity. The system of commodities, Marx pointed out, is an arrangement of production and exchange in which objects present themselves to us always as representations of something else. “The mystical character of commodities,” as he called it, arises from the fact that nothing can become a commodity, a thing of value, by standing for itself. An object can acquire value only by appearing to embody, or represent, some quality beyond itself. “A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing,” as Marx says, because it can never be just “a thing” but always appears, like a character on stage, as something representing something further. Yet as Derrida has written, if the commodity is never single but occurs as a relationship between “a thing” and the value that it promises, then the possibility of anything being merely a thing, of standing only for itself, of having only one, natural use, is compromised. Why should one suppose that an object can exist as pure use-value, if the possibility of exchange, of one thing standing in for another, is always already part of its potential? The system of commodities is not a masquerade or fetish ceremony in which the true nature of objects is disguised or
misunderstood. It is that theater in which all the characters assure us that they are merely standing in for something else, so that we leave the performance reassured of the real world outside, seldom noticing that the illuminated exit signs lead only to other, much larger theaters.79

If this effect of real versus represented is embodied in the exchange of commodified objects, it is far more extensively inscribed in the larger theaters of consumption, services, entertainment, and manufactured experience that, even in Marx's day, were beginning to constitute the social worlds of modernity. The processes we simplify under the name of commodification transform the nature of labor and exchange but also encompass the birth of modern schooling, science, and entertainment and the transformation of leisure and personal relations. In every sphere, objects and experiences come to be organized as systems of consumption, requiring them to represent some value, idea, or imaginative realm beyond themselves. The proliferating commodifications of life entail the staging of social relations and realities, so that everything presents itself as the representation of some prior value, some larger meaning, or some original presence.80

In the third place, representation is the novel method of creating colonial modernity's distinctive apprehensions of space and time. What distinguishes the experience of modernity is not simply, as we suggested above, its sense of contemporaneity. It is not just a particular effect of shared presence within a common social space, the homogenous space of the nation or the West. What is distinctive is that such contemporaneity or presence is an effect that can be rendered up to experience only through the structure of a replication—through a representation of the social, a mapping of the nation, a narrative of its history, a set of statistical images, or the varieties of representational practice that structure modern politics. It occurs only as something staged. This, it should be noted, is a somewhat different formulation from those, such as David Harvey, who follow Henri Lefebvre and discuss modernity in terms of changing ways in which space is produced. In *The Condition of Postmodernity*, Harvey analyzes the history of capitalism in terms of increasing speeds of communication and the increasing physical space that technology can control. He calls this changing power over time and space a process of "space-time compression" and analyzes the shift from modernity to postmodernity as the transition of this process to a new stage.81 Such arguments capture much of the dynamic of recent history. Yet they overlook what is most
distinctive in the modern, a difference on which the new compression of space and time depends: what occurs is not simply a change in the way space and time are produced but the production of the apparent difference between space (or time) and its representation. Modern social and political practice realizes a distinction between what might now be called not only "abstract empty time" but also "abstract empty space" and its meaning. This distinction makes space and time appear for the first time as inert, contentless scales or dimensions. As mere scales or frames, they can then be made to compress, expand, or speed up, and to carry different meanings.

Modernity, we have said, seems to form a distinctive time-space, appearing in the homogenous shape of the West and characterized by an immediacy of presence that we recognize as the "now" of history. This time and space are the products of an endlessly replicating system of representation. Modernity's present is not that immediate experience of the real imagined by phenomenology but a present displaced and replayed through the time lag of representation. Its location is not the plenitude of immediate surroundings but the homogenous, empty coordinates produced in the modern diagramming and programming of space. Capitalist modernity reproduces social worlds whose characteristic historical immediacy and spatial extension are generated only through their proliferating forms of representation, that is, through forms of replay, replication, and staging.

What conclusions can we draw from this for thinking about the place in modernity of the non-West? If modernity is not so much a stage of history but rather its staging, then it is a world particularly vulnerable to a certain kind of disruption or displacement. No representation can ever match its original, especially when the original exists only as something promised by a multiplicity of imitations and repetitions. Every act of staging or representation is open to the possibility of misrepresentation, or at least of parody or misreading. An image or simulation functions by its subtle difference from what it claims to simulate or portray, even if the difference is no more than the time lag between repetitions. Every performance of the modern is the producing of this difference, and each such difference represents the possibility of some shift, displacement, or contamination.

Once one places at the center of an understanding of modernity the process of representation and insists upon the importance of displacement, deferral, and delay in the production of the modern, the
non-West emerges as a place that makes possible the distance, the difference, and the time lag required for these forms of displacement. In Bhabha's analysis, the non-West is not a place that is entirely outside the West, not a site of pure difference. The difference between West and non-West must be constantly produced, through a process of disavowal, "where the trace of what is disavowed is not repressed but repeated as something different—a mutation, a hybrid." The hybrid forms of colonial modernity return to disrupt the West's claim to originality and authority, disturbing it with "the ruse of recognition."83

Modernity must be staged as that which is singular, original, present, and authoritative. This staging does not occur only in the West, as we saw, to be imitated later in the non-West. Its authority and presence can be produced only across the space of geographical and historical difference. It is this very displacement of the West that enables modernity to be staged as "the West." If colonial modernities often prefigure the emergence of modern forms and programs in the West, as I suggested at the start of this chapter, their significance is not in enabling us to revise the narrative of the West and to provide an alternative history of origins and influences. Nor should a more global view of the modern encourage us to talk simply of alternative modernities, in which a (fundamentally singular) modernity is modified by local circumstances into a variety of cultural forms. As with the discussion of different paths of capitalist development, the pluralist language of alternative modernities always presupposes an underlying unity in reference to which such variations can be discussed. Rather, the significance of allowing the non-West to disrupt the history of the West is to show that the West has no simple origin, despite its claims to uniqueness, and its histories cannot adequately be gathered into the form of a singular narrative. It is not that there are many different modernities, any more than there are many different capitalisms. Modernity, like capitalism, is defined by its claim to universality, to a uniqueness, unity, and universality that represent the end (in every sense) of history. Yet this always remains an impossible unity, an incomplete universal. Each staging of the modern must be arranged to produce the unified, global history of modernity, yet each requires those forms of difference that introduce the possibility of a discrepancy, that return to undermine its unity and identity. Modernity then becomes the unsuitable yet unavoidable name for all these discrepant histories.
The Double Difference
The limits to this process of displacement and rearticulation are likely to be as varied as the political and discursive contexts in which the modern is produced. To conclude, however, I want to argue that the staging of modernity is characterized by another kind of limit, one that is not related to specific discourses but to a more general way, within the worlds of modernity, in which systems of meaning are produced. Oppositional discourse must intervene in a field already shaped by the highly mobile powers of government that mark out the terrain of modern politics. But this is also a terrain shaped, as I have suggested, by the distinctly modern techniques of representation. These techniques define not only the ground over which modern politics will be fought but also the nature of its objects.

We can take the example of colonial medical practice, which Gyan Prakash discusses in his essay (see chapter 8), to examine what this means. Colonial power defines the body as an object of hygienic regulation and medical intervention, Prakash argues, a body that is marked by its difference from indigenous discursive treatments of the person. But one could add that this process also creates what appears as a second form of difference: the new difference between "the body itself" and its meanings. Modern medical practice creates a network of significations in terms of which the body can be diagnosed, monitored, and administered. Other forms of biopower produce further representations of the body. Schooling, public health, economic planning, industry, and the labor market each develop their systems of measurement and evaluation, all seeming to refer to the same object. This proliferation of representations produces numerous different images of the body but also produces something further: the apparent distinction between the body and its image. The very multiplication of significations generated by modern governmental power, each presented as a mere representation of the same physical body, appears to establish the object quality of the body. This is a modern effect, presenting the body as an inert, material object, not possessed of any inherent force or significance. The difference between the body and its meanings will be increasingly accepted as the fundamental difference, and political debate will begin to occur only between alternative representations of the body. The debate will come to accept the underlying assumption of capitalist modernity—that social reality is to be ordered according to the principle of representation.
The production of modernity involves the staging of differences. But there are two registers of difference, one providing the modern with its characteristic indeterminacy and ambivalence and the other with its enormous power of replication. The modern occurs only by performing the distinction between the modern and the non-modern, the West and the non-West, each performance opening the possibility of what is figured as non-modern contaminating the modern, displacing it, or disrupting its authority. But the performance of modernity also stages the difference between what is staged and what is real, between representation and reality. The effect of this staging is to generate a new world of multiple significations and simulations. But its more profound effect is to generate another realm that appears to precede and stand unaffected by these proliferating signs: reality itself—what now appears as a material order that preexists the constitution of the social, an order that is only reflected by the processes of signification, never shaped by them.

This effect of the real will appear, as we have suggested, in the difference between the "physical" body and the meanings through which biopower organizes its management. It is in this sense that biopower does not simply provide new significations for the body but produces the body. In the staging of modernity, however, the real will be produced in countless other ways as well. What will appear especially real is the modern production of the social as a spatial object. Just as medical practice produces the modern difference between the body as physical object and its meanings, other social practices of modernity establish what appears as the difference between physical space and its representation. The closed, imaginary space of the modern nation-state is produced through forms of mapping, boundary making, border control, and the management of cultural forms and economic flows that create what Thongchai Winichakul calls the "geo-body" of the nation. Like the medical body, the geo-body appears as a physical object that preexists its social constitution, rather than as the effect of a process of difference. This process is also at work in the cadastral surveys and legal arrangements that produce the modern institution of landed property, understood not as a network of social relations among multiple claimants to the land's productivity but as an individual right over a physical object.

This brings us back to the theme with which we began: the spatialization of modernity. Even in some of the most critical studies of
modernity, the geography of the modern is not in question. Modernity is staged as the West, and each account of the modern and the post-modern reenacts this staging. We have argued that this is only a particular representation, produced out of an imperial past and present, eliding the role of the non-West in the production of the West and ignoring the constant displacements involved in staging the difference between the two. But we have concluded by suggesting a further problem with this spatialization of the modern and a reason for its persistence. Modernity presents not only a particular version of the production of space, a particular image of the spatial order. The modern is produced as the difference between space and its representation. It is not a particular representation of space that characterizes the production of the modern but the organization of reality as a space of representation. The questioning of modernity must explore two forms of difference, both the displacements opened up by the different space of the non-West, and the ways in which this space is made to appear different. Modernity is the name we give the stage where this double difference is performed.

Notes


The beginnings of English literature have also been traced in another imperial context—the English subjugation of Scotland in the eighteenth century. See Robert Crawford, Devolving English Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), and Robert Crawford, ed., The Scottish Invention of English Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).


25. Fredric Jameson, “Secondary Elaborations,” in *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 297–418. In this essay Jameson repeats his argument that postmodernism is “a situation in which the survival, the residue, the holdover, the archaic, has finally been swept away without a trace. . . . Everything has reached the same hour on the great clock of development or rationalization,” but then adds “(at least from the perspective of the ‘West’).” For an exploration of this note of uncertainty, see Santiago Colás, “The Third World in Jameson’s *Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*,” *Social Text* 31/32 (1992): 258–70.


34. Ann Stoler and Fred Cooper also caution against the tendency to homogenize the diverse experiences of colonialism and to overlook its tensions, limitations, and contingencies, in an excellent review of recent writing on colonialism and empire: “Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda,” in Cooper and Stoler, eds., *Tensions of Empire*, 1-56.


37. The classic twentieth-century statement of the economic significance of Atlantic slavery to the development of industrial capitalism in Britain is Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944). Revisionist works of the 1970s and 1980s disputed the argument that colonies and colonial trade
made a decisive contribution to Britain's industrialization, especially Paul Bairoch,
"Commerce international et genèse de la révolution industrielle anglaise," Annales 28
104 (July-August 1977): 25–93. For a review of these debates, see Seymour Drescher,
"Eric Williams: British Capitalism and British Slavery," History and Theory 26 (1987),
180–96. Robin Blackburn has recently refuted the revisionists, arguing that slave pro-
duction in the Caribbean "decisively advanced" the process of capitalist industrializa-
tion in Britain (The Making of New World Slavery, 509–80, quotation from p. 572). See
also Stinchcombe, Sugar Island Slavery. On earlier attempts to explain the theoretical
place of slave economies in the development of capitalism, see J. Banaji, "Modes of
Production in a Materialist Conception of History," Capital and Class 7 (1979): 1–44.
On the larger problem of Eurocentrism in economic history, see J. M. Blaut, The
Colonizer's Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History
(New York: Guilford Press, 1993), and Frank, ReOrient, 258–320.

38. Mintz, Sweetness and Power, 59–61; emphasis in original.
39. Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (New York:
40. Marx, Capital, 1:669–70.
41. The presenting of contemporary differences as the simultaneous existence of dif-
ferent stages of a single history was elaborated in twentieth-century Marxism in formul-
ations such as Trotsky's "combined and uneven development" and Ernst Bloch's "si-
multaneity of the non-synchronous." For the latter, see his "Nonsynchronism and
42. Marx, Capital, 1:667.
43. The initial discussion of the original accumulation of capital (ch. 27), on the be-
ginnings of agrarian capital in the clearing of the agricultural population from the land,
continues at first to focus on England. But here too the real significance of these devel-
opments can only be found in colonial developments—the colonization of Ireland and,
especially, Scotland. What the removal of the population "really and properly signifies,
we learn only in the promised land of modern romance, the highlands of Scotland.
There the process is distinguished by its systematic character . . . [and] by the magnitude
of the scale on which it is carried out at one blow" (ibid., 1:681).
44. Ibid., 1:703.
45. Ibid., 1:676.
46. Ibid., 1:703. On "the state power," see also Karl Marx, "The Civil War in
France: Address of the General Council," in The First International and After, vol. 3 of
Political Writings, ed. with an introduction by David Fernbach (New York: Vintage,
47. Marx, Capital, 1:712, 705, 706.
48. Ibid., 1:703.
Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (New York: Verso, 1990), 3–85. For par-
ticular developments of Laclau's argument about capitalism, see J. K. Gibson-Graham,
"Identity and Economic Plurality: Rethinking Capitalism and 'Capitalist Hegemony',
Mitchell, "The Market's Place," in Directions of Change in Rural Egypt, ed. Nicholas
S. Hopkins and Kirsten Westergaard (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1998),
19–40. Major contributions to the question of writing post-Marxist history include
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography," in
Selected Subaltern Studies, ed. Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (New


52. Prakash, “Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World,” and “Can the ‘Subaltern’ Ride?”


58. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 22-36.


60. Bergson, Time and Free Will, 237.

61. Ibid., 110, 99.

62. For an examination of social practices that give rise to the new apprehension of time as a pure medium of consciousness, see Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, 73, 120.


64. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 246.

65. Ibid., 244.


69. Mitchell, Colonising Egypt.

70. See Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, ch. 1, for a further development of this argument, which draws, inter alia, on the work of Martin Heidegger, especially "The Age of the World Picture," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), and also the work of Jacques Derrida, beginning with Speech and Phenomena (Evanston, III.: Northwestern University Press, 1973).


74. Dipesh Chakrabarty, "Witness to Suffering: Domestic Cruelty and the Birth of the Modern Subject in Bengal," this volume, ch. 3.


76. Marx, Capital, 1:76.

77. Ibid., 1:77.

78. Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International (New York: Routledge, 1994), 160. Derrida's writing aims to show how the possibility of exchange, of value, and of meaning itself is always already present in the occurrence of any object and is therefore part of the condition of possibility of the appearance of an object world. However, he limits his dismantling of this metaphysics of presence largely to the writing of literature and philosophy, seldom examining the larger texts of the social world. He therefore offers no investigation of ways in which the reorganizing of the social world as a system of representation in the projects of colonial modernity has extended and reinforced but perhaps also made more vulnerable the Western metaphysics of presence. For an exploration of these questions, see Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, chs. 1, 5, and 6. On Derrida and Marx, see the insightful analysis of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Limits and Openings in Marx and Derrida," in Outside in the Teaching Machine (New York: Routledge, 1993), 97-119.

79. This argument about representation has been so frequently misunderstood that it is worth repeating here that I am not making some "postmodernist" claim that the real world does not exist. Such a simple dogma would leave the metaphysics of terms like "real" and "exist" unexamined. My argument is that in the modern world the real is increasingly rendered up to experience through binary strategies of representation, in which reality is grasped in terms of a simple and absolute distinction between the real and its image. Yet a rigorous ethnography of these strategies shows that the image is never just an image but is infiltrated and undermined by elements that belong to what is called the real world. And conversely, that what we call the real never stands alone but occurs in relationship to and is continually compromised by the possibility of representation. The problem of modernity is not so much, in Latour's terms, that "we have never been modern" (because, as he argues, the distinction between real and representation that defines the experience of modernity was never successfully established). The problem is to understand, given this failure, what forms of social arrangement have
persuaded us to believe in such a simple metaphysics. It is this arrangement and meta-
physic that I refer to here as representation and elsewhere have called "enframing" (see
Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, trans. Catherine Porter [Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1993], and Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*).

80. The argument is frequently made that post-structuralist analyses of the cultural 
aspects of modernity cannot be extended to the "more concrete" political forms of 
modern society, because of a fundamental difference between texts and institutions. 
Peter Dews, for example, argues that "institutions are not simply textual or discursive 
structures" but form a "non-textual reality . . . traversed by relations of force" (*Logics 
of Disintegration: Post-Structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory* [London: 
Verso, 1987], 35). I would argue that any adequate understanding of capital, the state, 
or any of the other "more concrete" institutional forms of modern politics must address 
the techniques of difference that make possible the very appearance of what we call 
institutions. For a development of this argument in relation to the modern state, see 
Timothy Mitchell, "The Limits of the State," *American Political Science Review* 85 
(1991): 77-96; see also Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, "Beyond the Positivity of 

81. Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1991); 
David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, 201-323.

82. Cf. Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*.

83. Bhabha, "Signs Taken For Wonders," in *The Location of Culture*, 111, 115.

84. Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of the Nation* 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994).

85. See Timothy P. Mitchell, "Making Space for the Nation State," in *Colonialism, 
Postcolonialism, and the Production of Space*, ed. Derek Gregory and Daniel Clayton 